Gender pay gap in Santander, Colombia
Diferencias salariales por género
en Santander, Colombia*
Diferenças salariais por gênero em Santander, Colombia
Alexandra Cortés Aguilar**
María Alejandra Flórez Vera***
Research Article
Date of reception: 1 September, 2015
Date
of approval: 9 December, 2015
https://doi.org/10.19053/22565779.3891
Abstract
This paper
analyzes the factors that influence hourly wages and their differences
according to gender, for the Department of Santander, Colombia, during the
years 2012 to 2014. Specifically, it explores whether the differential is due
to a discriminatory factor in the labor market of Santander or not, using data
from the Great Integrated Survey of Households, “Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares GEIH”. After the descriptive
analysis of the labor market in Santander, we make econometric estimations
using the Blinder Oaxaca methodology to prove the existence of a discriminatory
component. Results indicate that, for the total sample in the Santander region, between 25 % and
30 % of the wage differentials by
gender are associated with the unexplained discriminatory component.
Keywords:
human capital, gender, salary determinants, salary differences, salary
discrimination.
JEL: C32, J15, J16, J31, J71.
Resumen
Este
trabajo analiza los factores que influyen en el salario por hora y sus
diferencias por género para el departamento de Santander durante los años 2012
a 2014. Específicamente, se explora si dicho diferencial obedece o no a un
factor discriminatorio en el mercado de trabajo santandereano, utilizando los
datos proporcionados por la Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares GEIH. Luego de
presentar un análisis descriptivo del mercado laboral santandereano, se
realizan estimaciones econométricas aplicando la metodología Blinder-Oaxaca
para evidenciar la existencia de un componente discriminatorio. Los resultados
indican que, para el total de la muestra en la región santandereana, entre un 25
% y 30 % de las diferencias salariales por género se asocian al componente
discriminatorio no explicado.
Palabras clave: capital humano, género, determinantes salariales, diferencias
salariales, discriminación salarial.
Resumo
Este artigo
analisa os fatores que influenciam o salário por hora e suas diferenças por
gênero para o departamento de Santander durante os anos de 2012 a 2014.
Especificamente, explora-se se o diferencial obedece ou não a um fator
discriminatório no mercado de trabalho de Santander, utilizando os dados
fornecidos pela Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares, GEIH. Após apresentar uma
análise descritiva do mercado de trabalho de Santander, realizam-se estimações
econométricas aplicando a metodologia de Blinder-Oaxaca para evidenciar a
existência de um componente discriminatório. Os resultados indicam que, para a
amostra total na região de Santander, entre 25% e 30% das diferenças salariais
por gênero estão associadas ao componente discriminatório não explicado.
Palavras-chave: capital humano, gênero, determinantes salariais,
diferenças salariais, discriminação salarial.
INTRODUCTION
After the Second
World War, relevant transformations took place in the economic, social,
cultural, and demographic fields, among others, which brought about changes in
the size, structure, and functional role of households (García, 1989). As from 1945, female participation in the labor
market increased considerably. According to Sivard (1985), between 1950 and
1985, the number of female workers, in developed and developing countries
alike, even doubled. Higher levels of education, urbanization processes and
outsourcing, prevailing in the 20th century, allowed for female
labor participation to go hand in hand with the growth of the services sector,
concentrating women in certain occupations which, in general, were of lower
importance and remuneration than those which concentrated the male population
(García, 1989; Flórez, 2004; Alcañiz, 2012; Guzmán & Torado, 2001).
These
discrepancies in the labor market, in relation to the occupation and remuneration
by sex, motivated the interest of social researchers and its relevance has
increased simultaneously with female participation in the labor market (Brizuela
& Tumini, 2008, Fernández, 2006). Empirical evidence has shown that,
although human capital variables determine the salary level, it is fundamental
to take other non-observable factors into consideration, which may have an
influence on the determination of salaries: sector, occupation or problems of
salary discrimination by group, among others.
In Colombia, female
workforce participation has doubled in the last three decades, mainly because
of the addition of women who are married or in a common-law relationship, and
of women with a low level of education (Peña et al., 2013). However, this
female inclusion in the labor market has been accompanied by significant
inequality as regards work income against the remuneration received by men. At
the same time, at a regional level, in the department of Santander, studies
have been carried out supported by the regional government on the gender gap in
several aspects: education, income, political participation, violence against
women, and sexual and reproductive health. There is evidence of this in the
document called Diagnosis of the gender gap in Santander (Diagnóstico de brecha de género en Santander, 2009), where an
explanatory study was carried out about gender differences. It was the basis
for the Decenial Plan of Equality of Opportunities for Women (Plan decenal de igualdad de oportunidades
sobre la mujer 2010–2019), included in the Development Plan: Inclusive
Santander 2008–2011.
Although it is
acknowledged that it is necessary to promote equitable insertion into the labor
market for men and women, little is known about the labor market in the region of
Santander and the factors that determine workers’ salaries. For this reason,
the aim of this article is to analyze the factors that have an incidence on the
salary levels and their differences by sex for the department of Santander
during the period between 2012 and 2014, using as a source of information the
data base of the Great Integrated Survey of Households (Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares, GEIH, by its acronym in Spanish
and referred to in this way from now one). In the same way, it is sought to
establish the possible existence of salary discrimination, which attributes the
differences in work income to non-observable factors for the population of
Santander. Consequently, the results obtained in this work may act as a
reference for future research which broadens the reach of this study, or else,
as evidence for the implementation of improvements in matters of public policy.
To this end, this document has been divided into five
sections. In the first, there is a summary of the theoretical and empirical
literature about salary determinants and differences, within the framework of
the human capital theory. In the second, the methodology implemented for
determining salaries and their differences is presented. It explains the
equations of Mincer type income and the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (B-O),
simultaneously incorporating the use of Heckman’s (1979) selection bias
correction for the sample. Likewise, the data used for the empirical analysis
is described. In the third section, there is a descriptive analysis of the
labor market in Santander during the period 2012-2014. The results of the
econometric analysis are presented in section four. Finally, the conclusion and
policy recommendations appear in section five.
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND
The neoclassical theory of human capital, salaries and
gender
The study of the
determinants of work income in the labor market is traditional in economic
analysis. The Human Capital Theory (HCT), postulated by Mincer (1958), Shultz (1961) and Becker (1962),
among others, has been the reference par
excellence for the understanding of the determinants of work income, which
records the importance of the investment in human capital, its profitability
and relevance for the analysis of the work income of those individuals who opt
to invest in education. In this theory, education is constituted as a
fundamental variable which affects work income through its effect on
productivity. At the same time, factors such as age, cognitive skills,
experience or family composition contribute to explaining the accumulation of
human capital, its impact on work performance and, therefore, the income of the
individual.
Following this idea, the concept of discrimination by
gender arises in this context as an appendix of studies on salary differences[1]. Notwithstanding,
not every salary differential is a synonym for discrimination, nor is all
discrimination translated into differences in salary (Tenjo, Ribero & Bernat, 2005). Discrimination occurs when two
individuals with the same economic characteristics and abilities perform the
same tasks, but with a different payment and this treatment is systematically
related to certain non-economic characteristics of said individuals (race, sex,
religion, etc.).
The
incorporation of the economic analysis into gender and salary issues started
close to 1930, where aspects such as work outsourcing and task allocation
motivated the study of the causes of salary differences between men and women,
as well as works on domestic production and time use in the 1960s and 1970s
(Benería, 2004; Alcañiz 2012). Moreover, for 1918, the controversy of
determining a person’s salary revolved around conditions of imperfect
competition. However, this approach was replaced by the analysis of perfect
competition within the neoclassical models of discrimination. Thus, after the
Second World War, works on taste-based discrimination carried out by Becker
(1962), and Arrow and Phelps (1972) on statistical discrimination, paid special
attention to the explanation of salary differences attributed to non-observable
factors, stemming from work demand.
According to
Brizuela and Tumini (2008), the feminist perspective advances in the
explanation of the causes that produce the segmentation of the market and the
differences in payment due to gender. In this line of study, gender stereotypes
(positive and negative), which are established in society and spread to
occupations, are analyzed; positive attributes of women regarding care, health,
education, administrative tasks, etc., and other negative attributes in
relation to the adjudication of managerial positions and of technical and
professional qualification. As a consequence, gender roles have played an
important part in the estimation of salaries, and the relation between gender and
salaries has been well studied. The human capital theory will be used as the
basis of this research project. This theory appeared at the end of 1960s, and
it explains the differences as regards work participation and income according
to the productive characteristics of men and women.
Determinants of the differences in salary
As it was
mentioned in the previous section, from the second half of the 20th
century, the human capital theory (HTC) is constituted as the main theoretical
and conceptual instrument in the analysis of the determinants of salary income.
At the same time, HCT takes into consideration other cumulative factors of
human capital which have to do with the personal characteristics of the
individual. Thus, the different types of factors or variables, or both, which
have an influence on individual salary level are highlighted, incorporating the
proposed variables of work environment, such as work position, business size,
seniority, among others. This section summarizes the main variables that
national and international empirical evidence points to as determinants of
salary income.
Individual and
human capital characteristics
According to the neoclassical model of human capital
(Becker, 1964), investment in education positively affects salary; the
individual’s decisions to obtain a higher level of training generate greater
productivity than expected and, therefore, it is expected that income improves
according to the level of education. There is a vast amount of empirical evidence
that supports this hypothesis of a positive correlation between education and
salaries (Carrasco, 2001; Contreras
& Gallegos, 2011; Correa, Viáfara & Zuluaga, 2010; De la Rica & Ugidos, 1995; Guataquí,
García & Rodríguez, 2009; Korkeamäki & Kyyrä, 2006; Kunze, 2005;
Machin & Poani, 2003; Varela et al., 2010).
However, in relation to gender gaps, the same pattern
does not prevail, given that works such as those of Atal, Ñopo and Winder
(2009), for several countries of Latin America, show that although women have,
on average, a higher level of education than men, they receive a lower salary;
that is to say that, the return on education is not valued in the same way.
Specifically, said study found that men earn, on average, 10% more than women
despite their academic achievements. What is even more surprising is that if
women have the same characteristics as men (in particular the same level of
education), the salary gap by gender increases to almost 20%, although results
differ depending on the country. Similar results were found in Argentina and Colombia.
This phenomenon is usually attributed to discriminatory practices which
undervalue the productive role of women. On the other hand, Badel and Peña
(2009) found that returns on education in Colombia have a U shape, mostly
affecting the lowest salaries (sticky floors) and the highest ones (glass
ceilings).
Age is also a
relevant characteristic in determining individual salaries. According to
empirical evidence, age has non-linear effects on salary (Hernández, 1995;
Varela et al., 2010); this means that when age increases, salary increases too,
but to a lower extent, even reaching a point where a higher age may generate a
decrease in salary. Atal et al.
(2009) found that the gender pay gap increases with age, which could be
explained due to a cohort effect or the effect of some non-observable
characteristics, such as experience. On the other hand, experience is a human
capital factor with similar effects to age. As per the ideas of human capital,
when experience increases, salaries increase too, but in a lower proportion.
Drolet (2001), for example, shows that experience explains the 12% salary gap
for the Canadian case; similar to the evidence found in later research projects
(Actis & Atucha, 2003; Contreras & Gallegos, 2011). Similarly, Kunze
(2005) observed the level of income in people with different levels of
experience in Germany, and found a considerable salary gap in their first job,
which remains constant throughout the person’s career. Likewise, the author
determines that there are occupational segregation problems by gender against
women. According to this, salary differences are mainly associated with an
explained component; that is, education and experience, as human capital
determinants play a fundamental role. On the other hand, Hernández (1995)
perceives that as permanence in the last job increases, the relation with
salary becomes more positive, mainly favoring women. This evidence supports the
hypothesis that employment without voluntary interruptions mitigates the
process of salary discrimination, in accordance with Witkowska (2013), who
carried out a similar study in the United States.
Characteristics of the employment
The type of
occupation is a factor of the market labor which, to great extent, has an
influence on salary, given that it is usually related to the problem of
occupational segregation, where men and women are assigned to certain
occupations depending on specific employment characteristics, such as the level
of education, cognitive abilities, physical effort, etc. (Amarante &
Espino, 2004; Cain, 1986). Hernández (1995); Korkeamäki & Kyyrä (2006) and
El-Hamidi & Said (2014) found that there are large salary differences in
workers in managerial and administrative positions, given the disproportionate
concentration of women in work positions with low salaries, mostly attributed
to lower ability and the complex requirements of the work and discriminatory actions. Thus, those
managerial positions where salaries are high are mainly being occupied by male
workers (Esquivel, 2007; Baquero, 2001).
Nevertheless, Tenjo and Herrera (2009), in the study carried out in Colombia, found
that in the case of women, the occupational structure favored them, given that
women are more focused than men on occupations requiring higher levels of qualification
and, therefore, with higher salaries. Notwithstanding, there are cases in which
men as well as women have the same characteristics for carrying out certain
occupations and it is men who receive higher salaries. An example of this is
the work of Urdinola and Wodon (2003), where the massification of the labor supply
leads women to be rewarded with lower salaries, even in better-paid positions.
On the other
hand, according to the structuralist theory of the labor market, the size of
the business is related to the power of the market, education, the formation of
the workers, and the use of technologies. Given the above, the physical capital
of a business is closely related to the human capital of the employees and,
therefore, the productivity of the business. In Colombia, the research project
carried out by Ortiz, Uribe and García (2007) shows significant salary
differences between the formal sector (primary) and the informal sector
(secondary), for the size of the business has a positive and significant impact
on income. Moreover, the authors have concluded that the omission of the
business size, positively biases the impact of education, experience, being the
head of the household, and gender regarding salary payment.
In the same line, according to the structuralist approach, a formal
labor market suggests better payment, given that it has better quality
conditions and characteristics (Uribe &
Ortiz, 2006). As per Piore (1970) and Cain (1986), market segmentation is
closely related to discriminatory processes against minorities. Said authors
found that women or afro-descendent individuals are destined for the secondary
labor market. Deininger, Jin and
Nagarajan (2013), in their study based on the informal labor market in India,
showed that salary discrimination by gender is greater in informal markets than
in formal ones, and so the losses produced by discrimination are higher than
the benefits acquired by putting mitigation policies into effect.
Family characteristics
Family
characteristics are composed of factors that, one way or the other, impact on
the individual’s decisions concerning their participation in the labor market
and the acceptance of certain salary amounts as payment. Fernández (2006)
argues that there are factors, within the families, which are signs of the
commitment to being part of the labor market. Becker
(1985) illustrates that women have greater responsibility in taking care of their
children and that doing household chores may lead to the exclusion of women from
more demanding jobs, or to them dedicating less effort to performing the same
task as men. In that sense, having children is a family factor associated with
the role of the gender of the individuals in the household. This variable is
crucial not only for the determination of access to employment but also for
salary income, given that a person who has children needs to find a job that
covers their needs and those of their family.
Blau and Kahn
(2000) found evidence that women are still the ones who are mainly responsible
for household chores and taking care of the children in most North American
families and that, therefore, they receive lower salaries. According to Tenjo,
Ribero and Bernat (2005), for employers, having children is a risk and an
uncertainty factor in the decisions regarding
hiring women, and therefore, their punishment is to give them a lower salary.
In this same line, Fernández (2006) estimates that the work that women do in
the household, reduces the possibility of working extra hours, however, when making
a thorough analysis dissimilar behaviors are observed depending on the point of
the distribution of income from which the phenomenon is analyzed.
The marital status of an individual implies a
responsibility in the roles of the household, and for that reason, the results
with respect to the effect of marital status are diverse within the empirical
evidence. According to Fernández (2006), it is to be expected that being
married or in a common-law relationship is associated with positive and
significant returns for men as well as for women, thus, employers may see married
life as a sign of the commitment and constancy of the individual, or that to
the extent that they have greater incentives to do a better job and to be
promoted so as to improve the quality of life of their families. Abadía (2005)
found results that support the hypothesis that employers statistically
discriminate by gender against married women or those who are in a common-law
relationship in the Colombian labor market; this is possibly caused by the fact
that women have to divide their time between their household chores and work,
so the employer creates stereotypes in the access to and payment for the job.
This study explores the effect of these personal,
family, and employment characteristics over the salaries of men and women in
Santander. In this way, the differentiating effects which these may have on
each population group and the possibility of salary discrimination by gender
are delved into. To reach the objective of the study, the next section
summarizes the methodology used.
METHODOLOGICAL
ASPECTS
Mincer equations of income
According to the
analysis of the existing relations between explanatory variables and salaries,
two Mincer-type equations (1974)[2] are used: the first one for the male population and
the second for the female population. In these equations the dimensions of
human capital, family composition, as well as employment variables are
considered. This means that the salary (with logarithmic notation) is expressed
based on a series of observable characteristics, as follows:
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition
Following
Fernández (2006), it is possible to affirm that there are forces behind the
phenomenon of salary differences which make of this process a key component for
the analysis, design and putting into effect of attack policies. Therefore,
there is usually a decomposition of Mincer’s equation for men and women, as
follows:
Where h and m express the terms corresponding to men and women (h and m refer
to hombre - man and mujer - woman), respectively. The
methodology suggested by Blinder and Oaxaca (1973) is fundamental for the
decomposition analysis of the salary differencial, between a component which is
the result of the differences in endowment of human capital between the sexes
and another component which is the result of the returns of said endowments.
Following Tenjo (1993), the estimated differencial can be expressed as the
addition of different components, as follows:
Where,
Data of the study
The data base used corresponds to the GEIH
carried out by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE, by
its acronym in Spanish), for the years 2012 to 2014. The information about
salary income is expressed in constant prices from December 2012.
It is considered as the target population the sample
of header data and the rest, corresponding to the department of Santander and,
within it, the economically active population (EAP) between 18 and 60 years of
age[3]. The sample implemented is composed of 14,373
observations for the year 2012, of which 54.52% correspond to men and 45.48% to
women. For the year 2013 the number of observations went down to 14,344;
finally, by the year 2014 the observations were 14,187, for which none of the
variables being studied present losses.
According to the
data from the GEIH, the labor force participation rate (LFPR) in Santander, as a
relation between the economically active population (EAP) and the working age
population (WAP) registered a level of 68.9% in 2014 against 69.1% in 2012,
which corresponds to a slight reduction of 0.2%. On the other hand, the
employment rate (ER) showed contrary behavior to the LFPR, this means the ER
was 64.4% in comparison to 63.7% for 2012, and the unemployment rate (UR) was
gradually reduced by 1.3%.
In Santander,
these labor indicators did not show relevant changes between 2012 and
2014. In any way, the results reflect
that the greatest indicators of labor participation are for the male population
with a LFPR superior to 78% against 60% for women, as shown in Figure 1. The
same behavior is reflected in the employment and unemployment rates with gaps
of about 20% and 4%, respectively. This shows, not only a favoring context for
the male population, but also the lack of variability in the structure of the
labor market in terms of employed and unemployed people by gender during the analyzed period.
Figure 1. Labor market indicators in Santander by
gender.
Source: elaborated by the author based on data from DANE,
GEIH 2012-2014.
The population
indicators reflected an important increase. The total population and that of
working age rose by approximately 20,000 and 26,000 people respectively from
2012 and 2014. However, the increase of the WAP is slightly above 1% in
variability. In the region of Santander, for the period studied, the employed
population reached levels of 93% as a proportion of the EAP in 2014, as
observed in Table 1.
Table 1. Population
indicators in the labor market in Santander (Dane, 2013)
Concept |
2012 |
2013 |
2014 |
|
Total population |
2.031 |
2.041 |
2.051 |
|
Working age
population |
1.641 |
1.654 |
1.667 |
|
Economically active
population |
1.134 |
1.145 |
1.149 |
|
Employed |
1.046 |
1.061 |
1.074 |
|
Unemployed |
0.088 |
0.084 |
0.075 |
Source: elaborated by the author based on DANE, GEIH, data in
millions.
In terms of the sample
studied, from 2012 to 2014 the employed male population was 53.96% on average,
and the remaining 46.03% corresponds to the employed female population. Said figures indicate that female participation
in the labor market has increased, in comparison to what the figures of 2005 reflect,
where the female population, in proportion to the employed population, reached
a top level of 20%. The remaining 80% corresponded to employed men; behavior
that is repeated in most age ranges (PPMIGS-PS, 2010, p. 23).
With respect to the monthly
income of the population, in Appendix A the descriptive statistics for men and
women for the years 2012-2014 are presented. There are clear differences in the
average monthly income between men ($1,090,832.7) and women ($807,485.8).
Although this difference does not necessarily express that there is salary
discrimination, this is a first indicator that there is preferential treatment
for men and women in the labor market in Santander; the results of the wages
per hour, present similar behaviors. During the three years of the study, on
average, women received 89.28% of the salary received by men. A possible
explanation for this behavior is supported by the time that men dedicate to
work during the week in comparison to the time women employ. More than 90% of
men are full-time workers, that is, they devote 40 hours or more a week to do a
certain activity, contrasted with an approximate 71% of full-time female
workers.
No statistically significant
divergences were found in the average age of men and women; in both groups, the
average age is 37 years old. However, in terms of education (measured in years
of education), it is observed that, on average, women have one more year of
education than men (9 years for men and 10 years for women). Women occupy the
greater proportion of their population in the higher education level, whereas
men are a majority in the primary level. Therefore, it would be expected that
women receive a higher salary income in terms of returns on education.
In employment terms, the
structure of the labor market did not present meaningful changes during the
period analyzed. Most of the population is employed in companies, or else as
self-employed workers, essentially in micro-enterprises. The greater gaps are
observed in the population employed in domestic work, day laborers and
employers, given that the first activity is mainly assigned to the female
population and the other two to the male population. This could mean employment
segregation, with men mainly employed in day laborer tasks (lower salaries) and
employers (higher salaries), while women occupy positions mainly defined
according to stereotypes and gender roles in the services sector.
Among the most outstanding
results, it is important to highlight that women have a higher participation in
the role of domestic worker with 97% on average. For their part, the percentage
of male participation is higher than that of women in the occupations of
employer and day laborer with 71.1% and 89.4%, respectively. Indistinctively,
as is observed in Figure 2, most of the occupations carried out by women
receive salaries which are, on average, lower than those of men. In the
occupations of domestic worker and civil servant, women receive a higher
income, although this difference is not more than 50 thousand Colombian pesos.
The occupations that concentrate an average higher level of income are those of
civil servant and employer, where the differences in participation as well as
regarding income are significant. So, men obtain a much higher proportion of
the income with respect to women, this means that, on average, employed men as
employers earn COP $251,391 more than women.
Figure 2. Occupational structure of
the labor market in Santander in terms of average income and gender, year 2014.
Source: elaborated by the author based on DANE, GEIH (2014).
On the other hand, the
existence of labor segmentation in the region of Santander is inferred, given
that in the particular case of men, they are assigned to certain branches of
the economic activity (mainly jobs as laborers, self-employed workers or
employers, where the last group receive salaries that are much higher than the
rest of the population), for male characteristics allow them to carry out
activities that require greater effort and risk[4]. As regards women, they are
mainly allocated to activities of domestic work and civil servants, that is,
occupations that go hand-in-hand with a gender role. All the descriptive
statistics of these variables are presented in Appendix B.
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
In general
terms, the signs of the coefficients coincide with what was expected according
to the review of the literature. Appendix C presents the tables with the
results of econometric estimations. The data is divided into personal, family,
and employment characteristics, for the period studied, and the differential of
average income went from 23.7% in 2012, 22.8% in 2013 to 20.7% in 2014. This
means that the gap in the average income presented descending behavior, although
the male population that benefitted from this differential.
Now, examining the
determinants of income by gender, the Mincer equations of salaries present
coefficients of signs that are equivalent to those proposed by the theory of
human capital, where experience, age and education have positive effects on the
salary. Controlling the other variables, for one more year of education in 2012
a man and a woman, on average, receive a 7.7% increase in their salaries. However,
the valuation that the market gives to one more year of education has suffered
discrepancies for the years of the study, as is reflected in 2013, and even in
2014 where one more year of education for a man represents a 7% increase in his salary and for a woman only
6.1%. These results are similar to the national empirical evidence (Tenjo,
Ribero & Bernat, 2005; Tenjo & Herrera, 2009; Badel & Peña, 2009),
although there was an improvement in the last few years in the educational
level of women in Santander. According to the evidence presented, it can be
inferred that, controlling for the other variables of human capital and of
employment, the labor market in Santander is losing the connotation of an
equitable valuation process
for education
with respect to the investment in education that the individuals make.
The incidence of
age on the income is positive for both. The male population is more favored
than the female population, as their income increases until 50 years of age
(2012), and until 71 in 2014. Although the behavior, in the case of women, is
similar, they have increases in their income until the age of 46 (2012), and
until 50 in 2014.
For its part,
experience, which is measured by years of seniority in the company, for 2012
and 2014, show that men and women receive an increase in their income up to
levels of experience above 13 years. Nevertheless, in 2012 there were greater
divergences, given that for men the increase in their income was secured until
levels of experience that reach 28 years against 18 years required for women. However,
this discrepancy is reverted in 2014, given that men require levels of
experience up to 14 years to secure the increase in their salary, while women
may expect an increase up to 17 years of experience. The above indicates,
particularly between 2012 and 2014, that the relation between the level of
experience and income favors women, given that they may see an increase in
their salary even for longer than men when having more years of seniority in
the company. These results support the hypothesis that the labor market rewards
the voluntary non-interruption of work, applied by Hernández (1995) and
Witkowska (2013), for it would be expected that higher levels of experience had
a positive incidence over the salary of women.
With respect to
the variables of the work environment, the condition of informality of an
individual has a negative incidence on their salary, a finding that coincides
with the national and international empirical evidence. Thus, it is observed that
informality is a phenomenon that punishes greatly the income of women over that
of men. In other words, women can be more affected by the non-correspondence
between supply and demand of labor and the high labor costs of the companies
who hire personnel formally, among other factors.
Under the
structuralist approach of the market, the type of employment of the individuals
has some inherent characteristics, good and bad, which have an incidence over
the salaries of the employed population. In the present document, the different
types of employment provided by the DANE were examined, taking as a base
category that of employee of a private
company. Thus, controlling for the other variables, it is observed that
self-employed workers receive salaries that are lower than those of company
employees, especially in the female population. This reflects that the self-employed in Santander can mostly be
the population that is dedicated to street vending or trades that do not have social
provision and other benefits, for their work requires greater effort and a lesser
salary. In positions such as civil
servant and employer, the salary
is significantly higher than that of a company employee. In said occupations,
women have higher salaries in comparison to their peers in companies; this
increase ranges from 35% to 55%, while the salary increase for male civil
servants ranges from 10% to 18%, and as employers from 33% to 55%. Being a
domestic worker only presents statistically significant salary gaps for women,
as is already evident; they are the ones who carry out said activities.
Conversely, being a day laborer does not present statistically significant
differences in the income from company employees, neither for men nor for
women.
At the same
time, under structuralism, the size of the company has a positive influence on
the level of income of the population. For the estimations, the category of large enterprise was taken as a base. It
was found that the gaps in the income closes when the size of the company
increases; said increase is mainly presented in women, this means, a larger
company size leads to better work conditions and better training and
productivity, so the income increases too, controlled by the other variables.
In summary, the
determinants incorporated for this study had the expected signs, with certain
peculiarities from the point of view of gender. Variables such as experience
and the business size mainly favor women, given their process of training. On
the other hand, education and age are factors in favor of the male population.
In addition, informality has a less negative influence in the salary of men
than that of women. Moreover, the coefficient of the types of employment
correspond to the theory under the structuralist approach, given that according
to the conditions and requisites that each occupation has determine the salary
the person will earn. However, evidence in Santander reflects that a person who
is self-employed earns a lower salary than that of a company employee, but
closer to that of a day worker. This shows the poor conditions to which the
population who perform this trade are subject to.
Selectivity correction and determinants of labor
participation by gender
The male population that is out of the labor market
has a greater salary reserve (33% in 2012 up to 43.4% in 2014) than the one
offered by the labor market[5]. This situation is
contrary to that of the female population where the results for this parameter
indicate that unemployed women are willing to accept any amount of money that
the market is willing to offer. The above reflects that behind the acceptance,
or not, of a certain salary there are factors that influence the decision of
men and women. For the case of Santander, said factors have much more weight on
women, pushing them to accept any salary that the market is willing to offer
them. To examine this phenomenon, this study followed the idea of Bernat
(2005), taking as the determining factors of participation in the labor market,
personal characteristics, such as age, years of education and school
attendance, as well as family characteristics such as being head of household,
being married or in a common-law relationship and having children younger than
6 years of age in the household, as a proxy
of children. Given that at this point the methodology used is a probit of participation, the marginal
effects on the probability of working, which appeared from the changes in the
magnitude of the explanatory variables, are presented in Appendix D.
In general terms, the results correspond to the
outlines of the new domestic economy, regarding
the distribution of time between the household and work. In this way, having
children younger than 6 years of age in the household and being married or in a
common-law relationship, as indicators of commitment, reduce the probability of
participation in the labor market for women, while it enhances it for men. The
opposite occurs with one more year of education, which fosters an increase in
the probability of working for women and reduces the probability of working for
men in Santander. On the other hand, being the head of the household and age
are factors that increase the probability of participation in the labor market
for men as well as for women, especially for women. Finally, attendance in school,
or any educational institution, give those who are in that situation less
incentive to take part in the labor market and, for that matter, to being
hired. However, in 2012 and 2014, the probability of participation for men is
lower than for women, if they are attending school. In 2013, their
probabilities of working, although negative, are similar. The above shows how
family variables have a different incidence for men and women, even when both
groups show the same signs, the perception of the labor market assesses them in
a different way.
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition:
salary discrimination by gender
According to the results
estimated with selection bias correction, controlling for age, experience,
years of education, type of employment and work characteristics of informality
and business size, it is observed than men earn an average salary that is
higher than that of women in Santander, with the same productive
characteristics, which was 21.52% in 2012; a gap that reached 25.61% in 2014. This
gap, on average, is explained to a great extent by the unexplained component,
usually associated with a discriminatory factor that reached 24.5% in 2012,
which, like the differential average continues to increase until 2014, reaching
30.37%. Said component has its roots in non-observable factors in the labor
market or else in the distinctive valuation of the amounts of human capital of
the workers.
Under this assumption, women receive about 25% and 30% less salary in
comparison to men, even when women have the same amount of human capital as
men. However, as it was indicated previously, in Santander women have higher
levels of education, which is a discrepancy with the discriminatory phenomenon
presented, for the greater investment in education should imply reductions in
the average gap as well as in the salary discrimination by gender.
Given the above, salary gaps due to productive characteristics favor
women in Santander. This means, given the human capital characteristics of
women, if they were rewarded using the same criteria with which men are
assessed, women should receive higher salaries (on average). In numerical terms,
if the investment in human capital of women in the region of Santander were
rewarded with the same returns as their male peers, women should earn a higher
salary to that earned by men by 4.38%, 3.53% and 2.11% in the years 2012 to
2014, respectively. These discriminatory practices could be the consequence of
the segmentation of the labor market (explained by the massification of the
work supply), where women are placed in jobs with lower payment or else, as Piore (1970) and Cain (1986) affirm, they are placed
in the secondary labor market. On the other hand, in Deininger, Jin and Nagarajan (2013) another reason can be found
associated to income discrimination, from the component of informality, which
is already evident for the case of Santander, the income of the female
population suffers more under those conditions.
Figure . Blinder-Oaxaca
Decomposition, according to income estimation
Source: elaborated by the author based on DANE, GEIH 2012-2014.
From the results
of the estimations of the Mincer equations, and controlling for human capital
and employment variables, it can be concluded that, in general terms, there is
evidence that the women in the department of Santander are victims of salary
discrimination. On the contrary, if the observable characteristics only
determine the salary remuneration of the individuals, the women in Santander
should earn, on average, a higher income than men. These results are conclusive
as they present a similar behavior as in the Latin American situation studied
by Atal, Ñopo and Winder (2009), which reflects the lack of correspondence
between the labor policy and the valuation of the labor market over the productive
characteristics of the individuals, which presents market flaws that are
harmful to minorities (in this case, women) and, especially, for the sub-group
formed by those who are better educated.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the labor market in Santander, shown in this document,
presented the main labor indicators, the statistical description of the
variables studied and a small approximation of the occupational segregation
(allocation of men and women to certain occupations in relation to their gender
role) and compensation differences (given that men occupy roles that demand
greater levels of physical effort and risk). The results were similar to
Urdinola and Wodon (2003), for in occupations such as domestic worker (women)
or day laborer (men), the massification of the labor supply and the low
educational level made it that the population was rewarded with inferior
salaries.
In
that sense, in this article the determinants of salary incomes by gender in the
department of Santander were analyzed, under the human capital theory. Through
a linear model, proposed by Mincer (1974), it was sought to evaluate the effect
that personal characteristics, human capital and work characteristics have on
salary income. The estimations exhibited coefficients with signs close to those
proposed by the human capital theory; thus, education had a positive sign in
relation to income while age and experience have non-linear effects regarding
income. Informality, in both groups, had a negative incidence on the income.
For these regressions, the salary gap between men and women was between 21% and
24%, where the returns on education are unfavorable for women, and the returns
on age and experience favor men to a greater extent.
It
is vital to point out that for the total of Santander and for the male sub-sample,
a selection bias was observed and duly corrected, while in the female
sub-sample, the factors that condition the participation of women in the labor
market possibly did not generate differences between the salary expected by the
unemployed and salary received by the employed. From the analysis of these
variables, similar results to those of Abadía (2005) and Fernández (2006) were
found, for commitment indicators such as having children in the household and
being married or cohabitating represent a penalty for female participation in the
labor market, different to the case of men. On the other hand, the probability
of accessing the labor market is higher for those women who are heads of
household.
The
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition showed that discrimination is the component that
explains the existing salary gap. For the case of Santander, it was found that,
on average, women receive salaries between 25% and 30% lower than men, due to
non-observable factors associated with gender discrimination. Also, the
differences by human capital factors show that if women received the same
returns on human capital than men receive, they would earn, on average, higher
salaries than males. However,
this component only reached a maximum of 4.38% in 2012.
A peculiar piece
of information is that Mincer estimators determined that the valuation of years
of education have had a negative effect on women between 2012 and 2014, and
given that the analysis presented in this investigation was done using
statistical techniques that take into account average values of the
characteristics of the population, it is advisable to carry out further
research which uses an alternative methodology that measures the effects of the
explanatory variables of the different intervals of salary distribution. In
this way, it is possible to analyze the differences that some variables may
present, not on the average of the expected salary, but on different points of
the conditional distribution of salaries, quantile or percentile, so that in
the case of education, it can be established if the phenomena known as sticky
floor and glass ceiling are present in Santander. Likewise, it is recommended
to carry out research projects that resort to sources of information that allow
for the control of the possible endogeneity of education, given that the
estimation presented in this study may be under or overvaluing the salary
differences by gender, associated with discrimination.
So, given the
actions as regards public policy that have been intended to be put into force,
and in relation to the problems hereby presented, it is recommended that the
actions taken in order to mitigate the processes of inequitable remuneration allow
for the determination of their impact on men and women separately. In this way,
the changes and processes required to promote gender equality will be enacted.
On the other hand, it is recommended that the political actions contribute so
that women can balance the weight of their family factors, with the aim that
said factors do not exert pressure on their participation in the labor market,
accepting any income that the market is willing to offer them.
Moreover, it is
advised that there be a thorough review of the principles that constitute the
public policy on gender in the region, as it is pertinent that the public
policy is framed under the adequate analysis, where the relation between the
implications of gender relations and the social and economic analysis are taken
into consideration. Thus, the right decisions will be made so as to correct the
inequity problems existing between both sexes –such as salary gaps- so these
decisions are not biased by incorrect data.
Finally, those
who enact this type of policy are invited to take into account the labor supply
as well as the demand, in favor of gender equality. In public policy and gender
equality, the actions to be taken only contemplate the labor supply component,
leaving the problem of work demand behind. This means that, the policy is not
explicit in the designation of the responsibilities of the employing companies,
they being responsible for offering the working population a differential
treatment, which generates such differences in salary by gender. It is
important that the policy designs incentives to mitigate discriminatory
behaviors that go against the integral development of the population of
Santander.
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF
INCOME. TOTAL POPULATION AND GENDER, 2012-2014
YEAR |
Population |
Variable |
Observations |
Average |
Standard deviation |
Minimum |
Maximum |
|
2012 |
TOTAL |
Monthly income |
14373 |
975.794 |
1.251.624 |
0 |
60.000.000 |
|
Hourly income |
5.490 |
7.831 |
0 |
425.000 |
||||
Men |
Monthly income |
7836 |
1.113.800 |
1.435.337 |
0 |
60.000.000 |
||
Hourly income |
5.788 |
8.654 |
0 |
425.000 |
||||
Women |
Monthly income |
6537 |
810.363 |
961.695 |
0 |
20.000.000 |
||
Hourly income |
5.133 |
6.695 |
0 |
166.667 |
||||
2013 |
TOTAL |
Monthly income |
14344 |
947.873 |
1.058.031 |
0 |
34.300.000 |
|
Hourly income |
5.293 |
7.331 |
0 |
367.863 |
||||
Men |
Monthly income |
7732 |
1.075.960 |
1.190.115 |
0 |
34.300.000 |
||
Hourly income |
5.561 |
6.778 |
0 |
183.932 |
||||
Women |
Monthly income |
6612 |
798.090 |
854.824 |
0 |
17.200.000 |
||
Hourly income |
4.981 |
7.918 |
0 |
367.863 |
||||
2014 |
TOTAL |
Monthly income |
14187 |
957681,4 |
1020906 |
0 |
30.300.000 |
|
Hourly income |
5.308 |
6.276 |
0 |
189.269 |
||||
Men |
Monthly income |
7585 |
1.082.738 |
1.135.586 |
0 |
30.300.000 |
||
Hourly income |
5.578 |
6.572 |
0 |
189.269 |
||||
Women |
Monthly income |
6602 |
814.004 |
848.326 |
0 |
14.200.000 |
||
Hourly income |
4.998 |
5.903 |
0 |
138.797 |
APPENDIX
B
EXPLANATORY
VARIABLES AVERAGE BY GENDER, 2012-2014
Variable |
2012 |
2013 |
2014 |
|||
Men |
Women |
Men |
Women |
Men |
Women |
|
Human capital |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Age |
36,840 |
37,008 |
37,157 |
37,190 |
37,014 |
37,121 |
Education |
9,314 |
10,419 |
9,348 |
10,453 |
9,547 |
10,610 |
School attendance |
0,081 |
0,112 |
0,092 |
0,105 |
0,086 |
0,110 |
Seniority |
6,170 |
4,951 |
5,997 |
4,865 |
5,900 |
4,763 |
Employment characteristics |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Informal condition |
0,590 |
0,623 |
0,574 |
0,617 |
0,557 |
0,596 |
Full-time employee |
0,905 |
0,713 |
0,903 |
0,722 |
0,912 |
0,737 |
Type of occupation |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Company employee |
0,407 |
0,371 |
0,441 |
0,396 |
0,455 |
0,408 |
Civil servant |
0,034 |
0,042 |
0,031 |
0,038 |
0,033 |
0,039 |
Domestic worker |
0,001 |
0,065 |
0,002 |
0,064 |
0,002 |
0,062 |
Self-employed |
0,429 |
0,463 |
0,423 |
0,451 |
0,404 |
0,445 |
Employer |
0,101 |
0,050 |
0,080 |
0,043 |
0,082 |
0,039 |
No payment |
0,001 |
0,002 |
0,001 |
0,002 |
0,001 |
0,002 |
Day laborer |
0,023 |
0,003 |
0,021 |
0,003 |
0,020 |
0,002 |
Other occupation |
0,003 |
0,005 |
0,001 |
0,003 |
0,003 |
0,003 |
Business size |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Microbusiness |
0,599 |
0,621 |
0,594 |
0,617 |
0,578 |
0,608 |
Small business |
0,098 |
0,090 |
0,091 |
0,087 |
0,098 |
0,097 |
Medium-sized busines |
0,076 |
0,071 |
0,084 |
0,079 |
0,088 |
0,080 |
Large business |
0,227 |
0,219 |
0,231 |
0,217 |
0,236 |
0,214 |
Family characteristics |
|
|
|
|
|
|
With partner |
0,626 |
0,526 |
0,629 |
0,526 |
0,614 |
0,516 |
Head of household |
0,619 |
0,273 |
0,611 |
0,289 |
0,597 |
0,280 |
Infants younger than 6 years old in the
household |
0,348 |
0,358 |
0,336 |
0,350 |
0,329 |
0,350 |
Highest level
of education reached |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Primary or less |
0,282 |
0,207 |
0,283 |
0,198 |
0,243 |
0,214 |
Secondary |
0,134 |
0,124 |
0,134 |
0,127 |
0,123 |
0,121 |
Medium |
0,291 |
0,274 |
0,286 |
0,274 |
0,301 |
0,277 |
Higher |
0,272 |
0,383 |
0,281 |
0,391 |
0,311 |
0,370 |
APPENDIX C
MINCER
REGRESSIONES OF INCOME, BY GENDER 2012-2014
Mincer Regressions |
2012 |
2013 |
2014 |
||||||||||
Men |
Women |
Men |
Women |
Men |
Women |
||||||||
Without correction |
With correction |
Without correction |
With correction |
Without correction |
With correction |
Without correction |
With correction |
Without correction |
With correction |
Without correction |
With correction |
||
Constant |
6.626*** |
7.072*** |
6.865*** |
7.119*** |
6.447*** |
7.059*** |
6.799*** |
7.064*** |
6.826*** |
7.480*** |
7.106*** |
7.222*** |
|
|
(0.108) |
(0.144) |
(0.164) |
(0.269) |
(0.138) |
(0.208) |
(0.175) |
(0.290) |
(0.125) |
(0.181) |
(0.154) |
(0.244) |
|
Age |
0.051*** |
0.030*** |
0.028*** |
0.019* |
0.068*** |
0.039*** |
0.041*** |
0.032*** |
0.046*** |
0.014 |
0.030*** |
0.026** |
|
|
(0.006) |
(0.007) |
(0.009) |
(0.011) |
(0.007) |
(0.010) |
(0.009) |
(0.012) |
(0.007) |
(0.009) |
(0.008) |
(0.010) |
|
Age squared |
-0.001*** |
-0.000*** |
-0.000** |
-0.000 |
-0.001*** |
-0.000*** |
-0.000*** |
-0.000** |
-0.000*** |
-0.000 |
-0.000*** |
-0.000** |
|
|
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
|
Experience |
0.017*** |
0.017*** |
0.037*** |
0.037*** |
0.032*** |
0.032*** |
0.045*** |
0.045*** |
0.027*** |
0.026*** |
0.054*** |
0.054*** |
|
|
(0.003) |
(0.003) |
(0.006) |
(0.006) |
(0.004) |
(0.004) |
(0.006) |
(0.006) |
(0.004) |
(0.004) |
(0.005) |
(0.005) |
|
Experience squared |
-0.000*** |
-0.000*** |
-0.001*** |
-0.001*** |
-0.001*** |
-0.001*** |
-0.001*** |
-0.001*** |
-0.001*** |
-0.001*** |
-0.002*** |
-0.002*** |
|
|
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
(0.000) |
|
Education |
0.075*** |
0.077*** |
0.077*** |
0.074*** |
0.065*** |
0.067*** |
0.068*** |
0.065*** |
0.068*** |
0.070*** |
0.061*** |
0.060*** |
|
|
(0.002) |
(0.002) |
(0.004) |
(0.005) |
(0.003) |
(0.003) |
(0.004) |
(0.005) |
(0.003) |
(0.003) |
(0.004) |
(0.004) |
|
Informal |
-0.154*** |
-0.144*** |
-0.237*** |
-0.236*** |
-0.157*** |
-0.146*** |
-0.156*** |
-0.155*** |
-0.155*** |
-0.137*** |
-0.152*** |
-0.152*** |
|
|
(0.028) |
(0.028) |
(0.044) |
(0.044) |
(0.035) |
(0.035) |
(0.046) |
(0.046) |
(0.031) |
(0.031) |
(0.041) |
(0.041) |
|
Civil servant |
0.110** |
0.102* |
0.354*** |
0.356*** |
0.139** |
0.131* |
0.365*** |
0.366*** |
0.196*** |
0.182*** |
0.443*** |
0.443*** |
|
|
(0.054) |
(0.054) |
(0.078) |
(0.078) |
(0.071) |
(0.071) |
(0.083) |
(0.083) |
(0.062) |
(0.062) |
(0.076) |
(0.076) |
|
Domestic worker |
-0.221 |
-0.192 |
0.283*** |
0.280*** |
0.084 |
0.090 |
0.334*** |
0.333*** |
0.277 |
0.273 |
0.380*** |
0.379*** |
|
|
(0.239) |
(0.237) |
(0.064) |
(0.064) |
(0.290) |
(0.288) |
(0.067) |
(0.067) |
(0.232) |
(0.231) |
(0.062) |
(0.062) |
|
Self-employed |
0.049* |
0.048* |
-0.069* |
-0.067* |
-0.098*** |
-0.097*** |
-0.199*** |
-0.196*** |
-0.027 |
-0.028 |
-0.116*** |
-0.115*** |
|
|
(0.027) |
(0.027) |
(0.039) |
(0.039) |
(0.034) |
(0.033) |
(0.041) |
(0.041) |
(0.031) |
(0.031) |
(0.037) |
(0.037) |
|
Employer |
0.518*** |
0.508*** |
0.509*** |
0.511*** |
0.342*** |
0.334*** |
0.388*** |
0.390*** |
0.573*** |
0.557*** |
0.552*** |
0.553*** |
|
|
(0.037) |
(0.037) |
(0.069) |
(0.069) |
(0.050) |
(0.050) |
(0.077) |
(0.077) |
(0.046) |
(0.046) |
(0.073) |
(0.073) |
|
No payment |
-1.340*** |
-1.328*** |
-1.477*** |
-1.459*** |
-2.007*** |
-1.980*** |
-2.021*** |
-2.005*** |
-1.531*** |
-1.531*** |
-0.877*** |
-0.872*** |
|
|
(0.299) |
(0.298) |
(0.328) |
(0.328) |
(0.447) |
(0.446) |
(0.317) |
(0.317) |
(0.365) |
(0.360) |
(0.330) |
(0.330) |
|
Day laborer |
0.051 |
0.058 |
-0.153 |
-0.153 |
0.092 |
0.100 |
0.069 |
0.074 |
-0.012 |
0.001 |
0.175 |
0.176 |
|
|
(0.063) |
(0.063) |
(0.244) |
(0.243) |
(0.084) |
(0.083) |
(0.240) |
(0.239) |
(0.078) |
(0.077) |
(0.270) |
(0.270) |
|
Other occupation |
-0.487*** |
-0.490*** |
-0.439** |
-0.438** |
-0.945*** |
-0.896*** |
-0.356 |
-0.347 |
-0.665*** |
-0.647*** |
-0.400* |
-0.399* |
|
|
(0.178) |
(0.176) |
(0.201) |
(0.200) |
(0.303) |
(0.298) |
(0.270) |
(0.270) |
(0.196) |
(0.192) |
(0.219) |
(0.219) |
|
Microbusiness |
-0.256*** |
-0.259*** |
-0.286*** |
-0.288*** |
-0.224*** |
-0.229*** |
-0.422*** |
-0.426*** |
-0.277*** |
-0.283*** |
-0.506*** |
-0.507*** |
|
|
(0.036) |
(0.036) |
(0.055) |
(0.055) |
(0.045) |
(0.045) |
(0.058) |
(0.058) |
(0.041) |
(0.040) |
(0.052) |
(0.052) |
|
Small business |
-0.112*** |
-0.115*** |
-0.109* |
-0.111* |
-0.035 |
-0.037 |
-0.176*** |
-0.177*** |
-0.100** |
-0.100** |
-0.214*** |
-0.215*** |
|
|
(0.037) |
(0.037) |
(0.057) |
(0.057) |
(0.047) |
(0.047) |
(0.061) |
(0.061) |
(0.042) |
(0.041) |
(0.053) |
(0.053) |
|
Medium-size business |
-0.094** |
-0.094** |
-0.063 |
-0.064 |
-0.028 |
-0.028 |
-0.137** |
-0.137** |
-0.054 |
-0.055 |
-0.174*** |
-0.175*** |
|
|
(0.038) |
(0.038) |
(0.059) |
(0.059) |
(0.047) |
(0.046) |
(0.059) |
(0.059) |
(0.041) |
(0.041) |
(0.054) |
(0.054) |
|
Bias correction (λ) |
|
-0.330*** |
-0.107 |
|
-0.390*** |
-0.108 |
|
-0.434*** |
-0.055 |
||||
(0.069) |
(0.089) |
(0.098) |
(0.095) |
(0.084) |
(0.090) |
||||||||
Note: Significance * p< 0.1,
** p< 0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard error in parenthesis. |
|||||||||||||
APPENDIX D
INFLUENTIAL
FACTORS IN WORK PARTICIPATION OF MEN AND WOMEN
YEAR 2012
Probability of being employed |
MEN |
WOMEN |
||||
0.9001 |
0.6890 |
|||||
Variable |
Coefficient |
Marginal effect |
Coefficient |
Marginal effect |
||
Age |
0.1263 |
*** |
0.0221 |
0.1590 |
*** |
0,0562 |
|
0.0105 |
|
0.0018 |
0.0079 |
|
0,0028 |
Age squared |
-0.0017 |
*** |
-0.0003 |
-0.0020 |
*** |
-0,0007 |
|
0.0001 |
|
0.0000 |
0.0001 |
|
0,0000 |
Years of education |
-0.0002 |
|
0.0000 |
0.0347 |
*** |
0,0123 |
|
0.0044 |
|
0.0008 |
0.0033 |
|
0,0012 |
Married or
common law relationship |
0.2239 |
*** |
0.0402 |
-0.2475 |
*** |
-0,0865 |
|
0.0504 |
|
0.0093 |
0.0307 |
|
0,0106 |
Head of household |
0.4519 |
*** |
0.0828 |
0.2508 |
*** |
0,0852 |
|
0.0488 |
|
0.0092 |
0.0363 |
|
0,0118 |
School attendance |
-0.7825 |
*** |
-0.1915 |
-0.3736 |
*** |
-0,1392 |
|
0.0517 |
|
0.0162 |
0.0434 |
|
0,0168 |
Children in household |
0.1437 |
*** |
0.0244 |
-0.1167 |
*** |
-0,0415 |
|
0.0450 |
|
0.0074 |
0.0286 |
|
0,0102 |
Note: significance * p< 0.1, **
p< 0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard error in parenthesis
YEAR 2013
Probability of being employed |
MEN |
WOMEN |
||||
0.8943 |
0.7049 |
|||||
Variable |
Coefficient |
Marginal effect |
Coefficient |
Marginal effect |
||
Age |
0,1491 |
*** |
0,0272 |
0,1639 |
*** |
0,0566 |
|
0,0103 |
|
0,0019 |
0,0081 |
|
0,0028 |
Age squared |
-0,0020 |
*** |
-0,0004 |
-0,0021 |
*** |
-0,0007 |
|
0,0001 |
|
0,0000 |
0,0001 |
|
0,0000 |
Years of education |
-0,0010 |
|
-0,0002 |
0,0413 |
*** |
0,0142 |
|
0,0045 |
|
0,0008 |
0,0033 |
|
0,0012 |
Married or in
common law relationship |
0,3178 |
*** |
0,0599 |
-0,2083 |
*** |
-0,0713 |
|
0,0486 |
|
0,0094 |
0,0311 |
|
0,0105 |
Head of household |
0,3440 |
*** |
0,0646 |
0,2901 |
*** |
0,0955 |
|
0,0468 |
|
0,0090 |
0,0363 |
|
0,0113 |
School attendance |
-0,5934 |
*** |
-0,1392 |
-0,3786 |
*** |
-0,1388 |
|
0,0511 |
|
0,0147 |
0,0439 |
|
0,0168 |
Children in household |
0,1079 |
** |
0,0192 |
-0,1003 |
*** |
-0,0348 |
|
0,0444 |
|
0,0077 |
0,0293 |
|
0,0102 |
Note: significance * p< 0.1, **
p< 0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard error in parenthesis
YEAR 2014
Probability of being employed |
MEN |
WOMEN |
||||
0.9054 |
0.7196 |
|||||
Variable |
Coefficient |
Marginal effect |
Coefficient |
Marginal effect |
||
Age |
0.1570 |
*** |
0.0265 |
0.1422 |
*** |
0.0479 |
|
0.0108 |
|
0.0018 |
0.0081 |
|
0.0027 |
Age squared |
-0.0021 |
*** |
-0.0004 |
-0.0019 |
*** |
-0.0006 |
|
0.0001 |
|
0.0000 |
0.0001 |
|
0.0000 |
Years of education |
0.0054 |
|
0.0009 |
0.0385 |
*** |
0.0130 |
|
0.0046 |
|
0.0008 |
0.0034 |
|
0.0011 |
Married or in
common law relationship |
0.2669 |
*** |
0.0461 |
-0.2440 |
*** |
-0.0814 |
|
0.0489 |
|
0.0086 |
0.0314 |
|
0.0104 |
Head of household |
0.4428 |
*** |
0.0771 |
0.2072 |
*** |
0.0674 |
|
0.0483 |
|
0.0085 |
0.0365 |
|
0.0114 |
School attendance |
-0.6956 |
*** |
-0.1599 |
-0.4833 |
*** |
-0.1761 |
|
0.0525 |
|
0.0153 |
0.0437 |
|
0.0168 |
Children in household |
0.599 |
|
0.0099 |
-0.0996 |
*** |
-0.0338 |
|
0.0452 |
|
0.0074 |
0.0297 |
|
0.0102 |
Note: significance * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard error
in parenthesis.
* This article is the result of the research project
“Determinants of salary income in Santander: is there salary discrimination
because of gender?,” code 1378. Financed by the Vicerectory of Research and
Extension, UIS.
**
Professor in the School of Economics and Administration, Faculty of Human
Sciences, Universidad Industrial de Santander. PhD. Universidad de Granada,,
Spain. Leader of the Study Group in Applied Microeconomics and Regulation, EMAR
(by its acronym in Spanish). Postal address: carrera
27 - calle 9 Ciudad Universitaria, Facultad de Ciencias Humanas (Bucaramanga,
Colombia). Email address: alexacor@uis.edu.co.
***Researcher
of the Study Group in Applied Microeconomics and Regulation, EMAR (by its
acronym in Spanish). Economist from the Universidad
Industrial de Santander. Postal address: carrera
27 - calle 9 Ciudad Universitaria, Facultad de Ciencias Humanas (Bucaramanga,
Colombia). Email address: maria.florez4@correo.uis.edu.co.
[1]According
to Benería (2004), with the rise of the feminist movement, the vast majority of
the economists who worked on issues related to women continued to use the
neoclassic models or other variations of the conventional models.
[2]Although
the Mincer estimation of minimum ordinary squares has been broadly studied,
said estimation is not exempt from problems (Blaconá et al., 2001). According
to the signaling theories (Spence, 1973; Arrow, 1973) and studies such as those
of Griliches (1977) and Willis (1997), in the measurement of the performance of
education through the MOS method, there is bias. There could be problems of
sample selection which tend to be corrected by the procedure proposed by
Heckman (1979), and used in this document, or endogeneity problems, associated
with the problem of identifying the abilities of people, understood as
characteristics that could be considered as endowments, and that could lead to
inconsistent and biased estimations. In order to overcome the endogeneity, the
correction by instrumental variables is used (see Hausman & Taylor, 1981).
In most cases, the information on the level of education of the mother or the
father is used to correct this problem; however, in the GEIH there is no such
information and it is not possible to implement said correction.
[3]This
age interval is used following article 35 of Law 1098/06, which considers this
range to be able to work without any work inspection, in addition to the
average age of retirement for men and for women.
[4] It is from there that the possible existence of salary gaps due to
compensation differences can be established.
[5] The parameter that accompanies lambda
proved to be significant only for male population.