Skip to main navigation menu Skip to main content Skip to site footer

Vol. 7 No. 28 (2021)
Cuestiones de Filosofía

ARTICLES

Historical Epistemology with Epistemic Relativism

https://doi.org/10.19053/01235095.v7.n28.2021.12335

Published 2021-04-29

  • Alberto Fragio Gistau

Alberto Fragio Gistau
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Unidad Cuajimalpa, México

Abstract

This paper analyzes the communication breakdowns from the point of view of the historical epistemology of the styles of scientific reasoning. In order to clarify this issue, I will pay attention to the famous debate between Popper and Kuhn on the occasion of a symposium held in London in 1965. Popper considered Kuhn’s paradigms and incommensurability as an instance of what he called “the myth of the framework”, that is to say, the belief on the impossibility for a researcher to think outside of the framework of concepts and principles within which he is working, and compare it with another competing framework. I argue that the “myth of the framework” may help to further clarify some basic assumptions of the historical epistemology of the styles of scientific reasoning, as well as its relevance to a theory of communication. In this regard, my claim is that the epistemological explanation of the communicative breakdowns assumes a relativistic conception of styles of reasoning with framework, whereas the taxonomies of styles presuppose a transcendental conception of styles of reasoning without framework.

Keywords

styles of scientific reasoning, disagreement, communicative breakdowns, epistemic relativism, pluralism

HTML (Español) PDF (Español)

References

  1. Blumenberg, H. (2003). Trabajo sobre el mito. Barcelona: Paidós.
  2. Blumenberg, H. (2011). Descripción del ser humano. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
  3. Chandler, J.; Davidson, A. and Harootunian, H. (Eds.). (1994). Questions of Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion across the Disciplines. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  4. Chang, H. (2012). Is Water H2O? Evidence, Realism and Pluralism. Dordrecht: Springer. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-3932-1
  5. Chang, H. (2020). Relativism, Perspectivism and Pluralism. M. Kusch (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism (pp. 398-406). London / New York: Routledge. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351052306-43
  6. Crombie, A. (1994). Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition: The History of Argument and Explanation. London: Duckworth.
  7. Daston, L. (Ed.). (2000). Biographies of Scientific Objects. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  8. Daston, L. and Galison, P. (2007). Objectivity. New York: Zone Books.
  9. Daston, L. and Galison, P. (2008). Objetivity and its Critics. Victorian Studies, 50 (4), pp. 666-677. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40060410 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2979/VIC.2008.50.4.666
  10. Davidson, A. (1996). Styles of Reasoning, Conceptual History, and the Emergence of Psychiatry. P. Galison and D. J. Stump (Eds.), The Disunity of Science (pp. 75-100). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
  11. Davidson, A. (2001). The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  12. Davidson, A. (2004). La aparición de la sexualidad (J. López Guix, Trad.). Barcelona: Alpha Decay.
  13. Fleck, L. (1986). La génesis y el desarrollo de un hecho científico. Introducción a la teoría del estilo de pensamiento y del colectivo del pensamiento. Madrid: Alianza.
  14. Fuller, S. (2004). Kuhn vs Popper. The Struggle for the Soul of Science. New York: Columbia University Press.
  15. Gattei, S. (2008). Thomas Kuhn’s ‘Linguistic Turn’ and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism: Incommensurability, Rationality and the Search for Truth. Aldershot: Ashgate.
  16. Giere, R. (2016). Feyerabend’s Perspectivism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 57 (1), pp. 137-141. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.11.008 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.11.008
  17. Hacking, I. (1982). Language, Truth and Reason. M. Hollis and S. Lukes (Eds.), Rationality and Relativism (pp. 49-66). Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.
  18. Hacking, I. (2002). Historical Ontology. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
  19. Hacking, I. (2012). Language, Truth and Reason’ 30 Years Later. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 43 (4), pp. 599-609. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.07.002 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.07.002
  20. Hacking, I. (2015). Probable Reasoning and Its Novelties. T. Arabatzis; J. Renn and A. Simoes (Eds.), Relocating the History of Science. Essays in Honor of Kostas Gavroglu (pp. 177-192). Cham: Springer. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14553-2_12
  21. Hales, S. (2014). Motivations for Relativism as a Solution to Disagreements. Philosophy, 89 (1), pp. 63-82. https://doi.org/10.1017/S003181911300051X DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S003181911300051X
  22. Kinzel, K. and Kusch, M. (2018). De-idealizing Disagreement, Rethinking Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 26 (1), pp. 40-71. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1411011 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1411011
  23. Kuhn, T. (1970a). Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research? I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Series: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science. (pp. 2-24). London: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139171434.003
  24. Kuhn, T. (1970b). Reflections on my Critics. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Series: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science (pp. 231-278). London: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139171434.011
  25. Kusch, M. (2009). Objectivity and Historiography. Isis, 100 (1), pp. 127-131. https://doi.org/10.1086/597564 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/597564
  26. Kusch, M. (2010). Hacking’s Historical Epistemology: A Critique of Styles of Reasoning. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 41 (2), pp. 158-173. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.03.007 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.03.007
  27. Kusch, M. (2011). Reflexivity, Relativism, Microhistory: Three Desiderata for Historical Epistemologies. Erkenntnis, 75, pp. 483-494. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-011-9336-5 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9336-5
  28. Kusch, M. (2016). Relativism in Feyerabend’s Later Writings. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 57 (1), pp. 106-113. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.11.010 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.11.010
  29. Kusch, M. (2019). Epistemischer Relativismus. M. Grajner and G. Melchior (Eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie (pp. 338-346). Stuttgart: Metzler. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04632-1_41
  30. Kusch, M. (2020). Relativism in Feyerabend’s Later Writings. M. Kusch (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism (pp. 3-6). London / New York: Routledge. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351052306
  31. López, S. y Domingo, A. (Eds.). (2003). Popper y Kuhn: Ecos de un debate. Barcelona: Montesinos.
  32. Lovejoy, K. (2018). A.C. Pigou and the ‘Marshallian’ Thought Style. A Study in the Philosophy and Mathematics Underlying Cambridge Economics. Cham: Palgrave.
  33. Moulines, U. (2015). Popper y Kuhn: dos gigantes de la filosofía de la ciencia del siglo XX. Barcelona: Bonalletra Alcompas.
  34. Peine, A. (2011). Challenging Incommensurability: What We Can Learn from Ludwik Fleck for the Analysis of Configurational Innovation. Minerva, 49 (4), pp. 489-508. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43548632 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11024-011-9180-4
  35. Popper, K. (1970). Normal Science and its Dangers. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science 1965, 4 (pp. 51-58). London: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139171434.007
  36. Popper, K. (1976). The Myth of the Framework. E. Freeman (Ed.), The Abdication of Philosophy. Philosophy and the Public Good: Essays in Honor of Paul Arthur Schilpp. LaSalle: Open Court.
  37. Popper, K. (1994) The Myth of the Framework. In Defence of Science and Rationality. London / New York: Routledge.
  38. Sciortino, L. (2016). Styles of Reasoning, Forms of Life, and Relativism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 30 (2), pp. 165-184. https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2016.1265868 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2016.1265868
  39. Siegel, H. (1987). Relativism Refuted. A Critique of Contemporary Epistemological Relativism. Dordrecht: Springer. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7746-5
  40. Wang, X. (2016). Incommensurability and Cross-Language Communication. London / New York: Routledge.
  41. Worrall, J. (2003). Normal Science and Dogmatism, Paradigms and Progress: Kuhn ‘versus’ Popper and Lakatos. T. Nickles (Ed.), Thomas Kuhn (pp. 65-100). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613975.005

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.