Nature conservation on private land: Civil Society
Nature Reserves in Valle del Cauca*
Conservación de
la naturaleza en propiedad privada: las Reservas Naturales de la Sociedad Civil
en el Valle del Cauca
Conservação da natureza em propriedade privada: As Reservas Naturais da
Sociedade Civil no Valle del Cauca
Melissa Quintero López**
Fabio Alberto Arias Arbeláez***
Date of reception: 3 August 2015
Date of approval: 9 December 2015
Abstract
Civil Society Nature Reserves in Colombia play an
important role in the conservation of ecosystems. This paper investigates why
the owners of private areas in Valle del Cauca preserve nature on their properties.
Among the explanations considered are the economic theories of rational choice
and reciprocal altruism, as well as the theory of cultural value orientations which
comes from social psychology. It was found that the predominant reasons for the
establishment of nature reserves are self-interest and an appreciation of
nature on the part of land owners.
Keywords: Nature conservation, Civil Society Natural Reserves, incentives,
rational choice, altruism, cultural value orientations.
JEL: Q21, Q24
Resumen
Las
Reservas Naturales de la Sociedad Civil en Colombia cumplen un papel importante
en la conservación de ecosistemas. En este trabajo se investiga por qué los dueños
de áreas privadas en el departamento del Valle del Cauca conservan la
naturaleza en sus propiedades. Se consideran las explicaciones entre la teoría
económica de la elección racional, la teoría económica sobre los
comportamientos altruistas y recíprocos y la teoría de la psicología social
sobre los valores de orientación cultural. Se encuentra que las razones
predominantes para la conformación de las reservas naturales son el interés
propio y la valoración de la naturaleza por parte de sus dueños.
Palabras clave: conservación
de la naturaleza, Reservas Naturales de la Sociedad Civil, incentivos, elección
racional, altruismo, valores de orientación cultural.
Resumo
As Reservas Naturais da Sociedade Civil na Colômbia
têm um importante papel na conservação dos ecossistemas. Este artigo investiga
por que os proprietários de áreas privadas, no estado do Valle del Cauca,
preservam a natureza em suas propriedades. Explicações entre a teoria econômica
da escolha racional, teoria econômica sobre o comportamento altruísta ou
recíproco e a teoria da psicologia social sobre os valores de orientação
cultural são consideradas. As razões predominantes para a criação de reservas
naturais são o auto-interesse e a apreciação da natureza de seus proprietários.
Palavras chave: Conservação da Natureza, Reservas Naturais da
Sociedade Civil, incentivos, escolha racional, o altruísmo, valores de
orientação cultural.
INTRODUCTION
In Colombia, there are different mechanisms for
private nature conservation, but the only one that has legal recognition is the
Civil Society Nature Reserve. This legal form was born from the demands and
initiatives of property owners who conserved nature privately on their land and
demanded recognition for their actions on the part of the nation. Civil Society
Nature Reserves are therefore, private properties where conservation measures
and methods of sustainable production are carried out, which were registered
before the Unidad Administrativa Especial del Sistema de Parques Nacionales
Naturales de Colombia (Special
Administrative Unit of the System of Natural National Parks of Colombia). This
is the unit in charge of managing all the protected areas in the country (public
as well as private). The reserve owners carry out an important task, in
complement to the state, which is very important for the conservation of
resources that the government is not protecting.
Like in most countries, in Colombia, a large part of
the territory is in the hands of private owners and for that reason, private
conservation is important. Not all land owners decide to conserve, as the uses
they make of their lands are diverse. The different alternative uses that can
be made of properties, the fact that the owners of Civil Society Nature Reserves
decide to register their property before the state, and the need for more
private conservation areas, makes the analysis of this situation relevant. In
this paper, the reasons why the owners of private plots decided to conserve
nature on their properties and turn them into Civil Society Nature Reserves is
explored.
Because of various limitations it is not possible to
cover the whole country, although Colombia has Civil Society Nature Reserves in
most of its departments. In this work it was decided to carry out the study in
the department of the Valle del Cauca, which one of the pioneering departments
in conservation. In the Valle del Cauca there are more than sixty registered
Civil Society Nature Reserves and there are many properties where conservation
work and sustainable production is realized but are not registered. The
department also has various non-governmental organizations that look after
conservation and support reserve owners in the implementation of projects with
goals of environmental protection and sustainable production.
There is no single theory that provides an explanation
as to why people decide to conserve on their properties and form a Civil
Society Nature Reserve. Therefore, the incentives for private conservation that
exist in Colombia are explored and three theoretical lines of thought are put
forward that offer different explanations for such a decision. The first theory
put forward is the economic theory of rational choice, the second is the
economic theory of the private provision of public goods and
non-self-interested behavior, and the last perspective considered comes from
social psychology and is the theory of cultural value orientations.
The methodological approach of the study is
explanatory and deductive. From the theories explored in the theoretical
framework and the information on the rights of and incentives for Civil Society
Nature Reserves, some hypotheses were proposed, and then contrasted with the
compiled information. In such a way, the research also involved an empirical
approach. For the collection of data, a sample of Civil Society Nature Reserves
was chosen in accordance with the saturation criterion. The instrument chosen
for compiling information is a semi-structured interview. Finally, the results
are presented, an analysis of the compiled data is outlined which aims to
contrast the formulated hypotheses.
BACKROUND OF THE
PRIVATE CONSERVATION OF NATURE
Below, the object and area of study of this
investigation is presented: the Civil Society Nature Reserves in the Valle de
Cauca Department. As an introduction to the subject, a brief illustration of
private conservation in both America and Colombia is shown; the way in which
the legal form of the Civil Society Nature Reserve came into being is described
as well the importance of these areas for the country. Later, the area of
study, the department of Valle de Cauca, its environmental conditions and the Civil
Society Nature Reserves that exist in the department are introduced. Finally,
the incentives and rights that the owners of Civil Society Nature Reserves have
in order to conserve on their properties are dealt with.
Private
conservation in America
Private conservation in America is something that has
gained strength as an alternative way of conserving nature. The lack of public
protected areas to prevent degradation and the growing interest of civil
society in participating in the conservation of biodiversity, has influenced
the growth of private conservation areas in the region. According to Chacón
(2008), this interest of civil society in participating in the conservation of
nature is not new, but rather forms part of the traditional sustainable
practices of the original peoples. However, according to Monteferri and Coll
(2009), private conservation in America initially arose in the north, with the
conservation of private lands under the name of easement contracts, voluntarily
agreed to by the owners of those lands who sought to limit exploitation and
developments rights on their properties. There are currently individual and
community owners, conservation networks and systems in the majority of American
countries.
Monteferri and Coll (2009) indicate that in Latin America
nature conservation incentives have been outlined and implemented in different
forms. They have been implemented voluntarily as well as imposed, with or
without the support of the state, and in some cases with the support of various
NGOs. According to these authors, Brazil is a pioneering country in including
this concept as a conservation alternative in its legislation. It has the
strong backing of the civil society and more than 1,500 private protected areas
recognized by the government. Colombia also has a large number of such areas
and a legal form that is recognized by the state. In Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia
and Peru there has been little support from the state but they have managed to
develop small, but significant conservation systems. In French Guyana
conservation on private lands has been imposed by the state.
Private
conservation in Colombia
Private conservation in Colombia arose from the
initiatives of land owners who voluntarily decided to conserve nature and
implement sustainable practices of production on their plots. For more than two
decades, with the increase of private conservation plots and the collective
organization of some of those owners in a network called Resnatur, the need for
a legal form that would protect the conservation initiatives was put forward.
With Law 99 of 1993, the owners belonging to the Resnatur network got the state
to implement a legal form for private nature conservation plots. The legal
category implemented by the state is the Civil Society Nature Reserve (RNSC by
its acronym in Spanish), defined as:” … the part or all of the area of a
property which conserves a sample of a natural ecosystem and is managed under
the principles of sustainability in the use of the natural resources” (Law 99 of
1993, art. 109).
Ocampo (2010) highlights that with the legal category
of Civil Society Nature Reserve it was sought that the state recognized the
contribution of civil society to conservation and supported these initiatives.
Escobar and Solano (2009) indicate that the
conservation models and functions vary between reserves according to the actors
involved and their interests. According to these authors, reserves can be the
property of an NGO, family, business or can be community owned. As well as being
dedicated to conservation, the reserves can carry out other activities, such as
eco-tourism, environmental education, sustainable production systems, research
and permanent habitation. In Colombia, the institution in charge of both
private and public protected areas is the National Natural Parks of Colombia.
According to information from this entity, available on its web page, the
number of registered Civil Society Nature Reserves in the entire country, as of
2011, was 275.
Area of study:
the department of Valle de Cauca, Colombia
The department of Valle del Cauca, 63 Civil Society
Nature Reserves had been registered by the year 2014 (CVC, 2014a). There are
also private conservation areas in the department that have not yet been
registered or are in that process, which is why it is estimated that there are
many more such areas. There are Civil Society Nature Reserves in 14
municipalities of the department, with Versalles, El Cairo and Dagua being
those with the most reserves and Cali, Sevilla and Palmira with the least. In
Figure 1, the number of Civil Society Nature Reserves per municipality can be
seen.
Figure 1. Registered Civil Society Nature Reserves per municipality
Source: elaborated by the author
based on data supplied by the National Natural Parks of
Colombia (2014a, 2014b, 2014c)
The characteristics, functions and objectives of
conservation vary in each reserve according to geographical conditions and the
interests of its owners. In the department, there are reserves as small as 0.16
hectares in the municipality of Bolívar, up to 269,838 hectares in the Dagua
municipality. The municipalities with the greatest total number of privately
conserved hectares (the sum of the hectares of registered Civil Society Nature
Reserves in the municipality), are Dagua, Tuluá, El Cerrito and Versalles. In
Figure 2 the total of conserved hectares per municipality can be seen. The
conservation objectives consist, in general, of preserving the natural
ecosystem present within the reserve, although some reserves specifically
protect some species of plant or animal that is characteristic of the area and is
under threat.
The type of ecosystem of the majority of the Civil
Society Nature Reserves in the department is Andean and sub-Andean jungle. In
municipalities like El Cerrito, El Cairo, Bugalagrande, Versalles, Calima, and
Yumbo, among others, this kind of ecosystem can be found. In the municipality
of Dagua, a very special type of ecosystem can be found, sub- xerophytic. For this reason, the reserves located in this municipality
hold great importance in the protection of this unique ecosystem of the Andean
zone. One of the greatest contributions of the Civil Society Nature Reserves is
the protection of the regions water supply, as the majority of Civil Society
Nature Reserves protect springs, streams and watersheds.
Figure 2. Number of hectares of private conservation (RNSC) in
each municipality.
Source: elaborated by the author based on data supplied by
the CVC (2014b)
Rights and
incentives of Civil Society Nature Reserves
In Decree 1996 of 1999, which regulated articles 109
and 110 of Law 99 of 1993 on Civil Society Nature Reserves, the rights of the
owners who turn their plots into Civil Society Nature Reserves were
established. These rights are; participation rights in the planning processes
of development programs, the right of prior consent for the carrying out of
public investments that affect the Civil Society Nature Reserve and the right
to incentives. Regarding incentives, the decree establishes that the national
government as well as territorial entities, should create incentives directed
towards the conservation on the part of the owners of the Civil Society Nature Reserves
RNSC (Decree 1996, art.11, 12, 13,14).
The decision to privately conserve is beneficial for the country,
however, not all private owners decide to conserve. In this sense, the owners
of Civil Society Nature Reserves make a very particular
decision; to conserve on their properties as opposed to the diverse alternative
uses. These owners must have had some kind of incentive or motivation which led
them to make this decision and to carry out conservation on their plots. Why do
they conserve natural areas on their properties? Why do they register them as Civil
Society Nature Reserves? Why do they not make some other use of their
properties? Are there incentives for private nature conservation in the
department of Valle de Cauca and in Colombia? What are the motives that led
these agents to conserve on their properties?
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
No sole method of addressing the topic is put forward,
as none of the theories offer a complete explanation of why individuals decide
to conserve. Of the theories considered, two pertain to the economic field of
research and one to that of social psychology. The first theory contemplated is
the economic theory of rational choice. This theory suggests that individuals
would conserve nature because it offers them individual usefulness. The second
is the economic theory of non-self-interested behavior, individuals’ decisions
can be for other reasons than personal interest. This idea also covers the
personal provision of public goods, altruistic and reciprocal actions, among
others, which can be considered like donations or voluntary contributions to
the public good. The final theory considered comes from social psychology, the
theory of cultural value orientations, proposed by Schwartz (2006, 2007). This
theory proposes that societies have some determined cultural value orientations
which explain the behavior of individuals.
Rational and selfish agents
From the theory of rational choice (Pindyck & Rubinfeld,
2013; Varian, 1993), the decision to conserve can be regarded as a decision of
consumption, as a problem of the maximization of individual utility (Field
& Azqueta, 1996; Kolstad, 2000; Hanley & Barbier, 2009). From this
perspective, conserving nature can be analyzed as a consumption choice, that is
to say, individuals, as well as consuming common goods, also consume a good
called nature. Nature, like other goods, provides use to the individual and is
preferred over other goods. The conservation of nature therefore corresponds to
a decision in favor of individual interest. This approach presents some
questions: Do the individuals who make the decision to conserve nature view it
as a decision of consumption? Does nature constitute a good that these
individuals can get use from?
From the perspective of rational choice, Hardin (1968)
and Olson (1999) propose the inability or difficulty in finding a social
agreement in order to reach common wellbeing coming from individual interests. For
their part, in Ostrom (2000) and Ostrom et
al. (2002), it is noted that such a coordination is possible through the
formulation and putting into practice of rules that regulate the use of and the
interaction between community members. It is considered important to mention
the rapid way in which the theory of rational choice has widely studied the
goods of common use. Nevertheless, the lines of study regarding the
environmental goods mentioned do not suggest a way of analyzing why people
conserve natural areas on their properties.
Beyond the
assumption of self-interested individuals
Conserving nature on private property may not only
correspond to a decision of self-interest. It can involve concern for the
wellbeing of others, which is to say, a decision that seeks to benefit not only
the individual, but also other people or the community. Non-self-interested
actions, decisions and behaviors, are not analyzed in the rational choice
economic model. However, for a couple of decades some researchers in this field
have been interested in modelling and studying them. The different analyses put
forward suggest as behaviors non-self-interested, altruistic, reciprocal,
prosocial, among others.
Social interactions influence people’s behavior and
decisions. Becker (1974) was one of the
pioneers in trying to incorporate non-selfish behaviors and what he called
social interactions into modern economic theory. According to this author, the
personal characteristics of other people affect usefulness and income, for
example, the good actions of one person give an incentive to others to behave
in the same way. More recent works analyze non-selfish behaviors as a type of
preference called “social preferences,” which in its most simple version is
described as an individual interest in the wellbeing of other individuals as
well as one’s own interest. In this sense, social preferences, according to
Cabrales and Ponti (2011) are interdependent; individuals take the preferences
of others into account as well as their own preferences.
Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) suggest that there are
diverse types of social preferences; reciprocal preferences, pure altruism, an
aversion to inequality and envy. Reciprocal preferences describe individual
behaviors in agreement with the actions of other individuals, that is to say,
an individual with reciprocal preferences will respond kindly to kind actions
and in a hostile manner to hostile actions. Actions are classified as hostile
or kind depending on the justice or injustice of their consequences or the
intention that motivated them. Pure altruism is a type of social preference
that describes the behavior of individuals who value positively the resources
or profits of other agents, and never carry out actions against those profits.
Pure altruism, in contrast to reciprocity, does not arise in response to
altruistic actions; it is unconditional.
The theory of social preferences, in summary, proposes
that individuals take other people’s preferences and payoffs into account. The
theory of social interactions suggests that individuals take the characteristics
of others into account; both theories propose that individuals do not only have
selfish preferences. For the objective of this paper, it could therefore be
asked, if the individuals who make the decision to conserve on their
territories have social preferences, or can it be assumed that they are
preoccupied by the wellbeing or characteristics of others. In the case that
those people exhibit social preferences, what type of social preferences do
they exhibit? Do they show reciprocal social preferences?
Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) are not the first to
suggest that individuals can behave for reciprocal or altruistic motivations, other
economists have analyzed these motivations. A fundamental determinant of human
behavior is reciprocity. Zamagni (2006) puts forward that the incentive of
reciprocity is a behavioral response to perceived courtesy, in such a way that
transactions between people are bidirectional but voluntary and there are no
expectations of gains. Pure altruism, in contrast to reciprocity, does not
expect bidirectional transactions. This author has been interested in
individual behaviors that benefit social groups and communities, behaviors
known as prosocial (Zamagni, 1995).
Pena and Sánchez (2006) highlight that the prosocial
behaviors described by Zamagni can originate from altruistic and non-altruistic
behaviors. Altruistic behaviors can be motivated by sympathy or duty, while
non-altruistic behaviors can be motivated by social recognition and security
networks, or by institutions of non-voluntary cooperation. In the case of
altruism being motivated by duty, the individuals are motivated by moral
values.
The works cited suggest various significant aspects;
firstly, they recognize the importance and necessity of assuming that
individuals have motivations different to those assumed in the economic model
of rational choice, that is, selfishness or self-interest. Secondly, they
suggest that these motivations follow a preoccupation for the wellbeing of
other individuals or moral behaviors. Thirdly, they agree in that those
motivations are derived from altruism or reciprocity. Fourth, the theory of
social interactions as well as the theory of prosocial behaviors analyze the
case of donations and the possible motivations behind them. These key aspects
identified, a new question arises: How well can this theoretical line of
thought explain the choice to conserve nature on private lands? Can the
decision of private conservation be characterized as prosocial behavior?
Private
provision of public goods
One line of investigation that complements the above
is the private provision of public goods. In the economic field, donations and
voluntary contributions like the private provision of public goods have been
studied. Donations and voluntary contributions are characterized, in general,
by not being exclusive, the contribution of a person confers benefits to a
group. For that reason, Sugden (1984) argues that the goods provided by the
voluntary sector can be catalogued as public goods. Nature conservation can be
cataloged as a task which confers benefits to the society, given that the
maintenance of woods, for example, helps to keep the air clean, and that of
water, helps to maintain water sources. From this perspective it can be put
forward that nature conservation can be seen as a contribution to the public
good. In this section some works on this topic are reviewed.
The majority of works on the private provision of
public goods, analyze the efficiency of said provision or the motivations for
which individuals contribute. One that is often quoted is that of Bergstrom,
Blume and Varian (1986); these authors analyze the private provision of public goods
under a general model, in which individuals have independent preferences, and
are only worried about their private consumption and the total supply of the public
good. The most important results of their research show that only a small group
in society contributes to the public good and that redistributions of income do
not necessarily increase the number of contributors to the public good. They
also show that the contributors will be those with greater wealth, that the
contributors will consume the same amount of the public good as the private and
that the contributions of the government displace private contributions.
The model proposed by Bergstrom et al. (1986) is a classic model of pure altruism. The model of
Becker (1974) of social interactions, mentioned in the previous section, is
also a model of this type. The model put forward by Becker analyzes two special
cases, one is that of donations and the other is that of the redistribution of
income among the members of a family. In the case of donations, Becker proposes
that they can be motivated by the desire to improve the wellbeing of the
recipients, by the desire to avoid the distain of others or by the desire to
receive social acclamations. This author finds that the utility of donors is
positively related to the utility of the recipients, and that increases in the
incomes of the donors would increase their donations.
Explaining voluntary contributions to the public good
from conventional economic theory presents the necessity of resorting to new suppositions.
Sugden (1984) affirms that it is necessary to assume some type of moral behavior
that explains why people are interested in other people. This author finds that
this behavior is reciprocity, and in his work he proposes that reciprocal
motivations in a context of the voluntary provision of public goods, given that
if all individuals contribute, each individual in particular will be obliged to
contribute at least the same. In summary, the models mentioned regarding the
private provision of public goods propose that donations can be seen as private
contributions to the public good or as the provision of a public good.
These theories provide two important contributions to
this work. Firstly, they propose that donations can be seen as the provision of
a public good, and secondly, that this phenomenon needs to be studied.
Therefore, can the choice to conserve nature on private land be considered to
be a voluntary contribution to the environmental public good? Does the choice
to conserve on private properties respond to a desire to improve the wellbeing
of others?
Cultural value
orientations
The choice to conserve nature can be motivated by
different factors to those proposed by economic analysis. From social psychology,
Schwartz (2006) formulates a theory that explains individual or group behaviors
and choices. The theory of Schwartz tries to explain and characterize cultures
or ethnic groups, in accordance with the values emphasized in their way of
life, this is called the theory of cultural value orientations. This author
suggests that individuals belonging to a culture tend to make decisions and
choose ways of life in accordance with the values that prevail in that culture.
The analysis proposed by this author is focused on cultures, societies or
ethnic groups, but, this analysis begins with the individual and for that
reason his theory may serve to understand the motivations or values that
influence their decisions.
Values, according to Schwartz (2007), are desirable
objects which transcend specific situations, which vary in importance and that
serve as guiding principles in people’s lives. Values differ from one another
by the type of motivational goal that they reveal. The theory of cultural value
orientations proposed by this author, poses that there are ten cultural value
orientations, the relevance of which has been empirically proven in different
countries. Those ten values are: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation,
self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity and security
(in Table 1 their definitions can be found).
Table 1. Definition
of cultural value orientations according to the motivational goal that they express
|
Value |
Definition |
|
Power |
Social status and prestige; control or dominance over people and
resources. |
|
Achievement |
Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards. |
|
Hedonism |
Pleasure and sensuous
self-gratification. |
|
Stimulation |
Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. |
|
Self-direction
|
Independent thought and action (i.e., choosing, creating, and exploring). |
|
Universalism |
Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection of the welfare of
all people and of nature. |
|
Benevolence |
Preservation and enhancement
of the welfare of the people with whom one is in frequent personal contact. |
|
Tradition |
Respect, commitment and acceptance
of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide |
|
Conformity |
Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm
others and violate social expectations or norms. |
|
Security |
Safety, harmony and stability of society, relationships and self. |
Source: Schwartz (2007, p. 174
The ten cultural value orientations are grouped into
four dimensions according to their dynamic: self-enhancement,
self-transcendence, openness to change and conservation (Figure 3). Self-enhancement
is opposed to self-transcendence, the first emphasizes self-interest, while the
second emphasizes concern for others. In self-enhancement are grouped the
values of power, achievement and hedonism, and in self-transcendence are
grouped the values of universalism and benevolence. The pursuit of one value
can go against other values, as it can also promote or be complemented by the
pursuit of similar values.
Figure 3. Theoretical
model of the relations between the ten types of cultural value orientations.
Source: Schwartz
(2007, p. 175).
The other
two dimensions also outline opposed orientations. Openness to change promotes
independent action and thought, as well as preparation for new experiences,
while conservation promotes self-restraint, order and resistance to change.
Within openness to change are grouped the values of self-direction, stimulation
and hedonism, and in conservation, the values of security, conformity and
tradition. Schwartz (2007) represents the dimensions of values and those values
are grouped in a circular scheme. In this scheme, the closer
two values are in any direction, the more similar their underlying motivations
are, and the further apart they are, the more opposed their underlying
motivations.
This theory
proposes new analysis alternatives for the choice to conserve nature. Each
dimension can present an analysis alternative. The conservation dimension,
could in principle seem the most adequate for the analysis of this choice,
given that it emphasizes self-restraint and resistance to change. In this
sense, those who choose to conserve nature may do so based on the motivation
that it is an ancient world and it should be preserved. However, why not
consider other types of motivations that can arise from the other three
dimensions? The opposite dimension to conservation, openness to change,
emphasizes preparation for new experiences. In this dimension, the motivation
to conserve would be associated with the creation of a new world to improve.
The dimension of
self-transcendence emphasizes concern for the wellbeing and interests of
others. In this dimension, the choice to conserve can be seen as an action for
improving the wellbeing of everyone. In the opposite analysis, the self-enhancement
dimension, the choice to conserve can be seen as an action for one’s own
wellbeing, people who want to preserve a piece of the world for themselves.
These two last analysis alternatives are similar to those proposed by the
economic theory, self-enhancement can be said to be similar to the search for
individual utility and self-transcendence to altruistic and reciprocal
motivations. The theory of cultural value orientations suggests, therefore, an
analysis alternative that does not contradict the analysis proposed by the
economic theory; rather it is complementary.
None of the theories within the theoretical framework
suggest a single way to analyze or understand the decision to conserve nature
on private properties. Each makes a contribution or shines a light on the
analysis of this phenomenon. Based on this, from each theory a hypothesis can
be extracted as to why individuals decide to preserve nature on their lands or
what the repercussions are of that decision. The questions formulated
throughout the exposition of the different proposed theories, serve to
formulate the hypotheses.
A first hypothesis is formulated from the analysis of
the economic theory of rational choice: individuals choose to conserve on their
properties because the enjoyment of nature creates utility for them. A second
option is that the choice to conserve nature can be seen as the private
provision of a public good that comes from a concern for nature and the
wellbeing of society, and is motivated by altruism or reciprocity. A third
hypothesis, related to the previous, would be that people who choose to
conserve on their properties make that decision in accordance with some
cultural value orientations.
Finally, there is a fourth option that cannot be
dismissed; the incentives that exist for nature conservation. In the previous
section the rights and incentives regarding Civil Society Nature Reserves were
mentioned, and it was said that the state and some NGOs offer incentives for
which individuals’ conserve nature on their private properties. Among the cited
incentives, the exemption from property tax is found to be the most common.
From this, a fourth hypothesis is formulated: people decide to conserve because
there are incentives for it.
METHODOLOGY
The study has an explanatory and deductive approach.
Explanatory studies, according to Hernández, Fernández and Baptista (2003), are
characterized by looking for reasons or causes that provoke certain phenomena.
In general, these studies follow a deductive method, present hypotheses and
contrast them with empirical information. The proposed research explores: the
reasons why natural areas are privately conserved, it presents some hypotheses
for this question based on the theories revised in the theoretical framework
and contrasts the hypotheses with empirical information obtained in the field
work. A defined exercise is put forward, conservation on private properties in
the department of Valle de Cauca is studied, and some cases are selected to be
studied and compared, that is to say, Civil Society Nature Reserves in the
department are selected to be studied. Below, the sample and the information
collection procedure are presented.
For the research, a sample of Civil Society Nature
Reserves located in the Valle de Cauca were selected. The sample was selected
in accordance with the saturation principle. In this type of sample, according
to Vásquez et al. (2006), the
saturation point is reached when the information begins to repeat itself,
becomes redundant and does not offer new aspects. For this, the sample in this
type of research is not constructed in a probabilistic way, nor should it be statistically
representative. The criteria of saturation chosen are: location of the reserve,
area of the reserve and the importance of the municipality where it is located
in terms of the number of reserves registered and the number of hectares
conserved in that municipality.
In accordance with the location criterion, reserves located in
municipalities of the south, center and north of the department were selected. Under
the area criterion, it was sought that large reserves as well as small ones
were represented. In the sample, reserves from 1.87 hectares to 225.28 hectares
are found. The municipalities with the greatest number of registered reserves,
as can be seen in Figure 1, are Versalles and Dagua; for this reason, it was
sought that these two municipalities be represented in the sample. Also, it was
sought that reserves in the municipalities of Tuluá, Cerrito and Dagua be
represented in the sample, as these have the greatest number of hectares
conserved (see Figure 2). In accordance with the criteria, 13 Civil
Society Nature Reserves were selected in the municipalities of Cali, Calima El Darién, Dagua, El Cerrito, Tuluá,
Versalles and Yumbo. It was sought that the selected sample be a good reference
of the Civil Society Nature Reserves in the department of
Valle de Cauca. Also, it was sought that it not only be a good reference of biological
diversity, productive systems and more, but also of the diversity of owners,
their professions and occupations.
An interview was chosen as the data collection instrument. Semi-structured
interviews were carried out, as they allowed the introduction of additional
questions so as to obtain better information. Twelve interviews were carried
out with the owners of the Civil Society Nature Reserves selected in the sample
(see appendix 1[1]). For the realization of interviews, the interviewees
were asked to sign an authorization so that the information could be used in
the study.
In appendix 2 the questionnaire can be found. In the first part of the
questionnaire some questions were formulated for the characterization of the
reserve: the ecosystem, the flora and fauna present, the productive systems,
among other aspects; information that served to complement the characteristics.
In the second, questions that explored the research problem were included. The
questions that make up the second part of the questionnaire were elaborated
from the proposed hypotheses. The basic guide was the cultural value
orientations scheme, which investigates the ten values in Table 1, in four
groups that confront decisions with an individual or social inclination. An
interview based on this approach allows, at the same time, the evaluation of
the theory of choice that assumes self-interest as a prosocial choice, because
they are included in the cultural value orientations approach.
RESULTS: MOTIVATIONS FOR CONSERVING NATURE ON PRIVATE
PROPERTIES
From the theories presented in the theoretical
framework, four hypotheses were formulated. Below, an analysis is presented
based on the information collected in the field work, where each hypothesis is
addressed individually. Initially the hypothesis according to which the people
choose to conserve because there are incentives to do so is dealt with; immediately
afterwards the hypothesis that the individuals conserve in their territories
because it generates utility is analyzed. Then the hypothesis that the
individuals conserve so as to improve social wellbeing because of altruism and
reciprocity and the private provision of the public good is studied. Finally,
the hypothesis is addressed, according to which they choose to conserve in
accordance with some cultural value orientations.
Conservation
incentives
As one of the alternative hypotheses for analyzing the
object of this work it was suggested that the owners of Civil Society Nature
Reserves conserve because there are incentives to do so. The incentives and
rights that are granted to Civil Society Nature Reserves according to the
revised laws and bibliographies, consist of rights of participation in
development programs, the right to prior consent for the implementation of
public investments that affect the reserve and the right to incentives that
should be formulated by the different municipalities. From the information
collected in the interviews it was found that the municipalities in the Valle
de Cauca have not carried out the task of creating incentives for private
conservation. Nevertheless, the CVC, the environmental authority in the
department, and some NGOs have created some incentives for conservation in
certain municipalities.
The only incentive that is granted by some
municipalities in the department, because not all do so, is a reduction of
about 80% of the property tax. Of the 13 reserves interviewed, five have had
their property tax reduced. Among the reserves with reduced property tax, only
two confirm that the amount is significant, as both have more than 100 hectares,
and for this reason the taxes are high. These Civil
Society Nature Reserves are those of
Los Chagualos, located in the municipality of Tuluá,
and El Vesubio, located in El Cerrito. For the Civil Society
Nature Reserve El Tesoro, located in the municipality of
Dagua, the reduction is not significant because the area is small and the taxes
are low. The owners affirm that the paperwork that must be carried out is more
costly than the tax itself. The other two reserves which receive a tax reduction
are located in the municipality of Versalles, and are the Civil Society
Nature Reserves of Villa Manuela and La Huerta-Villa Nueva-El Descanso
respectively.
Three reserves were refused the property tax
reduction. Two of these are located in the municipality of Calima, and one in
Yumbo. The reserves located in Calima belong to the same owner and are called
Moralba and Rondalla. The reserve located in the Yumbo municipality is the
Civil Society Nature Reserve Parque Ecológico Samuel Álvarez. The remaining reserves have not
applied for the property tax reduction or the application is in process.
In some municipalities, the CVC has created incentives
for private conservation (CVC, 2012). In Dagua, the owners interviewed state
that this entity supports them constantly. The CVC offers them support and
supplies so as to erect isolation fences, reforest, protect water, and they
have provided diverse workshops for the implementation of sustainable
techniques in their reserves. In Tuluá, Los Chagualos reserve has benefitted
from various projects that the CVC has implemented in the zone for the
strengthening of conservation areas. In the rest of the municipalities where
interviews were carried out with reserve owners, the CVC has not implemented
incentives and so the owners have not benefitted.
In the municipality of Versalles, the NGO
Corpoversalles has dedicated itself to creating various benefits and incentives
for land owners to conserve. The owners interviewed whose reserves are found in
the municipality of Versalles, state that Corpoversalles has provided them with
education, training, and technical assistance. Another NGO that has been
dedicated to the creation of incentives and benefits for the owners of private
conservation efforts is Resnatur. The owners of the Civil Society
Nature Reserve Refugio Natural Corazones Verdes, located in
the municipality of Yumbo, state that through Resnatur they have received
training in different topics such as sustainable production and organic
agriculture. The NGO has offered them the possibility to carry out an inventory
of the flora and fauna in the reserve that can be uploaded to the data bases of
the Humboldt Institute, as well as other benefits and incentives.
Among the owners interviewed, some indicate that
although they do not receive incentives at the moment, they hope to receive
them in the future. These owners express that they hope for remuneration for
their conservation work and among the reasons for which they conserve is the
possibility of receiving incentives, as is the case of the reserve La Laguna.
Other owners, like the owner of the reserve El Vesubio, declare that they do
not conserve because of incentives, given that the incentives that the state
offer are minimal and that they have other reasons to do so. Nevertheless, all
the owners interviewed, independently of the reasons why they conserve, state
that any potential incentives offered by the state, the CVC or any private
entity are welcome.
Returning to the formulated hypothesis, based on the
interviews carried out, it can be affirmed that in some cases, among the
motivations to conserve lie the incentives, which is consistent with other
cases in Latin America (Langholz et al., 2000). As in the case of the Civil Society
Nature Reserves in Dagua, in the case of the Civil Society
Nature Reserves in Versalles and that of the reserve La Laguna
in Cali, they hope to receive them. The incentives that can be and are received
by the owners, weigh more in the decision to register than to conserve, because
all the interviewed reserve owners carried out conservation actions before
registering their plots as Civil Society Nature Reserves. Many owners registered with the intention of
having their conservation efforts recognized, of being protected in the face of
public investments or projects that could affect them, of working in a team, or
of being supported by incentives, but they already carried out conservation
efforts.
Conservation for
personal wellbeing or for the utility that nature confers
As was presented in the theoretical framework, one of
the proposed hypothesis is that individuals conserve because nature benefits
them. This hypothesis, as was argued, complements or is similar to the
self-enhancement dimension of the theory of cultural value orientations. For
this reason, in this section the hypotheses are addressed together: individuals
conserve for their own wellbeing, because nature benefits them and they conserve
for themselves. From the information obtained in the interviews, it was found
that this hypothesis is perhaps the strongest motivation had by the owners of
the Civil Society Nature Reserves interviewed.
The owners of the Civil Society
Nature Reserves El Cedral, San Antonio, El Vesubio, Rondalla,
Moralba, La Laguna, among others, expressed that they conserve because they are
passionate about nature. They enjoy the space that their reserve provides them,
the vegetation, the fauna, the water, the air, the landscapes, among other
things. For those who live in the reserve, like for some who do not, it
constitutes a space for relaxation, for some a working space and for others a
space for recreation. For the owner of the reserve of Los Chagualos, like many
more, the reserve is their life project, a place where they see their goals and
personal dreams realized, a place that can be enjoyed in the present and in the
future, it is a living place. The owner of the Civil Society
Nature Reserve Tesorito, located in Dagua, stated that their
family had always done conservation work and that they do so out of necessity,
because they foresee that if they use all their land they will not be able to
produce in the future, because if they do not take care of the water they would
not have it in dry periods, especially as they live in a very dry region.
Those that produce on their farms have implemented
sustainable techniques and systems, so that they and their families can continue
to produce in the future. Some of those that produce in their reserves live
from the resources generated from that production, and for that reason they are
very conscious that they must use sustainable management, as is the case of the
reserves located in the municipalities of Dagua and Versalles. For other
owners, the resources generated from their production form part of their
incomes, as is the case of the reserve Los Chagualos, while for other owners
their production does not generate income for their own maintanence, but rather
for that of the reserve itself, as is the case in the reserves El Vesubio and
San Antonio, for which reason they are also very conscious that they should
produce sustainably.
The owners that do not have a sustainable production
are also conscious that if they want to enjoy their space in the future, they
must conserve it. The majority of owners express that they conserve because
they want to enjoy nature in the future, they are guarding a piece of nature
for themselves, as well as for the community, as is the case of the owners of
the Civil Society Nature Reserves Villa Manuela, San Antonio, Refugio Natural Corazones Verdes,
among others. For most owners, being able to conserve nature on their
properties is a personal achievement, is part of their life goals, of their
life projects; many of them have professional and technical careers to do with
the environment.
Therefore, the reserves become, for many, spaces where
they can apply their knowledge, be it for productive activities, ecotourism,
research, education, among other activities; spaces where they enjoy doing what
they like and what they are passionate about. For this reason, it can be
affirmed that perhaps the greatest motivation for which owners’ conserve is because
it benefits them in some way, it gives them personal wellbeing and because they
conserve for themselves. The enjoyment of nature and the ability to do what
they are passionate about on their properties, gives the owners utility. The
different productive systems that they use in their reserves, the activities of
ecotourism and environmental education, benefit the owners, it provides them
with resources for their own maintenance and personal enjoyment. This proposed
hypothesis explains to a large degree why owners conserve, however, other
motivations exist related to the other proposed hypotheses.
Conservation for
altruism or reciprocity
From the economic theories of non-self-interested
behaviors is presented the hypothesis: individuals conserve nature because they
are concerned about the wellbeing of others and of nature; for altruistic and
reciprocal motives. Previously, it was suggested that the self-transcendence
dimension of the theory of cultural value orientations puts forward a similar
analysis that reinforces this hypothesis, and that for this reason it could be
considered that this theory is complementary to the economic one upon
analyzation. The theory of non-self-interested behaviors suggests that the
motivations behind those behaviors are altruism and reciprocity; for this
reason, firstly it will be analyzed if the conservation carried out by the
owners interviewed is motivated by altruism or reciprocity.
None of the owners interviewed conserve for
reciprocity, given that none of them do so because another owner or the state
is doing it. Only one of the owners explicitly states that they conserve out of
altruism, that their family bought the plots where the reserves of Rondalla and
Moralba are located, exclusively for conservation. The owner of these reserves
argues that they do not have money making interests and that they do not carry
out activity on the reserves to generate income, that they conserve because
they were educated with these values and because their family considered it
important to recuperate the tree cover so as to protect the streams on the
plots. This owner states that if it was necessary, they would donate the
property to the state or to some conservation oriented NGO in the zone.
The owner of the Civil Society
Nature Reserves Rondalla and Moralba and their family, have a
foundation that manages solid wastes, provides environmental education, works
in reforestation projects and offers an advisory service in environmental
law. According to the interview carried
out with this owner, it can be discerned that their motives really are
altruistic, as well as, that their economic level is superior to that of the
majority of the owners interviewed. None of the other owners interviewed express
that they conserve for altruistic motives, nor can this be sensed from the
interview, however, all of those interviewed state that they conserve because
the welfare of nature concerns them and that their actions benefit the local
community where their reserves are located, and in general, everyone.
Many of the owners propose that they conserve because
the degradation of ecosystems and the future water supply concerns them. The
owner of the reserve El Cedral, expresses that they conserve because they had
the opportunity to see how the ecosystems have changed and degraded. This owner
is convinced that their actions positively affect the environment. Various
owners argue that conservation efforts also have positive impacts on the
community and fulfill an important social function. The owner of the Civil
Society Nature Reserve Los Chagualos, for example, states that they carry out
important work with the local community, that in their reserve they offer
training for the implementation of sustainable techniques in the locality, and
that from the reserve projects are formulated for the development of the
locality.
Although the conservation efforts of the owners
benefit the community, it cannot be affirmed that they do so because of
altruism or the desire to improve the wellbeing of others, strictly speaking. None
of those interviewed, except for the owner of the Rondalla and Moralba
reserves, would be willing to donate their plot for continued conservation to
some state or private entity and all the owners express that they would share
their property for research but not for any other activity. If the reason for
which they conserve were social wellbeing, the owners would be inclined to say
that they would donate their property, or that they would share it for many
other uses that do not affect the conservation.
Conservation for
cultural value orientations
The theory of cultural value orientations proposes
four approaches for analyzing the choice to conserve nature. Two of the
approaches were already outlined in the previous hypotheses as complements to
the economic theories; individuals conserve for their own wellbeing and
individuals conserve to improve the wellbeing of everyone. With respect to the
first of those approaches it was found that most of the owners conserve for
their own wellbeing because they seek self-enhancement and utility. It was
found that this approach offers perhaps a better explanation of why individuals
conserve.
In relation to the approach that individuals conserve
so as to improve the wellbeing of everyone, it was found that most of the
owners do not do so for this reason, only one owner claims to have this reason.
The two remaining approaches suggest that the choice to conserve nature can be
motivated by the view that it is an ancient world which should be conserved, or
with the view that it is a new world to improve. The first perspective
corresponds to the dimension of values called conservation and the second to
that of openness to change. According to the information collected in the
interviews, the majority of the owners of Civil Society
Nature Reserves are inclined towards openness to change in
order to work to improve the current world.
Only two of the owners interviewed, those of El
Vesubio and La Laguna, expressed that they are inclined towards conservatism. For both owners, the old world was better because
ecosystems were less degraded and population was smaller. The other owners
interviewed are inclined towards openness to change, arguing that currently the
knowledge about biodiversity, environmental degradation and the technologies to
prevent, and to prepare ourselves for climate change, and to implement
sustainable techniques, are available. The owner of El Cedral, for example, proposes that everything has to evolve, that we
have to move forward with modernity, that we have to train and educate
ourselves.
The hypothesis that asserts that individuals decide to
conserve in accordance with some cultural value orientations, captures the
multiple motivations and reasons behind the choice to conserve. This hypothesis
covers the two formulated economic theories and also presents two approaches, offering
the visualization of a complete panorama of the reasons or motivations for
which individuals conserve nature. Nevertheless, we should not fail to mention
that incentives have been determinants for some owners.
CONCLUSIONS
The rights and incentives granted are a determining
factor in the decision to register the plot and in some cases in the decision
to conserve. Most of the owners expressed that they registered as Civil Society
Nature Reserves with the intention of protecting their plot
from investments and private and public projects that can affect them, a right
that they acquire upon registering as a Civil Society
Nature Reserve. These owners also stated that they registered
because they seek support from the state in their conservation efforts. For
them, the rights and incentives were determinants in the decision to register
but not in the decision to conserve, firstly, because they have other
motivations and secondly, because there are no strong incentives to conserve
nature in the department.
For the Civil Society
Nature Reserves in Dagua, Versalles, and Cali, rights and
incentives are a determining factor in the decision to conserve. Although the
owners of these reserves argue that they also have other reasons to do so, the
incentives that they have received from the CVC, in the case of the reserves in
Dagua, and from Corpoversalles, in the case of the reserves in Versalles, have
been important elements that have influenced their decision to conserve and
later to register as Civil Society Nature Reserves. These incentives have been, in Dagua, technical support,
training and different supplies, and in Versalles, environmental education,
training, technical assistance, supplies and materials. In the case of the
reserve La Laguna in Cali, the owner argues that among their reasons for
conserving are the possible incentives that they can receive from the state
(they conserve because they hope they will receive incentives), but until now
they have received none.
Nature conservation for utility, for personal
wellbeing and for oneself, is the strongest motivation that owners have. Most
of them express that they conserve because they are passionate about nature and
their reserve is a space where they can enjoy it. Reserves are for some, their
places of work and living, where they obtain the resources for their own maintenance
and that of their family. For this reason, they are conscious that they must
protect the water, if they want to benefit from it, that they should produce
sustainably, if they want to continue producing in the future, that they should
protect the forests, if they want to enjoy clean air, as well as the diversity
of flora and fauna species. For those
who do not live or work on their reserves, they are still places to enjoy,
relax and apply their knowledge. The reserve is a personal achievement for many
that they hope to enjoy for a long time. It is a way to conserve a piece of
nature for themselves into the future.
None of the owners interviewed conserve because of
reciprocal motives and only one for altruism. The owner that conserves for
altruism does not carry out any activity on the reserve other than
conservation, and if necessary would be willing to donate the property for it
to continue to be preserved. It should be highlighted that this owner has a
higher economic level than most of those interviewed. All the owners argue that
they conserve because the current state of the ecosystems concern them, and
that their actions benefit the community, nevertheless, their decisive
motivation is first and foremost their personal wellbeing. Motivated by
whatever reason, the conservation efforts that they all carry out benefit the
local, regional and global community, and for that reason, it can be affirmed
that they are contributing to the environmental public good.
The dimension of conservation from the theory of
cultural value orientations, which apparently seems to be a strong motivation
for preserving nature, is not. Only two of the owners interviewed claim that
they have a conservative orientation. The rest of those interviewed are
inclined towards the dimension of openness to change, of evolution and
modernity, of preparation in the face of new experiences based of knowledge and
available technologies. The other two dimensions, self-improvement and
self-transcendence were analyzed together with the economic theories of utility,
reciprocity and altruism, respectively. The theory of cultural value
orientations offers an analysis that collects the different motivations and
reasons that the owners have for conservation.
As has been argued, the choice of each owner to
conserve is motivated by different factors. Of the hypotheses proposed, it can
be affirmed that that which states that individuals choose to conserve in
accordance with some cultural value orientations is the best explanation of
these reasons, because it covers various motivations. Among the motivations
that it covers it can be affirmed that conservation for personal wellbeing is
the strongest motivation that owners have. The rights and incentives influence
more the decision to register then the decision to conserve in the majority of
cases.
Acknowledgements
To the Corporación
Autónoma del Valle del Cauca (CVC), for the information and access to
documents so important to carrying out this work well. And to each and every
one of those interviewed from the Civil Society Nature Reserves, as without
their collaboration, it would have been impossible carry out this work.
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APPENDIXES
APPENDIX 1: CIVIL SOCIETY NATURE RESERVES SELECTED FOR SAMPLE AND OWNERS INTERVIEWED
.
|
Civil
Society Nature Reserve |
Municipality |
Corregimiento/Vereda (small territorial division) |
Area |
Name of owner interviewed |
|
La Laguna |
Cali |
La Castilla |
1,87 ha |
Eusebio Angulo |
|
Moralba |
Calima El Daríen |
Berlín |
225,28 ha |
Iveth Katheryne Jaramillo |
|
Rondalla |
Calima El Daríen |
La Cristalina |
13 ha |
Iveth Katheryne Jaramillo |
|
El Tesoro |
Dagua |
Atuncela |
14,96 ha |
Oscar Benavidez Saa |
|
Tesorito |
Dagua |
Atuncela |
30,40 ha |
Leonel Benítez |
|
El Cedral |
El Cerrito |
El Pomo |
38,4 ha |
Alberto Silva Scarpetta |
|
El Vesubio |
El Cerrito |
El Pomo |
138,14 ha |
José Genner Gutiérrez |
|
San Antonio |
El Cerrito |
El Pomo |
44,8 ha |
Francisco Javier Arango |
|
Los Chagualos |
Tuluá |
El Chuzo y El Brasil |
167,33 ha |
María Patricia Mejía |
|
Villa Manuela |
Versalles |
El Balsal |
2,5 ha |
Luis Gerardo Monsalve |
|
La Huerta-Villa Nueva-El Descanso |
Versalles |
El Balsal |
26,4 ha |
Gerardo Antonio Pineda |
|
Parque Ecológico Samuel Alvarez |
Yumbo |
Dapa |
6,46 ha |
Martha Cecilia Cucalón |
|
Refugio Natural Corazones Verdes |
Yumbo |
Dapa |
4,74 ha |
Perla Barba |
APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CHOICE TO CONSERVE
1.
Is the reservation your own or of your family?
2.
Is it your residence?
3.
Do you consider
your reservation a place of recreation?
4.
What do you do
most of the time?
5.
Do
you carry out research activities on your reservation?
6.
Do you depend on the reservation for your
maintenance and that of your family?
7.
Does the reserve generate income or do you have to
use other sources for maintenance?
8.
For what types of activities do you receive income
(sustainable production, ecotourism, environmental education)?
9.
Do you receive financial support from third
parties?
10.
Does the state exempt you from property tax?
11. Does the state
exempt you from income tax generated by ecotourism services?
12. Have you received
subsidies for the improvement of your home or for the construction of tourist
accommodation in your reservation?
13. Have you received financial support for the
restoration of forests, rivers, the implementation of isolation fences, among
other activities, from the CVC, a government entity or an NGO?
14. Do you receive any economic compensation for
environmental services, sustainable production or any other activity?
15. Why did you form your property as a Civil Society
Nature Reserve?
16. Where did the decision to conserve come from?
17. Why do you
consider it important to conserve?
18. What have been the difficulties you
have faced and how have you overcome them?
19. Is the reserve a way of securing a part of nature in
the future?
20. Would you like
your family to continue your conservation work?
21. Do you consider your work to be good
for society?
22. Are you admired
for your work?
23. Do you consider
your work to be a personal achievement?
24. Would you share your ownership in
order to implement conservation and sustainable management activities?
25. Would you donate
your property to the state or an NGO to carry out research, conservation and
sustainable management actions?
26. What is your
perception of the state of today's ecosystems?
27.
From your experience as a protector of nature and
of life, what would you suggest to stop the degradation?
28. Is conserving
your way of contributing to the world?
29. Do you consider
that the old world was better and must be returned to?
30. How do you
relate conservation to the community?
31. How concerned
are you about the welfare of society?
*
A complete version of this study corresponds to the final degree project in
Economics from the Universidad del Valle, written by Melissa Quintero López
directed by Fabio A. Arias.
** Economist, researcher for the Asociación para el Estudio y Conservación de las Aves Acuáticas en
Colombia (Association for the Study and Conservation of Aquatic Birds in
Colombia), Calidris, Cali, Colombia, Postal address: Cra 60a No. 2a -79, Cali,
Colombia. Email address: meli_9224@hotmail.com
***
Economist, Ph.D in Sustainable Development, professor at the Universidad del
Valle, Cali, Colombia. A.A. 25360, Cali,
Colombia. Email address: fabio.arias@correounivalle.edu.co
[1] The sample
is composed of 13 Civil Society Nature Reserves, but two belong to the same
owner, for that reason 12 interviews were carried out.