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Li, Q. (2025). Constructing a Desirable Theory of Chinese Cosmopolitanism:
The Diculties and a Solution. Cuestiones de Filosofía, 11 (37), 59-78.
https://doi.org/10.19053/uptc.01235095.v11.n37.2025.19790
Constructing a Desirable Theory of Chinese Cosmopolitanism: The
Diculties and a Solution
Construyendo una teoría deseable del cosmopolitismo chino: las dicultades
y una solución
Qiuqi Li
华东理工大学 (East China University of Science and Technology)
Universidad de Ciencia y Tecnología del Este de China
ISSN: 0123-5095 E-ISSN: 2389-9441
Cuestiones de Filosofía Vol. 11 – N° 37, julio - diciembre, año 2025, pp. 59-78
Artículo de Investigación
Resumen
Ante el reto de la desglobalización, las
acciones cosmopolitas de China deben
basarse en una teoría sistemática. Sin em-
bargo, la teoría china del cosmopolitismo
se enfrenta a dos dicultades principales.
La primera es que los ciudadanos chinos
no son necesariamente partidarios de las
acciones cosmopolitas de su país, y la
segunda es que los extranjeros podrían
considerar esas acciones como ajenas o
incluso peligrosas. Para abordar estas dos
dicultades, la teoría del cosmopolitismo
chino debe reivindicar su deseabilidad.
Este artículo sostiene que sólo cuan-
do el cosmopolitismo chino cumpla tres
criterios –la preferencia individual, el
consentimiento de la mayoría nacional y
el consenso intercultural– podrá conver-
tirse en una teoría deseable. Basándose en
estos criterios, los tres enfoques principa-
les del cosmopolitismo en el mundo aca-
démico chino (basados en el confucianis-
mo, los principios universales y la acción
comunicativa reexiva) tienen sus pros y
sus contras. Para garantizar que el cosmo-
politismo chino construido para los ciu-
dadanos del mundo sea deseable, distingo
entre dos contextos discursivos diferentes
en los que se pueden utilizar los tres enfo-
ques del cosmopolitismo.
Palabras clave: cosmopolitismo, deseabilidad, confucianismo, principios universales,
acción comunicativa.
Recepción / Received: 08 de julio del 2025
Evaluado / Evaluated: 28 de agosto del 2025
Aprobado / Accepted: 14 de julio del 2025
Historia del artículo / Article Info:
Correspondencia / Correspondence: Qiuqi Li. 130 Meilong
Rd, Xuhui District (Shanghai, China) (Código Postal: 200237).
Correo-e: ecust_qiuqi@126.com
Citación / Citation: Li, Q. (2025). Constructing a Desirable
Theory of Chinese Cosmopolitanism: The Diculties and a So-
lution. Cuestiones de Filosofía, 11 (37), 59-78.
https://doi.org/10.19053/uptc.01235095.v11.n37.2025.19790
60 Cuestiones de Filosofía No. 37 - Vol. 11 Año 2025 ISSN 0123-5095 Tunja-Colombia
Abstract
Facing the challenge of de-globalization, the cosmopolitan actions of China
need to be grounded in a systematic theory. However, the Chinese theory of
cosmopolitanism encounters two main diculties. One is that Chinese indi-
viduals are not necessarily supporters of the country’s cosmopolitan actions,
and the other is that foreigners could regard those actions as alien or even
dangerous. To address these two diculties, the theory of Chinese cosmopo-
litanism needs to claim desirability. This paper argues that only when Chine-
se cosmopolitanism meets three criteria –individual preference, the consent
of a domestic majority, and intercultural consensus– can it become a desira-
ble theory. Based on these criteria, the three main approaches to cosmopo-
litanism in the Chinese academic world (based on Confucianism, universal
principles, and reective communicative action) all have pros and cons. To
ensure that the Chinese cosmopolitanism constructed for world citizens is
desirable, I distinguish between two dierent contexts of discourse in which
the three approaches of cosmopolitanism can be used.
Keywords: cosmopolitanism, desirableness, confucianism, universal princi-
ples, communicative action.
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Li, Q. (2025). Constructing a Desirable Theory of Chinese Cosmopolitanism:
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Etymologically, “cosmopolitan” is a Greek term that means “citizen of the
world”. In moral philosophy, cosmopolitanism proposes that people from all
countries should build a world community together, in which we are obliga-
ted to help anyone in need as fellow citizens (Kant, 2006; Nussbaum, 2019).
Under the context of international politics, cosmopolitanism holds the posi-
tion that a country ought to take armative actions toward world peace and
provide aid when other countries suer from serious disasters.
Despite its Western origin, cosmopolitanism is an idea that has actually in-
uenced the self-imagination of China. Over the past 75 years, since PR
China was founded, compared to other developing countries, China has in-
creasingly sought to engage in international aairs, which inevitably drew
attention from the international community. However, the Cold War ended,
and its ideology is no longer dominant, so China’s actions in foreign aairs,
for example, the economy and military, cannot be grounded on the idea of
world revolution, while the consideration of state interests alone fails to pro-
vide inner continuity to guide its actions. This gap in theory causes more pro-
blems at this point in history in which the global framework of nation-states
and free markets is partly in crisis, as reected in Britain’s falling out with
the European Union and the rise of right-wing parties throughout all Western
countries.
With the worldwide chaos created by de-globalization, the discourse of Chi-
na’s self-imagination has faced many realist problems, such as shrinkage of
global industrial chains and struggling with international trade. For both tem-
porary and long-term purposes, China’s cosmopolitan actions need to be su-
pported by systematic and pragmatic theory to make those actions consistent
and understandable.
Three Criteria of Desirability
As a concept in philosophy deeply tied to political activities, the idea of cos-
mopolitanism concerns not only what value we want to achieve but also the
possibility of truly achieving it. To construct a theory of Chinese cosmopo-
litanism, we must rst deal with two main diculties that could undermine
China’s cosmopolitan actions.
First, Chinese individuals are not necessarily in favor of the cosmopolitan ac-
tions of their country. In terms of state interests, China ought to engage more
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in international aairs, which is not controversial among Chinese scholars.
After all, the economic growth in China since its opening to the world mar-
ket, objectively, is closely related to the globalization process. Here, the pro-
blem is that the logic of state interests has dominated the discussion about
China’s foreign actions, overshadowing the growing appeals of Chinese in-
dividuals. In other words, it is not necessarily desirable to individuals that
China gains a larger voice in the international community and sometimes
even intervenes in foreign aairs with little relevance to itself. Compared
with the example of the United States, the problems of unemployment, fa-
lling incomes, and the lack of social security among the working classes
have directly contributed to the country’s drawing back from international
aairs. Although the situation in China is not totally equivalent, nonetheless,
this example shows that a country’s cosmopolitan actions do not always win
the support of its citizens.
Second, other cultural groups might not favor the idea of Chinese cosmopoli-
tanism. If such an idea is regarded as alien or even dangerous, the validity of
China’s cosmopolitan actions will be denied, and in some cases, the intention
of the actions can be interpreted as hegemonism, or the “China Threat”. For
example, as DeepSeek is online for free, China is accused of using AI as a
tool to increase political inuence. Although Chinese media have responded
that Western critics aim to politicize China’s eorts to oer global public
goods, it is also possible that the accusations are misunderstandings caused
by China’s weakness in theorizing its cosmopolitanism.
To overcome the two main diculties mentioned above, I try to use desira-
bility as my target in constructing a systematic theory of Chinese cosmopo-
litanism. Desirability would mean that such a theory is not only supported
by Chinese individuals but also gains a certain degree of recognition among
other cultural groups. To elaborate my argument, the target of desirability
can be further developed into three criteria:
a. Individual preference: “I” support my country providing help to people
in other countries, no matter how irrelevant those people are to me.
b. Consent of the domestic majority: Chinese cosmopolitanism is desira-
ble to all or at least most Chinese citizens; otherwise, it will become a
subculture only accepted by the domestic minority.
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Li, Q. (2025). Constructing a Desirable Theory of Chinese Cosmopolitanism:
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c. Intercultural consensus: In the international community, Chinese cos-
mopolitanism should be grounded on constant dialogs with other cul-
tural groups, not on the monologue of Chinese culture.
In the following, based on the criteria above, it can be found that the three
main approaches to cosmopolitanism in the Chinese academic world all have
pros and cons. To ensure that the Chinese cosmopolitanism constructed here
is desirable, I distinguish between two dierent contexts of discourse in
which the three approaches of cosmopolitanism can be used.
Cosmopolitanism Based on Confucianism
Drawing on a broad sense of Confucianism, is it possible to develop a kind of
cosmopolitan ethics? Fei Xiaotong, the well-known critic of Confucianism,
sees the complexity of this question. He does not argue that Confucianism is
in no way the source of cosmopolitan ethics. On the contrary, he points out
that the Confucian gentlemen pursue an ideal of practicing cosmopolitanism
as the higher form of self-love:
Confucius focuses most on the word “spread” as a water ripple spreads
outward from the center. He rst acknowledges there is a self that can em-
pathize with other people. The self is expected to be cultivated by rites (li).
Then the cultivated self can be the ground for developing a cosmopolitan
ethics, just like how water ripple spreads from the center (Fei, 2012, p. 26).
Then, what is Fei Xiaotong’s discontent with Confucianism? He points out
that the core value of cosmopolitanism, or any modern ethics, is based on
the absolute incommensurability between individuals and the group. It is
because individuals are relatively independent from the group that it is pos-
sible to prevent the rights of individuals from being violated by the state.
In the same way, the group is an entity relatively independent from indivi-
duals so that public interests are not damaged by individuals. However, in
Confucianism, the group is not a social entity but a mixture of family rela-
tions and their extensions. There is no denite way to separate individuals
from the group, so public interests are usually in danger of being under-
mined. “When people say that something belongs to the group, they mean
everybody could take advantage from it –everybody has the rights to it but
no obligations” (p. 25). Similarly, it is very hard to dene the meaning of
‘cosmos’ in Confucian culture. People in traditional Chinese society know
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the value of practicing cosmopolitanism, but they do not actually unders-
tand what to defend in practice.
However, since the 1980s, the context of Fei Xiaotong’s argument has shifted.
As social conicts have intensied, Western communitarianism put forward
an incisive criticism against the abuse of rights and extreme individualism.
Meanwhile, a number of scholars have tried to solve such problems in ways
embodied in non-Western cultural understandings of virtue. In such a con-
text, Confucianism comes back into the horizon of those scholars aiming to
construct a form of cosmopolitanism based on virtue (Chen, 2016).
For instance, Tu Weiming suggests that Confucian ethics gives a ranking of
values that weighs people’s practice of virtue:
Confucianism strongly opposes that people harm others to benet themsel-
ves. Additionally, Confucianism argues that there is certain value in bene-
ting oneself while not harming others and more value in beneting both
oneself and others. For example, loving your own children can be seen as a
virtue, but you can further share this love with the children of other people
and even with strangers, which embodies a higher value in the practice of
virtue (2010, p. 6).
In short, the basic principles of Confucian ethics accord with people’s moral
intuitions –family are more important than strangers, but it is a higher virtue
not to limit this love to family members. Therefore, the Confucian teachings
of virtues are easy for everyone to understand and accept, including both
gentlemen and sometimes relatively selsh people.
Meanwhile, some scholars think that the value-ranking approach of Confu-
cian cosmopolitanism oers a way to solve the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe.
On this issue, Bai Tongdong argues that the position of Confucian cosmo-
politanism would not totally support the EU’s opening of borders becau-
se –if we draw an analogy between a government and a Confucian moral
agent– the primary goal of a government is to guarantee its citizens a safe and
prosperous life. On the other hand, the position of Confucianism would not
totally support the EU’s closing borders either –analogous to a moral agent, a
government has obligations to help foreigners in trouble after its citizens are
ensured a ne life (Bai, 2019, pp. 203-207).
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Li, Q. (2025). Constructing a Desirable Theory of Chinese Cosmopolitanism:
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Then, from the basic position of Confucianism, is it possible to develop a
desirable form of cosmopolitanism? The answer to this question needs to be
elaborated through the three criteria mentioned above.
My rst argument here is that only if Confucianism has been modernized can
it align with the criterion of individual preference. As a matter of fact, many
ideas of classic Confucian texts still enlighten people in daily life, which
is the reason why Confucianism remains intriguing in an individual-based
and industrialized society. For example, people may not be familiar with the
concept of cosmopolitanism, but they can understand Confucius’ teaching
of “love your parents and children, then spread this love to the parents and
children of other people”. From this perspective, Confucianism can serve as
the ground for a desirable cosmopolitanism not because it embodies value
in itself but because it expresses people’s authentic values in a more delicate
way. On the other hand, the part of Confucianism that advocates inequa-
lity needs to be revealed and revised. That is, Confucianism, which can
properly contribute to cosmopolitanism, needs to be adjusted to the basic
principles of modern individualism, such as human rights, value neutrality,
and democracy. This kind of cosmopolitanism is a supplement to extreme
individualism in modern society but does not overturn the achievement of
modern political ideas. There are incoherence and tension inherent in origi-
nal Confucian classics, making it possible for Confucianism to be grafted
with modern individualism.
Then, does Confucianism accord with the criterion of the consent of the do-
mestic majority? Starting from the New Culture Movement in 1919, An-
ti-Confucianism has been one of the basic drives in China’s modernization.
Even now, the Confucian idea of Li is still constantly criticized for advocating
inequality. However, it is too arbitrary to conclude that Confucianism cannot
be the foundation for cosmopolitanism. First, Confucianism is understanda-
ble for the majority of Chinese people because Confucian classics are a key
part of Chinese compulsory education. Second, from the so-called “Chinese
classics fever” and the commercialization of Confucianism, we can see that
Confucianism meets the demand of the Chinese people for cultural identity.
As Bauman points out, following globalization and social homogenization,
the search for cultural identity becomes a substitute for the degradation of the
“natural home” (2001, p. 141). Along with China’s continuous involvement
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in globalization and the loss of its tradition, the demand for cultural identity
is still growing.
Last but not least, Confucianism cannot accord with the criterion of inter-
cultural consensus in any sense. As far back as the end of the 19th century
and early 20th century, facing the pressure of being dominated by Western
universalism, Chinese scholars have been trying to reconstruct Confucianism
into a universally valid theory, for instance, K’ang Yu-wei’s One-World Phi-
losophy (1958) and Mou Zongsan’s New Outer Kingship (xin wai wang)
(2014, p. 180), to avoid having Confucianism gradually degenerate into a
kind of cultural particularity. The problem here is that the outcome of this
theoretical work cannot truly be understood by other cultural groups and
thus is unable to become a valid medium for intercultural communication
in Habermas’ sense. Supposing that Confucianism is desirable as revealing
people’s authentic values, why not just ground Chinese cosmopolitanism di-
rectly on those values without emphasizing their relations with Confucian
classics? In this way, the incommensurability between Confucianism and
other cultures would not undermine Chinese cosmopolitanism.
Cosmopolitanism Based on Universal Principles
As a symbol of Western Enlightenment, Kant is devoted to justifying human
agents’ rational abilities of self-legislation. Since then, constructing normati-
ve principles that are valid beyond one certain culture, religion, and race has
become a desirable approach in political philosophy. From the discussion
above, we can see that Confucianism oers insight into cosmopolitanism that
is relatively subjective and relation-based. Comparatively speaking, based
on the assumption of rational abilities that everyone holds regardless of his
or her status, the Kantian approach to cosmopolitanism is more objective and
rule-based.
In the vision of post-Enlightenment, however, Kantian rationalism has been
widely criticized. For instance, as Nietzsche sharply asserts, Kant’s categori-
cal imperative is not a suitable candidate for justifying any ethical principle
because it is unattainable and unprovable (2005, p. 171). MacIntyre further
points out that the ground of Kantian rationalism, the belief of teleology in
human nature, has already been abandoned by modern philosophers (2007,
pp. 62-68). If Nietzsche and MacIntyre are right, the Kantian approach to
cosmopolitanism is doomed to failure as well.
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In the meantime, facing the danger of extreme cultural relativism, some
scholars in the Chinese academic world still value Kant’s eorts at grounding
cosmopolitanism on universal principles and seek to construct a set of rules
that Chinese cosmopolitanism can stand on without reference to rationality
or teleology.
Among those scholars, Zhao Tingyang’s idea of cosmopolitanism, the all-un-
der-heaven or Tianxia, is widely discussed in both Chinese and Western aca-
demic worlds. To address the topic, he admits the necessity of setting up
universal rules while criticizing Kant for being limited by a frame of duali-
ty, which presupposes an area of the “thing-in-itself” outside people’s inte-
llectuality and therefore fails to formulate a cosmopolitanism regarding the
world as a whole (Zhao, 2019, pp. 46-49).
In fact, as Zhao Tingyang points out, we cannot truly imagine a world with
absolute otherness. Before the 19th century, most social and economic acti-
vities were limited to the domestic area, so international aairs were not the
main concern of scholars. As an increasing number of countries actively or
passively engage in the process of globalization, their contacts become in-
creasingly close, and therefore, a new type of international relation emerges
that embodies both interdependence and continuous conict (p. 57). Dur-
kheim foresaw this in the late 19th century. He indicated that the social ano-
mie caused by the loss of tradition cannot be solved by any one country but
can only be settled when people from every country accept the same set of
rules (1984, pp. 336-337).
Concerning the idea of all-under-heaven, the rst concern of creating a desi-
rable cosmopolitanism is whether it satises the criterion of intercultural
consensus. Although there have been political doctrines that try to realize
perpetual peace throughout the whole world since the start of globalization,
they are actually a branch of state theory that regards the nation-state as the
highest political unit. In traditional Chinese philosophy, however, intercul-
tural universality is initially guaranteed by the transcendental wholeness of
all-under-heaven, which creates a world view that regards all countries as
one community. In this conception, the distinction between ourselves and the
others is no longer the starting point for dealing with international relations.
That is, not to say the alliance between states is unnecessary, but absolute and
unabsorbable otherness is obscured (Zhao, 2019, pp. 58-59).
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For instance, in the context of ancient China, the sovereign, or Son of Hea-
ven, was originally in a position of ruling, and the people were bound to be
ruled. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of rule depends on whether he can regard
his territory as a home and look after his people as family members. On the
analogy between ruling a country and managing a household, the sovereign
has to act by the principle of no otherness. Extending this principle into the
arena of world politics, the sovereign should not aim to occupy other coun-
tries but to establish a world order that is fair for everyone (pp. 7-9). By
comparison, the cosmopolitanism formulated within state theory has a fatal
shortcoming in its world view, which sees the antagonism between states as
everlasting and hopelessly tries to maintain a dynamic balance between itself
and other states. In reality, the balance is always formed as the result of one
or several world powers controlling the rest along with the universalization
of a dominating culture. Obviously, by suppressing other states, such a form
of cosmopolitanism cannot meet the criterion of intercultural consensus.
However, from Zhao Tingyang’s perspective, when we imagine a desirable
approach to cosmopolitanism, the criteria of individual preference and the
consent of the domestic majority are neither necessary nor possible (2019,
pp. 62-63). In the strictest sense, only when a world system meets the condi-
tion that everybody agrees with it can it be valid, which is impossible in the
real world. Even if we settle for the weaker condition that the majority agrees
with it, such a world system is still hardly possible to realize. The key ques-
tion here is not about nding the right proportion of people who agree, such
as 70 percent or 80 percent, but that we cannot ask individuals to be totally
seless and considerate of the world community. Within a state, the so-called
consent of the majority is actually the sum of interests and emotions of the
people, which does not help to set up a normative argument.
Is it true that individual preference and the consent of the domestic majority
are not two necessary criteria for a theory of cosmopolitanism to be valid?
The problem of Zhao’s argument is that it forces us to think about humanity
in a very specic way. For instance, we must admit that the essence of hu-
manity is selshness. Otherwise, a person may make decisions for the best
interests of the world community out of his moral intuition or sense of honor.
If such people exist in the real world, we do not have to abandon the crite-
rion of individual preference because it is an unnecessary sacrice. Overall,
without the spontaneous support of the domestic majority, the idea of cosmo-
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Li, Q. (2025). Constructing a Desirable Theory of Chinese Cosmopolitanism:
The Diculties and a Solution. Cuestiones de Filosofía, 11 (37), 59-78.
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politanism can hardly be realized in the law-making process and ultimately
become a political utopia.
In short, the real contribution of Zhao Tingyang’s idea of all-under-heaven
is that it underlines every nation’s political obligation to maintain a just sys-
tem in a Hobbesian world. In the area of international relations, the world
view oered by Zhao eectively refutes Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap,
which sees war between a growing power and a grown power as inevitable
(Allison, 2017). However, if we look back into the ancient Chinese idea of
all-under-heaven, the conicts between countries are never irreconcilable.
Cosmopolitanism Based on Reective Communicative Action
In the vision of post-Enlightenment, Kantian rationalism based on human
agents has been regarded as a useless conception by Nietzsche and MacIn-
tyre, while reective communicative action becomes the more illuminating
source of ideas for the formulation of cosmopolitanism, following the re-
construction by Habermas. In Habermas’s argument, although we live in a
multivalue society, there still exists a weak sense of reason that comprises a
social overall consciousness so that the validity of norms is not destroyed by
pluralism. Such a homogeneous consciousness is the result of reective com-
municative action between participants. In argumentative practice, people
get to know the reason why the actions of others make sense and why those
actions are moral. In this way, people reach a kind of mutual understanding
even if they disagree with each other (Habermas, 1996, pp. 17-23).
On the issue of cosmopolitanism, Habermas has been criticized by Zhao
Tingyang for two reasons. On the one hand, mutual understanding does not
guarantee a consensus. People tend to stand up for themselves rather than
compromise, especially when it concerns beliefs, identity and welfare. On
the other hand, society is constantly changing. People cannot aord the time
cost of communicative action, and they are required to make decisions right
away. The two aws of Habermasian cosmopolitanism, as Zhao suggests,
lead to the bankruptcy of discourse theory (Zhao, 2019, p. 48). Actually,
whether Habermas’s discourse theory is bankrupt depends on the purpose of
cosmopolitanism. For example, some Chinese scholars argue that they would
rather nd a temporary and contextual point of cooperation in a multivalue
world than set very high standards of political obligation for every nation as
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on the principle of all-under-heaven, in which case Habermas could oer a
way to constructing a thin theory of cosmopolitanism.
First, on the basis of reective communicative action, we manage to maintain
the consistency of national identity. If people ground national identity on
the superiority of the native culture, the identity is doomed to collapse when
their nation is surpassed. However, if all nations, powerful or not, are able
to participate in communicative action as equals and build the world system
together, people from each nation can construct their national identities
under the condition of mutual recognition. In unocial activities, identity-
making becomes a dynamic process that involves constant dialog between
international students and native students, between foreign employees
and local colleagues, and between the artists who travel abroad to display
their exotic works. In a cosmopolitan way, people can gradually abandon
the power logic in the formulation of their national identities. Accordingly,
whoever loses power does not have to experience social fractures caused by
an identity crisis.
Second, reective communicative action is not only the way that national
identity produces itself, promoting a basis for the consent of the domestic
majority but also the way to reach intercultural consensus. As an increasing
number of countries engage deeply in globalization, we cannot construct a
universally valid norm by excluding countries with dierent cultural back-
grounds or forcing others to accept certain values. For example, in the con-
text of market globalization, many developing countries are involved in the
key parts of production and consumption. There is no reason to argue that
developed countries could gain economic benets from those countries while
excluding them from the procedure of rule-making. In the view of Haber-
masian cosmopolitanism, no one ought to make unilateral decisions about
the form or content of universal norms. Instead, every country should be an
equal actor in communicative action and oer its own discourse in argumen-
tative practice.
In this way, nationalism is not necessarily the opposite concept to cosmo-
politanism because the validity of universal norms depends on two kinds
of views interacting with each other –dening nations from the eyes of the
world community and constructing universal norms from the eyes of natives.
Meanwhile, the ideal goal of communicative action does not stop at mutual
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Li, Q. (2025). Constructing a Desirable Theory of Chinese Cosmopolitanism:
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understanding or an overlapping consensus but requires that every country
modify its cultural beliefs and bring that new perspective into the construc-
tion of a just world system.
To elaborate this further, the reason why Habermasian cosmopolitanism
meets the criteria of the consent of the domestic majority and intercultu-
ral consensus is that it emphasizes the relational dimension in the unders-
tanding of human essence. Some Chinese scholars have seen the similarity
between discourse theory and the teachings of Confucianism, as both try to
understand individuals in a relational dimension. From the point of discourse
theory, people with a mature personality in our time are the ones who learn to
look at problems through the eyes of others. In Confucianism, the maturity of
personality means that a person is able to establish his or her social relations,
such as a family and friends, and deal with those relations in a moral way
(Tong, 2006, p. 312). Analogically, by overcoming the self-centered view,
a state could leap out of the logic of ethnocentrism and engage in the cons-
truction of a world system with an open and tolerant mind, thus fullling the
potential of a culture-relational dimension in cosmopolitanism (Liu, 2015).
However, cosmopolitanism based on reective communicative action can
hardly meet the criterion of individual preference. To support the cosmopoli-
tan actions of our country, we do need to be seless in some way, but is com-
municative action necessary for this? As mentioned above, Confucianism is
a qualied candidate in the construction of cosmopolitanism, as it embodies
people’s moral intuition. Similarly, before the actual communicative action
occurs, such an intuition already exists among individuals. For instance,
when there is news on TV about a serious disaster happening in a very distant
country, most people would support their country in providing aid, and very
few might doubt whether the money is being put to the right use. Without
communicative action between individuals, they could still favor the idea of
cosmopolitanism. It is also notable that the consequences of communicative
action are uncertain; they may either reinforce people’s moral intuition to act
selessly or push people to act in their own interests.
Two Discourses in Solving the Contradiction of Chinese
Cosmopolitanism
Judging from the three criteria of desirability, the approaches to cosmo-
politanism grounded on Confucianism, universal principles, and reective
72 Cuestiones de Filosofía No. 37 - Vol. 11 Año 2025 ISSN 0123-5095 Tunja-Colombia
communicative action all have pros and cons. When Chinese cosmopolita-
nism learns from the Confucian teaching of universal love and its unique
way of realizing it, such a theory not only oers individuals a fair reason
to give up self-interests but also meets the nationwide demand for cultural
identity. When Chinese cosmopolitanism creates a new way to establish
universal principles, it embodies an idea that goes beyond the limitations of
culture, race and state, which we can see in the theory of all-under-heaven.
When people formulate Chinese cosmopolitanism in a reective form of
communicative action, they manage to construct a rm national identity
based on mutual recognition with other countries while ensuring that all
countries engage in the construction of a just world system, truly showing
the universal characters of Chinese cosmopolitanism.
Cosmopolitanism
Based on
Confucianism
Cosmopolitanism
Based on
Universal Principles
Cosmopolitanism
Based on Reective
Communicative Action
Individual
preference
✓
x x
Consent of
domestic
majority
✓
x
✓
Intercultural
consensus
x
✓ ✓
The problem is that it is not feasible to blend the three approaches together.
On the one hand, we cannot just add up the advantages of the three approa-
ches and keep them as complementary parts in one theory because what we
need here is the systematic discussion of a desirable cosmopolitanism, not a
summary of the topic.
On the other hand, it can be seen that the three approaches to cosmopo-
litanism do have irreconcilable contradictions according to the criteria of
desirability, which undermines the possibility of constructing a theory that
embodies them all. The main contradiction lies between the criterion of in-
dividual preference and the criterion of intercultural consensus. For the sake
of individual preference, we need to oer a reason with strong cultural and
local characteristics, as it will t into people’s private value orientations
73
Li, Q. (2025). Constructing a Desirable Theory of Chinese Cosmopolitanism:
The Diculties and a Solution. Cuestiones de Filosofía, 11 (37), 59-78.
https://doi.org/10.19053/uptc.01235095.v11.n37.2025.19790
more easily, such as the teachings of Confucianism. However, to meet the
criterion of intercultural consensus, the theory of cosmopolitanism cannot
be based on ideas in traditional culture, as that kind of political thought is
likely to be rejected by other cultural groups. To avoid the contradiction
above, I argue that Chinese cosmopolitanism can be developed into two
discourses: the discourse addressed to domestic people and the discourse
addressed to the international community.
First, the domestic discourse of cosmopolitanism mainly concerns the cri-
teria of individual preference and the consent of the domestic majority. On
this level, the teachings of Confucianism, such as taking care of all elderly
and children like your own family members, give individuals fair reasons to
sacrice part of their self-interests and support their country’s cosmopolitan
actions. In addition, the Confucian way of realizing universal love, such as
true benevolence emerging from one’s love for one’s own family, oers an
example of how to construct a practical form of cosmopolitanism and avoids
establishing impossibly high standards for normal people. It follows from the
Confucian approach to cosmopolitanism that only when China has ensured
the basic welfare of its own people can it aid other countries, which shows
a dierent priority in principle compared to Kant’s categorical imperative.
However, if we regard Confucianism as the only foundation of Chinese cos-
mopolitanism, there is a possible danger of a turn to cultural conservatism.
Overall, Confucianism not only teaches people the importance of universal
love but also develops the ideas that defend the feudal hierarchy. Therefore,
the domestic discourse of cosmopolitanism also needs to be grounded in Ha-
bermas’ theory of communicative action. In Chinese society, the argumen-
tative practice rooted in reective communicative action makes individuals
reconsider the teachings of Confucianism and adopt them conditionally ac-
cording to the specic context of modern life.
Second, the international discourse of cosmopolitanism chiey seeks to meet
the criterion of intercultural consensus. When China ocially began one
particular cosmopolitan action, the criteria of individual preference and the
consent of the domestic majority were given enough consideration in the
decision-making process and were not further engaged in the discourse of
cosmopolitanism that was addressed to the international community. Among
the existing approaches to cosmopolitanism in the Chinese academic world,
74 Cuestiones de Filosofía No. 37 - Vol. 11 Año 2025 ISSN 0123-5095 Tunja-Colombia
the idea of all-under-heaven takes intercultural consensus as its theoretical
target and tries to share the unique world view of traditional Chinese thought,
which could serve as the main source of China’s international discourse on
cosmopolitanism. Over the last two decades, the idea of all-under-heaven has
drawn wide and constant discussion in the Western academic world. Despite
scholars’ mixed reception, this phenomenon shows that the idea of all-un-
der-heaven is understandable to non-Chinese people.
Similarly, the idea of all-under-heaven alone cannot make a desirable form
of international discourse on cosmopolitanism because of its conservative
remnants. Although it proposes a possible way to settle the ever-lasting
conicts between countries, Chinese scholars still need to clarify that the
idea of all-under-heaven is not a new form of hegemonism. In this context,
they might come to realize that the theory of communicative action can
make up for the monological side of all-under-heaven. Adequate discus-
sions among dierent countries can reveal what part of all-under-heaven is
truly universal, which itself is an attempt to reach the criterion of intercul-
tural consensus.
Third, the domestic discourse on cosmopolitanism and the international dis-
course on cosmopolitanism each have their own points of focus, but they
are not two separate discourses. With the theory of communicative action
serving as a medium, they can complement each other dynamically.
In some cases, it is easier for foreigners to accept the discourse addressed to
domestic people just because it embodies the consent of the domestic majo-
rity by means of communicative action. Taking the United States as an exam-
ple, during the time after the civil rights movement in the 1960s, the theory
of cosmopolitanism gradually degenerated into a fancy idea held only by
scholars and the elites. Without an eective way of deliberation, some people
turned to support policies of anti-immigration and even racial discrimination.
Surely other societies would not be willing to adopt a political idea that has
proved to be a failure.
In the logic of Habermas’s conception, if every individual has a chance to
participate in the discussion of cosmopolitanism and nally comes to a con-
sensus, then such an idea of cosmopolitanism itself embodies the consent of
people about what their country should and should not do to meet the great
challenges of the era. In the process of modernization, the problems that
75
Li, Q. (2025). Constructing a Desirable Theory of Chinese Cosmopolitanism:
The Diculties and a Solution. Cuestiones de Filosofía, 11 (37), 59-78.
https://doi.org/10.19053/uptc.01235095.v11.n37.2025.19790
many countries face have much in common, so the idea of cosmopolitanism
in one country has the potential to benet other countries, which shows that
the discourse addressed to domestic people can be desirable to international
society if it is the outcome of social deliberation.
On the other hand, the discourse addressed to the international community
can in turn be desirable to native people because it is a window into knowing
what we are, which is an important source of national identity. As seen from
Habermas’s theory, the communicative action between countries does not
necessarily lead to a consensus. Instead, it helps to clarify the particularity
of each country and in some way creates a mutual understanding that we do
have dierences and that this is not in itself negative. Modern individuals, as
Charles Taylor suggests, have a strong desire for identity, which is usually
built on the recognition of others (1991, pp. 48-50). By telling foreigners
what we want to achieve in the international community, a discourse of cos-
mopolitanism with national characteristics can also contribute to the process
of identity-making.
In summary, with the medium of communicative action, the audience of the
domestic discourse of cosmopolitanism is not limited to native people nor
is the audience of the international discourse of cosmopolitanism limited to
foreigners. Separation is just a strategy to promote Chinese cosmopolitan
actions because the content of Chinese cosmopolitanism in dierent stages
needs to be addressed to dierent groups of people. In the formulation of
cosmopolitanism, the country oers an institutional platform for communi-
cative action among individuals and among states to occur and guarantees
the consistency of theory and action. Therefore, the relation between the idea
of cosmopolitanism and national identity should not be seen as contradictory
but as mutually reinforcing.
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