Colombia y su participación en la Guerra de Corea:

Una reflexión tras 64 años de iniciado el conflicto*

 

 

Juan David Meléndez Camargo[1]

Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia

 

Reception: 20/07/2014

Evaluation: 12/08/2014

Approval: 27/11/2014

Research and Innovation Article.

 

Resumen

El texto hace una reflexión sobre la participación de Colombia en la Guerra de Corea y las implicaciones políticas que tuvo para el país. Dicha participación generó mucha polémica porque Colombia fue el único país latinoamericano que colaboró con la causa norteamericana para derrotar la expansión del comunismo. En este contexto geopolítico de la Guerra Fría se iniciaron las llamadas “guerras satélite” patrocinadas por los Estados Unidos y la extinta Unión Soviética. Para este estudio, la prensa de circulación colombiana es de gran relevancia porque permite hacer seguimiento al desarrollo de esa confrontación armada, desde la perspectiva de los soldados colombianos y lo que esta intervención le dejó al Ejercito y al país. En términos generales la competencia ideológica de Estados Unidos y la URSS, que inició tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial, vinculó a muchas naciones tercermundistas en la coyuntura del agitado orden político mundial y polarizó sus relaciones políticas.

 

Palabras clave: Guerra de Corea, Guerra Fría, Colombia, Batallón Colombia, Comunismo.

 

Colombia and its participation in the Korean War:

A reflection, 64 years after the beginning of the conflict

 

Abstract

This document is a reflection on the participation of Colombia in the Korean War and the political implications it had for the country. This participation generated much controversy in Colombia because it made Colombia the only Latin American country that cooperated with the North American cause to defeat the expansion of communism. In the geopolitical context of the Cold War, the so called “proxy wars” began, sponsored by the United States and the former Soviet Union. The Colombian press was very relevant for this study in political history as it allowed t the development of this armed confrontation to be followed from the perspective of Colombian soldiers in Korea, and the reflection about what this intervention achieved for the army and the country. In general terms, the ideological race of the United States and the USSR that began after World War II, drew many third world nations into the agitated political world order, polarizing their political relationships.

 

Keywords: Korean War, Cold War, Colombia, Colombian army, Communism.

La Colombie et sa participation dans la Guerre de Corée: une réflexion 64 ans après les débuts du conflit

Résumé

Ce texte propose une réflexion à propos de la participation de la Colombie dans la Guerre de Corée et des implications politiques qu’elle a eues pour le pays. Cette participation a suscité de vives polémiques parce que la Colombie a été le seul pays latino-américain à s’engager dans la cause nord-américaine dont le but était de stopper l’expansion du communisme. C’est dans le contexte géopolitique de la Guerre Froide qu’ont débuté certaines guerres dites “satellites”, parrainées par les Etats-Unis et la disparue Union Soviétique. Pour cette étude, est d’une grande importance la presse colombienne qui permet de suivre au pas le développement de cette confrontation du point de vue des soldats colombiens, et d’analyser les conséquences de cette intervention tant pour l’Armée que pour la Colombie. En somme, la dispute idéologique des Etats-Unis et de l’Union Soviétique, entamée dès la fin de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale a entraîné beaucoup de nations du Tiers-monde dans la conjoncture mondial d’un ordre politique trouble, en polarisant leurs relations politiques.

 

Mots clés: Guerre de Corée, Guerre Froide, Colombie, Bataillon Colombie, Communisme.

1. Introduction 

More than sixty years after the cease-fire was established around the 38th parallel which ended the war between the two Koreas, and because of the persistence of deep political and diplomatic differences in that zone, it is appropriate to make a retrospective view that can provide a general outline of this event. Taking advantage of the vast historiographical production on the subject, it is also important to review the implications that the news of the country's participation in the Asian conflict had in the context of the Cold War.

 

This war, which saw action between 1950 and 1953 in North and South Korea, was one of the conflicts with the greatest participation of foreign countries in a single territory and, evidently, was an almost direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in a period characterized by the greatest international political tension of the twentieth century. By 1950, the world political order was quite complex, as the expansionist and containment strategies of the power blocs shaped the diplomatic future of the planet, and the struggle against communism became widespread in some regions.

 

It may be surprising that, for Colombia, this conflict in distant lands would have effects, and even more so if one speaks of the Colombian soldiers who died in Korea or of veterans who tell their story today. This was because of a disputed decision that turned Colombia into the only Latin American country that really and materially collaborated with the North American cause, to defeat the expansion of communism in Korea; a large contingent of national soldiers fought against the North Koreans and Chinese on the peninsula.

 

Colombia's active involvement in the conflict meant the beginning of a serious controversy that is still under discussion today when the social conditions that the country lived in are recalled, in a time marked by violence and considered key to the understanding of some processes that today are still in existence. That support for South Korea's defense, which was nothing more than another battle for US anti-communist policy in the Pacific, was supported by the conservative majority in Colombia, a political group that reflected the Western thinking that reigned at the time in the country; but on the other hand, this support was seen as a mistake that ignored the national reality of partisan war that was being lived and that jeopardized the sovereignty of a country with no notable experience in international guerrilla war[2].

 

The news took the citizens by surprise, but with the passing of time it became a reality that, in the press for example, was confirmed through headlines such as: "Colombia's effective aid in Korea announced[3] "or "The Colombian offer to Korea is not platonic, says Chancellor[4]”.

 

In the context of the Cold War and the violence in Colombia, the bloody confrontation on the Korean peninsula lasted for three years. It left more than half a million dead. The decision of national participation was controversial, but it also led to the recognition of the Colombian contingent for their performance by the Americans[5]. In the words of the recently deceased General and Captain of the Colombia Battalion, Álvaro Valencia Tovar, it can be said that: "More ink has been spent on Colombian newspapers and magazines in discussing the country's military presence in Korea than in praising its exploits on the battlefield[6]”.

 

In order to make such a revision, it is essential to keep in mind the following questions: Did the assumption of a communist enemy of order, make the Colombians understand that the country's participation in the Korean War was a diplomatic obligation? Was the participation of Colombia in the Korean War the result of a particular need that was superimposed on the difficult local situation? Did the performance of the Colombia Battalion in the confrontation in the East serve anything more than the satisfaction of a governmental interest? Or, what were the gains of participating in the Korean War?

 

This work is divided into three parts. The first contextualizes the dynamics of the international politics that saw the rise of the Cold War and the Korean War. The second addresses the local problem, when Laureano Gomez responded affirmatively to the call of the UN in the midst of the "Violence". Finally, the third part deals with the development of the war and the entry into action of the Colombia Battalion and what this meant for Colombia.

 

2. Expansion or containment: A glimpse of what would be a not-so-cold war

In innumerable and valid investigations and publications made around the ideological confrontation that occupied half of the 20th century, between the two powers that emerged after World War II, depending on the side from which it is looked at, the conception changes radically. For that reason, it is important to see this structure of social and political transformations, aware of the western ideology that prevailed in Colombia and the region[7].

 

The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, those two powers that divided the world from the old continent, marked the postwar period of distrust and political tension which indicated the birth of the threatening Cold War. The political and economic division of the world was clearly marked by the Yalta and Potsdam accords, and the interests were sufficiently opposed for one to think that diplomatic relations would normalize after the great war.

 

The US government, in addition to being focused on the reconstruction of Europe, for its geographical position and its economic interests in regions such as the Pacific and Middle East, where, for example, oil played a very important role, would become the sponsor of both internal and international confrontations to support groups of third parties, who would eventually become militants of all kinds in areas as isolated as strategically desired.

 

For this reason, within the new United States foreign policy adopted since 1947, the Asian territories would be as important as Western Europe and it would seek to stop the communist advance from there. For 1950 with Harry S. Truman in his second mandate leading the United States, said foreign policy was based on containment and espionage. The Americans were in the full rearmament of their forces and the reconstruction of Europe, but criticisms of some of the president’s decisions were increasing. In April of that same year, the National Security Council of the United States decided to abandon its policy of nonintervention, which allowed the communist advance of China, and which went on to be reconstructed as a military power able to respond to any challenge[8].

 

On the other hand, Stalin's Soviet communism began to be seen as a risk as from 1946 when, in a speech with obvious ideological content, the top Soviet leader announced the postwar course that his country was going to follow. For the Americans, that meant "a definitive break with the spirit of the Great Alliance; the speech contained not a single friendly word to the Western powers[9]." Slowly an atmosphere of rejection and hostility towards the Americans was created and communism became an option for part of devastated Europe, "the revitalization of chauvinism and nationalism and the ideological belief in the aggressive hostility of 'Western imperialism' towards the Soviet Union were factors that contributed to creating the powerful amalgam that caused millions of Soviet citizens to subscribe in good faith to Stalin's post-war plans[10]."

 

The Cold War would then develop with two leaders who, without arriving at direct aggressive confrontation, had under their control several nations that would act on their behalf, or worse, define their local problems on their lands and with their people, but with the conditioned and interested military support of the powers. The nature of the conflict took on a global character and was part of a "universal struggle between good and evil[11].”

 

The so-called containment theory promoted by the United States sought only one thing: to keep communism away from the western zone and to control it in places where it already had influence. The idea was to block any possibility of an expansionist advance of Soviet theory, beyond what would be known as the "iron curtain." The task was monumental and it was sought by all means to make the countries that were under the influence of the United States see that the enemy was communism and the eradication of any of its forms of introduction was essential for the rulers to apply and thus, not jeopardize their political and economic stability.

 

In the case of Latin America, the emergence of the Cold War was of great impact. It transformed the regional policy completely and took this anti-communist mentality to the most hidden levels of society. Barbara Skladowska very well defines what a foreign war meant for the continent and especially for Colombia, where they appropriated various situations of the world context on a local level, for her it is interesting to see "how the Latin American continent translates external conjunctures, how it appropriates them. How it configures its representations, trying to find a place of significance in the complex geopolitics of the Cold War[12].”

 

This view of the Eastern ideology as a threat to be eradicated at the global level, led Colombia to consider blindly that forming an alliance with the United States in this mission would be a good way to give the government a firm image regarding the communist foci that already existed in Colombia[13]. Containment in Colombia would then be applied as it was on the global level, distorting the communist discourses and attacking the currents or movements that would support the policies of the USSR in the region[14].

 

An example of the Conservative party's repeated attempts to combat the alleged alliance between liberals and the Communist Party can be seen in the invitation made in 1949 by the National Conservative Directory to create a National Anti-Communist Front, arguing the alleged dangers and the damage brought to the motherland by these new totalitarian ideas.

 

At the time, Colombia had good relations with the US government and, in diplomacy, the following points can be highlighted, which at the end of World War II served as cohesive elements in the international policies of the two countries: first, the "active subordination" applied by the liberal government; second, the appointment of Alberto Lleras Camargo as the continental leader of the Pan American system; third, entry into the UN in 1945; fourth, the creation of the International Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance with the United States; and fifth, the creation of the OAS with Colombia as a fundamental part of the process[15].

 

For an anti-communist government, as the great majority of the American nations in the mid-twentieth century were, to support the United States in a cause such as halting the spread of Chinese Communism in Asia, would represent a future recognition by the Americans, but could also mean a military and economic failure for the country. For the United States, the possible assistance of a Latin American country did not mean so much, since there was little that the Americans could receive materially from Third World nations, but, as evidenced by the voices of the main leaders and by The United Nations[16], the need was great and there was an urgency to receive any kind of support and this action was expected promptly regardless of the nation[17]. Perhaps the human factor did represent a significant contribution to the troops that would be available in Korea, but politically, the countries of the region continued in a relationship of submission to the country of the north, which were practically forced to take action with a contingent; such was the case of Colombia.

 

But it all began on the other side of the Pacific when the scene of hostility formed and the tension of the nascent Cold War intensified with the victory of the communist revolution in China in 1949, when the USSR understood the importance of completing its dominion in the region[18]. Control of the Korean peninsula, which since 1945 had been snatched from Japan and distributed conveniently with a parallel as a referent, was in the hands of what began to be recognized as capitalist Korea and communist Korea. From that moment, the sector acquired a global political background with the two blocks of power as main actors, but with the particular problems and the interests of the rulers of the zone as detonators.

 

The troops of the North Korean army of Kim II-Sung, with Mao pulling the military strings from mainland China, crossed the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, arriving in the outskirts of Seoul with great ease and thus beginning the Korean War. This outbreak of war "radically militarized the Cold War and virtually reduced the space for peace talks and agreements in Europe to zero[19]." Both the United States and the Soviet Union that year had just withdrawn the bulk of their troops from the Korean peninsula, established there as guarantors of Japanese disarmament after World War II, and rearmament now seemed imminent.

 

After hearing the news of the advance of the North Korean army into the south, Truman decided to use force to respond to the invasion and, without consulting Congress, approved a military defense of the zone, sending ships and regiments and he immediately requested the support of the United Nations, which approved the intervention without much delay. Those who gathered around the president in Washington believed that the invasion had been decided in Moscow and that the North Korean government only obeyed orders, which was not true; "years later, when the archives of Moscow were opened, it was clear that it had been decided by the young and impulsive Kim II-Sung and that Stalin, always prudent, had bowed to his wishes reluctantly[20].”

Despite not being the result of a direct order from Stalin, the North Korean incursion would have the backing of the Soviet leader and China's triumphant people’s army. The Korean War was then born as a proxy war, that is, on the lands of the emerging Korean nations, the two most powerful world powers would measure forces, controlling the actions at a distance and giving economic and material support to the second actors that, because of the situation, were immersed in a confrontation that was inevitable.

 

But it was not only the United States and the USSR, because behind them were other important elements such as the United Nations and Chinese Communism, just to mention a few. In such a way that in this situation the countries allied to the powers knew that their position of support was fundamental and the declarations of aid were given politically and militarily to the whole world. It is important to be clear that this collaboration was not, in many cases, as voluntary as would be believed, since the Americans did not speak directly of aid to governments, but did suggest troop involvement and sometimes pressured countries under their protection and even the same foreign citizens who were in the American union.

 

When the newly-created United Nations Security Council quickly condemned the act and ordered the necessary assistance to repel the attack and restore security in the region, US President Harry S. Truman ordered the deployment of his forces and together with the contingent convened by the United Nations, the troops that were gathered added up to about 50,000 men. Under the command of the United Nations there were also troops from Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, Denmark, India, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey and Colombia.

 

Viewed from the political analysis of the time, beyond the defense of the integrity of a nation, these commitments and duties coordinated by the United States were, "more than the spirit of the crusade that inspired those responsible in Washington it was a generalization of the doctrine of the containment of communism[21]". The Korean War was a political confrontation above all else and, as Hobsbawm would say from the other side, "the general character of the war is a more important problem than the specific reasons that determine it. For example, it is more important to ask whether or not it has been a just war[22]."

 

The outbreak of the Korean War meant what could be called a materialization or militarization of the Cold War, the daughter of the postwar period, a name that in the Korean case would be paradoxical because of the intensity of the fighting. Everyone was waiting for a military outburst from this tension, perhaps on a nuclear scale, but this political and ideological confrontation, as history has shown, was nothing more than a political one, which generated an extreme advance in military technological development and obviously, widespread fear in every corner of the planet, while the Korean War was everything that the powers did not want to face in their own names and territories.

 

3. The controversial decision to go to Korea in the middle of the Violence

 

The society of the mid-twentieth century in Colombia witnessed changes in many aspects and difficulties in internal circumstances that had historically influenced the development of the country as a democracy. The beginning of the fifties can be understood as a transcendental moment in the social, political, diplomatic and even military arena, this for two recognized events that are part of that national history: first, the surprising and controversial participation of the Colombian Battalion in the Korean war; second, the increase of partisan violence[23] after the outbreak of the events of April 1948.

 

At the end of the Liberal Republic (1930-1946) in Colombia, the conservatives gained power, but accompanied by a period of political and social tensions between the supporters of the parties which maintained a bloody confrontation, while the liberal and conservative directorates experienced strong internal divisions. This phase of violence, which began in 1946, was felt strongly and the rural areas were basically in the midst of a struggle with the emergence of the liberal guerrillas in 1948, who belatedly responded to the crimes and abuses of official groups such as the "chulavita" police[24]. The American influence was felt in new anticommunist movements in national politics and, on the other hand, the situation was one of tension between the government and the nascent rebel groups of a liberal inclination[25]. Years ago, in the Bogotazo (April 9, 1948), there was an accusation, on the one hand, of the entry of international communist policies, reflected in radical liberalism and, on the other hand, the influence and definitive support of the CIA in radical right groups, soon to be the intellectual authors of the assassination of the liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, thus reflecting a polarization that permeated all areas of national politics, in many cases with unfounded accusations and confrontations. The discussion about the death of Gaitan, detonating the rebellion and those violent events, is a key piece to understanding and contextualizing the period and many of the subsequent actions of both rulers and the society[26].

 

The differences between the parties became abysmal and would be characteristic of Colombian politics thereafter, so it is not strange to see a reality that currently persists; as Daniel Pecaut affirms, there are dilemmas so strong that they still exist today with different characters, "at the political level, first, we certainly find different actors but we would be approaching similar dilemmas: the country of the forties, on the edge of popular insurrection and partisan engagement, and that of today, debating between war and negotiated peace[27]”.

 

Seen in this way, partisanship has historically been a determining factor in our nation, both in warfare and in the quest for peace and even in aspects temporarily removed from different conflicts, but which, even today, to a lesser extent, retain that tint and have been reflected in the socio-political evolution of Colombia. Presumably, by the 1950s, this scourge of partisan violence appropriated the local social and political sphere, so adhering to the controversial national participation in an international conflict could have meant that dangerous spark that was needed in the complex Colombian panorama. It is enough to look carefully at the period, to determine that this event would be of great importance for good or for ill and that it would weigh in on the image of the government of time[28].

 

It is not difficult to say then that Colombia had its own internal problems as well as social and political responsibilities at the time, so as to have intervened in a project that could represent more inconveniences and losses than benefits. Despite a slight increase in the economic aspect that the country had had to date[29], a Latin American country was not able to cope with a lasting military intervention abroad, since there were social priorities such as urbanization that began at the time[30]. However, with Laureano Gómez the ruling class was strengthened and economic dependence on the United States was consolidated. Although it was Gómez who officialized the offer of Colombia's active participation in the Korean War, this was a decision that had been studied in the last days of the government of Mariano Ospina Pérez, when the United States and the United Nations sought Latin American support in the struggle to demonstrate that the West as a whole was against communist expansion[31]. For a year, the subject of the way in which the American army would be supported was discussed and negotiated, since in spite of the interest of the conservative governor, the country was aware that its support could not go beyond the diplomatic and the United States accepted such support, but it was logical that American interest was focused on something tangible, as it finally found with Gomez.

 

The controversial conservative president, Laureano Gómez, from the outset, showed his inclinations towards the right, structured as from a very definite catholic vision. With great experience in the field of international relations for his multiple positions abroad representing the Colombian government, Gómez began his career by presiding over important public positions, but he was also transforming his political vision to the extent of supporting the Spanish falange with speeches loaded with hatred of communism and the republic, and advocating violence to justify self-defense[32].

 

The Liberal party was the target of the most vocal criticism of the president when he referred to the dangers of communism and the party's relationship with that ideology. For Barbara Skladowska: "(...) the anticommunist imaginary reached a particular tone, clearly antiliberal, which separates us, that is, Colombians, Catholics and conservatives, from the perverse them, communists, bandits, atheists and also liberals[33]." But as well, the Liberal party was the constant antagonist of the policies of Gómez and his government from the very moment of the conservative possession [34]. 

 

In addition to questioning the magnitude of the idea, all the criticisms "(...) asked why this man, apparently so opposed to the United States during World War II, would mobilize forces to fight alongside that country in Korea[35]". Given Gomez's position in the mid-twentieth century, when he supported European fascism[36], it can be said that the conservative president was urged to erase that image in order to achieve his more immediate political purposes. Evidently "as the United States emerged as the world's greatest anti-Communist power, there was a radical change in the relationship between the conservative leader and the nation that he had in the past described as Colombia's worst enemy[37].”

 

Laureano Gomez was one of the conservative leaders who cared little to hide his sympathy for the falange, but perhaps this characteristic has been given too much importance, more than the other political expressions that the president may have had in his public demonstrations, such as that great resentment that he held for the United States from time to time with the loss of Panama[38]. His performance can be seen as a timely move to ingratiate himself and gain military benefits for the Colombian army. For researcher Cesar Torres del Rio, Laureano, with his unconditional attitude towards the United States, pursued specific armament improvements for his army, unlike other governments, with more planned out interests[39].

 

Taking advantage of his position as a recognized enemy of communism in the region, because his discourse always showed his interest in combating the spread of this ideology throughout the world and in Colombia, Gomez sought to get closer to the Americans. The newspaper El Siglo shows many of the appearances of Laureano Gomez and his new position regarding the Americans, here a sample:

 

The prosperity of the United States and that of the entire world is threatened with death by the morbid communist who detests the well-being of peoples and seeks nothing but ruin and desperation to stimulate the resentment which is the fundamental basis of his system and hatred of some men for others, an animating force and unique in its methods. The United States has understood the obvious danger and is defending against it with irrevocable decision[40].

 

The president could be considered, in the eyes of Truman's anti-communist policy, as an important ally to American interests in the area. This possibility was important for the Colombian president, even more when he was interested in erasing his anti-American past. National policy was also focused on this Western view, and the position of the state was perhaps the most obvious example of this[41]. Official statements in favor of the eradication of and the war against communist ideology and its expansion, little by little showed the government's interest in convincing the public that intervention in Korea should be accepted and supported. In such a way that for the time being, the outbreak of the Korean War was for Gomez an opportunity to take advantage of in certain respects, and perhaps to gain approval from a society that did not fully support his mandate. As Álvaro Valencia Tovar affirms, the opposition saw Gómez's action as a way to gain political acceptance and neutralize pressures[42]. But this was a project that was perfectly framed in the context that was being lived and the decision was in line with the political situation in the region. The interest in foreign investment and the growing anti-communist thinking would be key elements in the decision, and the president knew very well what were the gains that this would bring to him, his government and his army.

 

One might also think that the partisan aspect had a lot to do with, for example, the sending of Liberal officers to Korea who, for one reason or another (political), were not in the President's affections and he would get to kill two birds with a single stone, but this possibility was easily dismissed because, as Bushnell states: "(...) this idea, apart from lacking concrete evidence, is somewhat improbable. Liberal officers could cover themselves with glory on foreign battlefields and then return to the country to try to overthrow Gomez[43]." This, undoubtedly, could be extremely conflictive for the interests of the president, seeing the militants of the opposition party transformed and received as heroes.

 

In opposition to explanations such as Henderson's, there is the theory that Eduardo Sáenz sets out, affirming that far from ideas or partisanship, Gomez's opening up to the United States in the diplomatic, political and military spheres "was due to a strategy of pragmatism, almost political survival, and not simply ideological motivations[44].”

 

The two main points of criticism or discussion as to the President's motives for supporting the American cause were: communism being Gomez's enemy and not an enemy of the nation, and the war as a political and economic tool with which to fulfill the interests and needs of the nation, its army and the president himself. It is fundamental to analyze the justifications that were given at the time and to see them from the perspective of power, a transcendental element of the relations between what was the state and the citizenship of the time, with a discourse transmitted through the press, the infallible tool of rulers over the years in our country. Referring to Philip Abrams, it is understood not as something hidden in political practice, but as a set of relationships and practices of power not superficial, or rather, "that mask that prevents us from observing the political practice as it is[45].”

 

The importance of seeing how the government shapes public opinion or determines what is informed about or not, lies in the implications that this practice had at a given time. In the case of conservative governments, it would have to be said that the management of the news through the press did not have to be so complex, since at many levels of politics and society one could perceive the fear of Communist expansion and that Western vision was only resisted by a few liberal sectors. Possibly there was an interest in legitimizing Laureano Gomez himself, not simply with the participation in an international war, which very surely had its motives revolving around political interests or ideologies, but by the local context that could be seen in the censorship of the press (1949-1957). In such a way that the information that the citizens received, came surely modified, far from the reality, or biased by official publishers.

 

The same nature of the time marked the conception that the society could have of that news and, possibly, what was transmitted responded to a political tendency of the moment and it was not allowed to criticize the situation, in such a way that the citizenry was accommodated to a particular view of events. The search for the self-legitimation of the acts and determinations of his government led Gómez to manipulate, as far as possible, information or the access to it, to control that important thing that revolved around the people, who were seen as a popular mass that approved or disapproved of its management. The objective was to dominate by means of the discourse to that fundamental group, and, for the case that we were dealing with, the printed media were then a bridge between the authority and that society that witnessed the news events that came from abroad.

 

Regarding the press, for Laureano Gómez, the criticism came from the newspapers of the liberal opposition, such as El Tiempo, which, as Adolfo León Atehortúa notes, stated on August 22, 1950 that "it would be better to send ten thousand Chulavitas to fight against the communist beasts and at the same time pacify the country[46]." This is not the only example of the large number of voices that came out to oppose the plans of Gomez, but it is the reflection of the nonconformity of a people submerged in violence who called for more wisdom on the part of their president.

 

On the other hand, the official newspaper El Siglo, owned by Laureano Gómez, defended the decision and explained each point that justified the closeness to the United States through military support. This newspaper emphasized an urgent need to supply the weapons to fight against communism[47].

 

One point in which these two representatives of the press coincide for the period of war is that they see the unity of Colombia with the United States as a strategy of power, which in the end will benefit the two nations, one immediately and the other in the future.

 

For a highly useful theoretical approach when discussing the role of power in this complex period of Colombian and international history, we can refer to Max Weber, an author who speaks of a clearly structured power that occurs in the relations of "political communities" and which is a reflection of a class struggle that seeks position. Through Weber's structuralist methodology, we can see a power in two ways, first as the axis of the development of a struggle within the world of politics and secondly, as the sole end of the characters that are part of that structure, which is based on the social, but that have personal interests in the background[48].

 

Global interests, understood as the pursuit of the greatest utility in the scene of world politics in this case, can be seen as the center of a relationship between one and others that is characterized by the alignment with a cause (the one that is most convenient) and this is defined knowing who it is that has the prestige and the power[49]. Colombian aid to the United States would then be seen as a personal strategy with different objectives that would be achieved if they were appropriately matched in the international map with the decision. Undoubtedly, the whole weight of the matter cannot be relegated to a mere personal desire, since there was much more in the context, but this was key in that sovereign determination for diplomatic, political and economic purposes. For the case of the Colombian political context from 1950 to 1953, we can speak of a generalized thinking at an international level that permeated the local sphere and was the basis of the organization by the government of the local leaders who took advantage of the circumstances to attack their rival politicians, ingratiate themselves with different sectors and demonize what from the north was seen as a possible threat[50]. This is evident when Gómez, in his inaugural address in August 1950 emphasized the fundamental role of the United States in the struggle against communism and the importance of supporting that cause:

 

On August 7, 1950, at the inauguration ceremony, Gomez gave his unconditional support to the US government's foreign policy and its role in Korea for its "heroic effort to save civilization"; he described the United States as "the defender [country] of the sovereignty and independence of the people and of the freedom and dignity of men that the communist tyranny wants to destroy[51].”

 

Shortly thereafter, he made the specific offer of a full battalion created for the conflict in Asia and a vessel that would provide logistical and monitoring support on the South Korean coast. Here is an excerpt from the official letter that the Colombian government sent to the United States:

 

 […] the Colombian government places at the disposal of the United Command an infantry battalion, composed of approximately 1,080 well-trained personnel, without artillery support, composed of regular forces. This battalion at present is equipped with an irregular variety of European and American infantry armaments. It would be necessary, then, that before its departure for Korea it be endowed with the weapons of the United States infantry and trained in their use. The Government of Colombia recognizes that it will incur the obligation to reimburse the United States Government for the value of the training, logistical support and any other services that the battalion must receive […][52]

 

The UN accepted this option and the news was released by the media in Colombia, and the controversy inevitably arose within Colombian public opinion. The action was made official with the trip made by the Minister of War to Washington to specify the conditions of the aid[53], which despite being small was important, since no other country in the region had sent troops to the conflict zone (remember that the OAS was unable to make a massive contribution from the region to the conflict, only Costa Rica and Colombia did so in a non-symbolic way.

 

This anti-communist struggle that the United States led and which Laureano Gomez pursued for his government, undoubtedly helped the conservative president to draw closer to the Americans and this is why, from a diplomatic point of view, such an action would not be surprising in the context mentioned[54]. But in spite of the different circumstances and the background of the government's decision, the Korean War would be part of the country's military history from that moment on.

 

And it is so that for years, Gómez had been managing a discourse of patriotism that fit perfectly into that situation when he was president. He always sought to speak of order and the importance of defending the nation above all else, with the religious faith that characterized it; now a war abroad that would seek to end a "threat" for the homeland would be fully supported, all in order to fight against chaos and evil[55].

 

Without having a better option, the soldiers who formed the Colombia Battalion had to defend the flags of a group of nations that fought against something more than a simple aggressor army, without thinking about the motivations and the real usefulness of this participation in a war of a global magnitude.

 

In the eyes of the president, this was an opportunity to improve the situation to ensure a future that was promising with the ally in the north, regardless of the political and economic effort that it represented to him. It should not be forgotten that the United States, in addition to its anti-Communist discourse, always promoted a Pan-American unity in order to win allies in the region, so for Gómez there was nothing to lose regarding the motives that internationally they would defend, since he denounced the possible penetration of foreign communism through liberalism. For its part, the Liberal party in Colombia strongly criticized the purchase of weapons by the conservative government, which was finally signed in 1952. Another criticism was that of sending soldiers to fight and, quite possibly, to die in Korea as if they were serving a death sentence[56].

 

The challenge for Laureano Gómez was to form the contingent and to specify the armaments that it would have in combat and that, very likely, would return to the country to be part of the National Army. The process was by no means simple, since Colombia, as part of the countries that accepted the call to collaborate with the United Nations, had to respond with its own weapons or otherwise pay for them to be provided by the United States, and this was the option to be taken by the government of Gomez, although, before signing the agreement, they had to negotiate the economic aspects, but in the end they would be accepted because America – for the intensity of the war that was coming - would obviously receive the Colombian contribution with open arms, even though it was inferior to that offered by other nations.

 

It was not long after having agreed on the military aid that the government of Gomez asked the United States for armaments for the battalion and to thus generate a good image of the country and have an acceptable performance in the Korean peninsula. Also, in 1951, the Colombian minister of war considered the possibility of obtaining armaments for the improvement of the Military Forces in the country. This situation was evidently very untimely for the American cause, which was in need, but it was not able to give aid and Colombia was not in the condition to pay.

 

4. The War and what the Colombia Battalion brought to it

 

The Americans repeatedly pressed for Colombia to pay for troop and equipment improvements in Korea, but they did not go further because they understood the situation and were aware that any sanction or action would cause the withdrawal of the battalion and that other allies would no longer want to help. A study by the armed forces of that country concluded that it was necessary to recondition the majority of the Colombian battalion and it was not feasible to do so, but it was finally done.

 

On the confrontation on the Korean peninsula, many studies have illustrated the nature of this war, highlighting the military strategy of General MacArthur at the head of the UN's defensive troops, or the effectiveness of the Communist armies on the North Korean side[57]. For the Colombian case, the book of Valencia Tovar is a reference that describes, step by step, the work of the Colombian soldiers in the East[58]. If you want to study closely the participation of the Colombia Battalion in Korea, it is also essential to examine the work of Brigadier General Gabriel Puyana García Por la libertad... en tierra extraña. Crónicas y reminiscencias de la guerra de Corea[59], a text which revives the day to day lives of the Colombian soldiers in the peninsula and shows his perspective of the conflict where he served as a lieutenant of the Colombian Battalion. Finally, is the investigation carried out jointly by these two important Colombian military men, called En Corea por la libertad y por la gloria: participación colombiana en la guerra 1951-1953[60]. In this work, with a purely military approach, there is an analysis of the action of the Colombian military in the bloody war against the communists.

 

The active participation of Colombia began with decree 3230 of 1950 in which the frigate "Almirante Padilla" was made available and with decree 3927 of December of 1950 which created the infantry Battalion N ° 1 Colombia, which would be trained in Bogota and the United States and then join one of the American companies in the combat zone[61]; 1050 men formed the contingent sent to Korea, which arrived in Pusan ​​on June 16, 1951 and was received by the South Korean president, Sygman Rhee. As commander of the Colombian battalion was designated the infantry lieutenant colonel, Jaime Polanía Puyo and as executive and second commander, Major Alfonso Novoa Morales. The reinforcements joined the 24th American Division and saw combat for the first time on August 7. On this date, we find a detailed account of Captain Álvaro Valencia in El Espectador, here is an aside from the text that describes the entrance to the "fire zone" of the Colombian Battalion:

 

The morning of August 7 arrived at the front line of the Third Battalion after a night of vigil in which five violent Chinese attacks crashed in their suicidal fury against tenaciously defended positions [...] at seven fifteen, patrolmen were advancing through the undergrowth and slowly they were approaching towards the height. I looked at the clock: seven-thirty ... A figure was drawn behind the burnt logs that crowned the summit, and an explosion shook the air[62] […]

 

The Colombian military mounted a memorable defense of Kumsong from 13 to 23 of October, in the beginning of 1952 they were transferred with the 31st infantry division of the United States and they fought notably in the "Old Baldy" before being relieved by the 2nd American Battalion on July 4th. By the date that the battalion left Korea in October 1954, 131 Colombians had died in combat[63].

 

The group, specially formed for the Korean War, was characterized by the large number of volunteers who, in addition to the varied and different personalities, probably decided to go to a confrontation outside their country for private reasons. An example of this is told by veteran Raúl Tibaduiza:

 

 […] I was 21 years old and I decided to enter service, because you could not go anywhere safely, when the army came and asked for papers, that tired me and I gave myself to (laughter). It took 3 months and one day to my company of 30 soldiers, they told us that we had to go to fight in a war in Korea. We with the illusion of traveling and of knowing, because we did not think beyond[64] […]

 

These fighters in the east knew at least that they were fighting for the cause of the United States, and they knew that their enemy was communism, but they scarcely understood the broad context of the greater situation, they were there for a cause and one invisible from the trenches, battling for the "great homeland" that had sent them, from that "little country[65]" that was nothing more than the field of war where they had no choice but to join with their counterparts and defend not a cause but their integrity. In short, you can say that they went without motivation, at least a general one, and also, without a knowledge of what they were going to do specifically and in some cases, they did not even know where they would[66].

 

Many of these soldiers, especially the youngest, enlisted in order to know a war from within and to gain recognition, often without knowing if they would return to Colombia or not. Other cases were civilian volunteer reservists who for legal reasons or for simple unemployment saw a new opportunity in Korea and the government, aware of their situation, enlisted them knowing that it had nothing to lose. Finally, there were the officers and sub-officials who, because of their behavior or their inconveniences in the forces were practically forced to go to combat, in this case the volunteers "did not correspond to the reality", it is also said that the political affiliation of many these had something to do with it. It is said that the morale of many members of the newly formed battalion was not adequate and that they were not there precisely for good behavior or because they generated much confidence in their commanders[67].

 

But this opposition to the soldiers' testimonies came from the high command of the military forces that years after the war affirmed that the subject of volunteers was not certain, or at least the only determining factor, and that the partisan political aspect was fundamental in the formation of the initial group. The same Valencia Tovar claims that: "Serious flaws were evident in the selection process. The "volunteers" did not correspond to the reality. The uneasiness that was evident among the non-commissioned officers exposed the extent to which the morbidity of partisan politics was invading the professional and apolitical army (...)[68]. " We also find the testimony of Gabriel Puyana, who states that: "... they chose precisely those who by their misconduct or antecedents seemed convenient to release to their unit[69].”

 

 

As to the objectives and instructions that were given to the Colombian military at the time of departure, it can be said that the national contingent was destined to obey and collaborate in the demands of the American army and to join their forces, a clear example of that is that they fought with American uniforms. The local commanders in charge of training in Cantón Norte in Colombia did not have specific points to develop in confrontation, more than sending a reinforcing contingent, so any heroic act or fairly important victory would be a gain for the high commanders who made this collaboration possible from a distance.

 

The Colombian army itself reflected the situation of its current leader, that is, it directly supported a war, but with a personal conviction rather than a truly defined social or national motive, in other words, with more will than reason. Soldiers within the ranks recognized an enemy of the government but not an ideal of the fatherland, since the orders were clear and were fulfilled, but many had personal objectives or situations that complemented that impulse[70].

 

On a strictly military level, the Korean War meant for Colombia, the deployment of just over four thousand men between infantry and navy to totally unknown lands and to an area where war was at its peak and there was no room to become familiar with the place much less to make mistakes, although as there were so many allied forces, training and rest were fundamental when they could occur[71]. Obviously, the soldiers of the Colombia Battalion did not fight alone or without guidance, since the American troops were constantly reinforcing and collaborating in the operations logistics of the South Americans or vice versa, an example is the entry into action of the Frigate Almirante Padilla in Korean waters, something that was transmitted in great detail:

 

From Tokyo, they report that the "Almirante Padilla" frigate, with Colombian crew and under the orders of the United Nations and the North Americans, has found action in Korean waters by supporting a British landing on the coast near the North Korean capital, according to the barracks general of naval forces in the Far East. The operation was developed with precision, ships from four-nations supported the commandos[72].

As from 1951, the most violent and most important fighting took place against the Chinese Communist armies, which suffered hundreds of casualties, and for about two years they confronted the Red Army in struggles for hills and strategic points that were vital in gaining ground[73]. Among the operations or battles that Colombian soldiers had the most impact and recognition in were those of Climber and Old Baldy, as they achieved victories in strategic places and with outstanding performances, thus showing results, somehow not expected by the world powers that were present in the conflict[74].

 

The Korean War was advancing and in world politics it seemed that a military defeat was expected in order to proceed with a dialogue that would put an end to hostilities[75]. In the so-called "Nomad offensive", which represented the last great advance of the Allies, the members of the Colombia Battalion stood out before the American commanders of different divisions. Within the group, the stories began to emerge and today these memories remain intact:

 

When we did not find a mine, it was a patrol, or if not, an agent. I was very scared of dying, because the people spread out in the street, or the wounded who passed without a leg or without an arm, helped by their companions. It did not give me hope that I would return alive, many comrades became crazy because of that chaos[76].

 

This is just one example of what the participation of these men was in the peninsula, because there are many experiences and stories that later came from this group, and which recreate what it is to live a war from within, with all the characteristics of the military structures, and the military men, armaments and human demands of a world-class conflict.

 

By 1953, before the end of the conflict, the Ministry of War showed its intention to withdraw the Battalion from the conflict zone for reasons of sustainability and because of increasing human losses. The decision was made by the government of Rojas Pinilla, but not before discussing the possibility of acquiring more weapons from the United States. However, the Colombian Battalion would remain on the Korean peninsula, carrying out surveillance work in the disarmament zone that was created after the end of the conflict, remaining there until August 1954.

 

The results of the operations in which Colombians participated and some distinctions that were made at the end of the war would show that, far from being a positive event for the dynamics of the country at that time, the participation of the Colombian Battalion fulfilled the primary objective of providing real aid to US and South Korean troops in the war. As for the benefits of sending the contingent to Korea, it could also be said that it was also useful, since a large amount of armaments returned to Colombia, and, above all, the experience acquired by the soldiers meant an advance of years for the ranks of the Colombian military in the country, which was of great service. And the most important thing was what was subsequently gained by the Colombian Military Forces, since notable advances were seen in aspects such as logistics, armaments and training[77]. According to official documents, it was stated at the time that the participation of the country exclusively sought the American consideration of the National Army, which included: "creating thirteen infantry battalions, acquiring two frigates, some warplanes and transport vehicles, to fight the guerrillas of the Llanos[78]."

 

This was done in two ways: by supporting, in a real way, a country that in the future would recognize the effort that had been made, and also achieving local military benefits that would later be reflected in the development of the army. Two clear examples of these achievements are: (A) in the years that followed, US military support increased sharply. B) many of the combatants who returned to the country were sent to fight peasant guerrillas, applying the techniques learned in foreign lands[79].

 

For Valencia Tovar, the lessons of the Korean War can be summarized in what is known as the 'third military reform of the twentieth century' which included: the introduction of the Plana Mayor, the perfection of the tactics of fire and movement, and the technical, defensive doctrine, the introduction of intelligence and counterintelligence, the order for the logistical functioning of troops such as transportation, rations, uniforms, etc., technical improvements in communications, instruction through visits, manuals and texts to members of the army, advancements in naval science, among others. Valencia Tovar acknowledges the capacity of adaptation of the Colombia Battalion to the orders of the North Americans and to the performance that these men had in a war that had demands as far as the relations of control is concerned[80]. This vision, despite being that of a military protagonist for our country in that event, serves as a reference to interpret what the conflict meant to those men who gave their lives for Colombia, beyond the political context that surrounded them.

5. Conclusions

The ideological competition between the United States and the USSR that began after World War II, linked many tertiary nations in the circumstances of the agitated political world order. Latin American, Asian, and Eastern European countries would be involved in this post-war rivalry, with episodes such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Central American liberation wars, and the Gulf Wars.

 

The Korean War was not a simple proxy war like the one that would be seen in the second half of the 20th century, since it was one of the episodes in which the United States and the Soviet Union were nearest to direct confrontation. The results of the war involving close to 20 nations, which ended with the declaration of a cease-fire and a pact which divided the country at the 38th parallel in July 1953, show a conflict with extremely political international overtones, which was not resolved for the purpose of this confrontation.

 

The fact that Colombia, under Laureano Gomez's government, affirmatively responded to the call for help from the United Nations and the United States in defending South Korea's territory, was a matter of discussion regarding the reasons that the president had for sending troops abroad. Many were the theories that attempted to explain the decision taken by the President, since it was an action that represented extensive political and diplomatic activity and it is supposed that it was not driven by the simple generosity of the Colombian president in a crucial moment for the country and for his government.

His training, his ideology, his personal interests, his political necessities, his military projects, among others, were elements that served to interpret the president's decision in his time. But there was something to be said: that the country was not in a good position or at a good moment to lend itself to an intervention of such magnitude, and that his motivations were not based around a united nation. And it is true that the period of violence, due to its complex political and social developments, was an obstacle to the country's progress in many respects.

 

The decision to join in the Korean War, did not only generate dissatisfaction in the liberal opposition. Citizens who, through the various media, became aware of the development of the negotiations and, later, of the Colombian troops in the Far East, saw an ideal of the homeland transmitted, perhaps without realizing it, by means of the constant information of the Colombian soldiers in the War.

 

As for the military part, what the Colombian Battalion contributed was significant, because of the actions of its men in important battles alongside the United Nations troops, thus showing the other side of the situation, because despite the discussions and the internal reality of Colombia, this was a group that was representing the nation abroad and even came to be received as heroes at the time.

 

Sixty years after the ceasefire, it can be said that this war, obviously without ignoring the lamentable human losses, left for Colombia certain positive aspects in the strictly military sense, since the National Army was the institution that actually benefited from this episode, not to mention what was learned by the men who made up the Colombian contingent, and the reputation the national military began to acquire from this participation.

 

Like all wars, the Korean War left death, destruction and hatred in the societies of the protagonists and, as can be seen today, the differences persist in that eastern region, suggesting that the sacrifice of many foreigners was not enough to reach substantive agreements.

 

Documental Sources

“Colombia no ahorrará esfuerzo en la lucha contra el Comunismo internacional”. El Siglo, mayo 27, 1951.

“Colombia recibe la bandera de la ONU”. El Espectador, mayo 21, 1951.

El Espectador. Julio 15, 1950. 

 

El Espectador. Septiembre 19, 1950

“La ONU pide envío de tropas hacia Corea”. El Espectador, julio 14, 1950.

“La lucha contra el Comunismo apenas está comenzando, dijo Marshall”. El Espectador, octubre 28, 1950.

“La Fragata ‘Almirante Padilla’ participó en una audaz operación de desembarco en Corea Comunista”. El Espectador, junio 12, 1951.

 

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To cite this article:

Juan David Meléndez Camargo, “Colombia and its participation in the Korean War: A reflection, 64 years after the beginning of the conflict”, Historia y Memoria N°10 (January-June, 2015): 199-239.

 



* This article is the product of the research project titled: La prensa y la participación de Colombia en la guerra de Corea (The press and the participation of Colombia in the Korean War).

[1] Historian, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. Candidate for a Masters degree in History, Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia. Research group: Conflictos sociales siglo XX (Twentieth century social conflicts). Email address: jd_mmcc@hotmail.com

[2] It is important to note that not all Conservatives agreed with Laureano Gomez's decision, many sectors of the ruling party agreed with the opposition, saying that the offer sought to respond to external pressures against the regime and they opposed the sending of troops

[3] El Espectador, July 15, 1950. 

[4] El Espectador, September 19, 1950.

[5] As it was said within the ranks of the military forces after the end of the War, for the US generals, the Colombian Battalion was not an exhibition army, the Colombians gained a reputation as good combatants, surpassed only by the attitude and the performance of the Turks.

[6] Álvaro Valencia and Jairo Sandoval, Colombia en la Guerra de Corea: la historia secreta (Bogotá: Planeta, 2001), 320.

[7] A work that can be a reference of what was, politically, the Cold War and more specifically the Korean War in the eyes of the Colombians, is that of Bárbara Skladowska, Los nombres de la patria en la Guerra de Corea  (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 2007), a study that deals with the war based on the national protagonists, but which does not ignore the context or the complex discourses that were handled both locally and internationally in the development of the conflict, elements which that work sees as "agents and social mirrors.”

[8] André Fontaine, Historia de la Guerra Fría (Barcelona: Caralt, 1970), 13.

[9] Vladislav M. Zubok, Un imperio fallido: La Unión Soviética durante la Guerra Fría (Barcelona: Crítica, 2008), 93.

[10] Vladislav M. Zubok, Un imperio fallido…104.

[11] Josep Fontana, Por el bien del imperio: Una historia del mundo desde 1945 (Barcelona: Ediciones de Pasado y Presente, 2011), 16.

[12] Bárbara Skladowska, Los nombres de la patria en la Guerra de Corea (Bogotá: Uniandes, 2003), 22.

[13] A radical vision, but an absolute reflection of the thinking of that time is that of José M. Nieto, who affirms that "Colombian communism did not act as a loose wheel but rather as a cog in the great machinery directed from Moscow, interested in fomenting an extensive communist social movement in all the countries of America”. José M. Nieto R, La batalla contra el Comunismo (Bogotá: Empresa Nacional de Publicaciones, 1956), 20.

[14] For the particular Colombian case of the persecution of this ideology, see: Diego Jaramillo, La Satanización del Socialismo y del Comunismo en Colombia 1930 – 1953 (Universidad del Cauca, 2007).

[15] Adolfo León Atehortúa, “Colombia en la Guerra de Corea”, Revista Folios N° 27 (first semester 2008): 73.

[16] In a news item entitled "The UN calls for sending troops to Korea," UN Secretary-General Trygue Lie urged 52 nations of the world, excluding Russia and its satellites, for urgent effective support and especially infantry, El Espectador, July 14, 1950.

[17] El Espectador had the headline "The fight against Communism is only just beginning, says Marshall", and reported how the United States Secretary of Defense called on the twelve nations of the Atlantic pact to "raise their joint defences" and to comply with the promise of rearmament before the communist threat, also hoping that the nations of the pact act "more for themselves" and not expect only the help of the Americans, El Espectador, October 28, 1950.

[18] Stalin devised an economic cooperation agreement in northeastern China that did not include the Americans. Its aim was "to gain complete control of Manchuria, and the most convenient way to achieve this was through Soviet military occupation and, after the withdrawal of troops, using CCP forces as a counterweight to the nationalist government of the Guomindang and the Americans. Vladislav M. Zubok, Un imperio fallido…69.

[19]  Vladislav M. Zubok, Un imperio fallido…133.

[20] David Halberstam, La Guerra de Truman el día que Estados Unidos decidió invadir Corea [online]. La Razón February 14, 2011. 18:05h. http://www.larazon.es/detalle_hemeroteca/noticias/LA_RAZON_59042/la-guerra-de-truman-el-dia-que-eeuu-decidio-invadir-corea#.Udwbbb4o7mJ (November 17, 2013. 10.00h).

[21] Raymond Aron, La República Imperial (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1973), 182-187.

[22] Eric J. Hobsbawm, Entrevista sobre el siglo XXI. Al cuidado de Antonio Polito (Barcelona: Crítica, 2000), 22-25.

[23] Before the Bogotazo, at the end of 1947, there had already been 14,000 deaths caused by political violence. James D. Henderson, La modernización en Colombia. Los años de Laureano Gómez, 1889-1965 (Medellín: Editorial Universidad de Antioquia, 2006), 443.

[24] An necessary text to frame this period in Colombia is the work by Guzmán, Fals Borda and Umaña Luna, which even today continues to be relevent. Germán Guzmán Campos, Orlando Fals Borda and Eduardo Umaña Luna, La Violencia en Colombia: estudio de un proceso social (Bogotá: Editorial Iqueima, 1962).

[25] This period saw the birth of the guerrillas of the left in opposition to the conservative governments that dominated the panorama of the armed resistance in Colombia throughout the second half of the twentieth century, a clear example of this is the guerrillas of the plains or those of Sumapaz.

[26] Historiography has approached the theme of the bogotazo with the international context as a central axis. Gonzalo Sánchez says: "The episode of the alleged links between the Soviet Union and the events of April 9 is of no material importance today, but it does say a lot about diplomatic behavior in crucial issues, and above all it says much about the resources used in the rivalry between powers, and how following the Truman Doctrine, enunciated on March 12, 1947 and inspiring the post-war years, produced the alignments that took place in the international arena.” Gonzalo Sánchez, Grandes potencias, el 9 de abril y la Violencia (Bogotá: Planeta, 2000), 182.

[27] Daniel Pecaut, Orden y Violencia (Bogotá: CEREC y Siglo XXI Editores, 1987), 3.

[28] Daniel Pecaut, Orden y Violencia…19.

[29] It cannot be ignored that the decade of 1945 to 1955 saw growth in the economy, with an increase of 5% of the GDP, although evidently this does not justify nor support the military actions and the President also did not see it thus. See: David Bushnell, Colombia una nación a pesar de sí misma: De los tiempos precolombinos a nuestros días (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta, 1994), 282-285.

[30] Eduardo Sáenz, Colombia años 50. Industriales, política y diplomacia (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional, 2002), 79-111.

[31] Atehortúa would suggest that: “The United States sought the broadest Latin American participation, as it would show the interest of the West and the free world in facing communism”. Adolfo Atehortúa, “Colombia en la Guerra…64.

[32] After the triumph of Laureano Gómez, "Colombian politics acquired a clearly defined profile, characterized by the conservative monopoly of all public spheres. In this sense, political action lost all the dynamics of the period 1946-1949, insofar as the weakened liberal party was displaced from the main political stages.” Gonzalo Sánchez, Grandes potencias276.

[33] Bárbara Skladowska, “Los nombres de...65.

[34] Sáenz noted that: The Liberal Party announced that it would assume "an attitude of radical opposition ", and with the exception of a Cali newspaper, the liberal press did not circulate on days 7 and 8 in protest against Gómez.” Eduardo Sáenz, “Colombia años 50…45..

[35] David Bushnell, “Colombia una nación288.

[36] It is important to separate this European trend of totalitarian ideas, which Gómez did not practice in Colombia, as he did with his marked authoritarianism based on Catholic nationalism, which should not be confused with this support for the regimes of the old continent in the period of World War II (fascism and Nazism), which led him to be totally against the policies of the United States. See: Hésper Eduardo Pérez Rivera, “Acerca del Nacionalismo Católico de Laureano Gómez. 1930-1946”, Revista Colombiana de Sociología N° 20 (2003): 31-40.   

[37] James D. Henderson, Las Ideas de Laureano Gómez (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1985), 255.

[38] Stephen J. Randall, Alfonso López Michelsen: Su vida, su época (Bogotá: Villegas Editores, 2007), 121.

[39] “(…) while the Brazilian government turned its cooperation into a strategic political tool to obtain resources for development and industrialization, Laureano Gomez's government used Colombian military participation in Korea to solicit more weaponry from the Americans.Cesar Torres del Río, Colombia siglo XX: Desde la guerra de los Mil Días hasta la elección de Álvaro Uribe (Bogotá: Norma. 2010), 215.

[40] El Siglo, October 22, 1949.

[41] In an official meeting in the United States, with the help already accepted, Colombian Ambassador Restrepo Jaramillo said: "Colombia will spare no effort in the fight against international Communism”, El Siglo, May 27, 1951.

[42] Álvaro Valencia, “Colombia en la Guerra…225.

[43] David Bushnell, “Colombia una nación…289.

[44] Eduardo Sáenz, “Colombia años 50…47.

[45] Philip Abrams, “Notes on the difficulty of studying the state”, Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 1, N° 1 (March, 1988): 59.

[46] Adolfo Atehortúa, “Colombia en la Guerra…65.

[47] Adolfo Atehortúa, “Colombia en la Guerra…65.

[48] Max Weber, Estructuras de Poder (México D.F: Ediciones Coyoacán, 2004), 8.

[49] Max Weber, Estructuras de Poder…17.

[50] James Henderson, Las ideas de187.

[51] Eduardo Sáenz, “Colombia años 50…44.

[52] Letter of the Colombian offer of an infantry battalion. from the Colombian ambassador to the United States, Eduardo Zuleta Ángel, to US Secretary of State Dean Acheson”, November 14, 1950.

[53] With the headline "Colombia receives the UN flag," El Espectador reports on its front page about a symbolic act in New York where the United Nations flag was handed over by Secretary General Trygve Lie to the Colombian minister of war Roberto Urdaneta to be delivered to the Colombia Battalion, thus confirming the official acceptance of the offer. El Espectador, May 21, 1951.

[54] Rafael Martínez Pereira, Los tres regímenes: fuego, arrasamiento, desolación y lágrimas: doctor Mariano Ospina P., Doctor Laureano Gómez C., Doctor Gustavo Rojas P (Barranquilla: Clavería, 1974).

[55] “(…) the solution was always the same: if the Colombians wanted to save their nation from chaos they had to remain faithful to the philosophia perennis of Catholicism and fight against the evils that the speaker pointed out with evangelical zeal.” James Henderson, Las ideas de…130.

[56] Adolfo Atehortúa, Colombia en la Guerra…69.

 

[57] See: David Halberstam, La guerra olvidada: historia de la guerra de Corea (Barcelona: Crítica, 2009).

[58] For a complete reconstruction of what the participation of the Colombia Battalion in Korea was and the most significant battles, see: Álvaro Valencia Tovar and Jairo Sandoval, Colombia en la Guerra de Corea: la historia secreta (Bogotá: Planeta, 2001).

[59] Gabriel Puyana G, Por la libertad... en tierra extraña! crónicas y reminiscencias de la guerra de Corea (Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1993).

[60] Gabriel Puyana and Álvaro Valencia Tovar, En Corea por la libertad y por la gloria: participación colombiana en la guerra 1951-1953 (Bogotá: Imprenta y Publicaciones de las Fuerzas Militares, 2003).

[61] The Colombia Battalion immediately arrived in Korean territory and was put under orders of the United States Army, more precisely to the 21 Regiment of the 24 Infantry Division.

[62] El Espectador, September 2, 1951.

[63] This figure is so variable that there is no certainty about the final number of casualties, almost 700 is spoken of.

[64] Taken from the unedited text of the interview: “Viaje sin itinerario” of Carolina Alfonso Álvarez. Social Communication student. Universidad de Boyacá. 2014.

[65] Bárbara Skladowska, “Los nombres de...100.

[66] The veteran José Álvarez affirms that: “(…) many did not know where Korea was or why we were going to fight, but we did and there we arrived, with Infantry Battalion Number 1 Colombia”, Carolina Alfonso, “Viaje sin itinerario”, 1.

[67] Álvaro Valencia, “Colombia en la Guerra...228.

[68] Álvaro Valencia, “Colombia en la Guerra...228.

[69] Some of the officers and most of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers were assigned to Korea for partisan reasons, by region of origin, or simply, as Gabriel Puyana points out, to get out of various problems. All this allows us to think that the internal situation of the country and the army had much to do with the decision to go and with the same process of recruitment." Bárbara Skladowska, “Los nombres de...54.

[70] Celmira Figueroa (interviewer), Me fui para la Guerra de Corea sin permiso de mis padres [online]. Diario La Opinión, July 03, 2010. http//:www.laopinion.com.co (21 November, 2013. 09.30h).

[71] Some data from Bárbara Skladowska: 4,314 men. Four battalions (relief). 428 wounded. 69 missing. 28 prisoners exchanged. 139 dead. Source: www.fac.mil.co/2001/marzo/batacolom.htm

[72] Notice titled: “The frigate ‘Almirante Padilla’ participated in a daring landing operation in Communist Korea”. El Espectador, June 12, 1951. 

[73] See: Carter Malkasian, Essential Histories: The Korean War 1950-1953 (Osprey Publishing, 2001).

[74] Nigel Thomas, Peter Abbott and Mike Chappell, Men at Arms series n° 174. The Korean War 1950 – 53 (Osprey Publishing, 1986).

[75] In the heat of the war, the world was asking about the cessation of hostilities and the search for peace. The United Press correspondent, Leroy Pope, in a note of El Espectador titled "The world waiting to know when and how peace in Korea will be achieved," analyzed the conflict in Korea and questioned the continuity of the same on the part of the United Nations. Analogously, the journalist compared the Korean War with a judicial case in which the jury would define the future of the conflict according to their vision of each of the major events and the implications of permanence for Europe, for example. El Espectador, May 18, 1951.

[76] Testimony of what Raúl Tibaduiza saw. Carolina Alfonso, “Viaje sin itinerario”,1.

[77] This is what a veteran of war says about what the participation of the Colombia Battalion in the War left behind. Celmira Figueroa (interviewer), "I went to the Korean War without permission from my parents [online], Diario La Opinión, July 03, 2010. http//:www.laopinion.com.co (November 21, 2013. 09.30h).

[78] Gabriel Puyana García, Vivencias de un ideal: Relatos que pueden ser historia (Bogotá: Editorial Guadalupe, 2001), 122.

[79] Adolfo Atehortúa, Colombia en la Guerra…71.

[80] Álvaro Valencia, Colombia en la Guerra...312.