El último Bolívar: renuncia y retiro del ejercicio del poder (1829-1830). Entre la autoridad y la legalidad*

 

“For God’s sake, come quickly, as otherwise, we will drown in blood, and you will be responsible because this, being in your power, you do not prevent it”[1]

Rafael Urdaneta, Venezuelan serviceman

 

 

Álvaro Acevedo Tarazona[2]

Carlos Iván Villamizar[3]

Universidad Industrial de Santander

 

Reception: 19/01/2015

Evaluation: 12/02/2015

Approval: 13/05/2015

Research and innovation article

 

Resumen

 

En la documentación epistolar remitida por Bolívar, a través de las nociones de retiro y renuncia, se identificarán las posiciones políticas tomadas por Bolívar en sus cartas frente al ejercicio del poder, para tratar de señalar cómo estas posturas incidieron en la vida política de la sociedad colombiana de su época, y comprender así sus actuaciones en torno a la inevitable disolución del proyecto de Nación Colombiana durante los años 1829-1830. Este trabajo se realizó a partir del análisis de la correspondencia de Bolívar en estos años. De esta se extrajeron las posturas políticas planteadas por Bolívar relacionadas con su permanencia o retiro del cargo de presidente.

 

Palabras clave: Bolívar, disolución del proyecto nacional, correspondencia, unión, legalidad, retiro

 

 

 

The last years of Bolívar: resignation and retirement from power (1829-1830). Between authority and legality

 

Abstract

 

In the epistolary documents sent by Bolívar, through the notions of retirement and resignation, we will identify the political positions that Bolívar adopted in his letters regarding the exercise of power, in order to point out how these positions influenced the political life of Colombian society at the time, and thus, understand his behaviors regarding the inevitable dissolution of the project of the Colombian Nation during 1829-1830. This work was developed through the analysis of his correspondence from the time, from which the political positions formulated by Bolívar were extracted, in relation to his permanence or retirement from the presidential position.

 

Key words: Bolívar, dissolution of the national project, correspondence, union, legality, retirement.

 

Le dernier Bolivar: démission et renonciation de l’exercice du pouvoir (1829-1830). Entre l’autorité et la légalité

 

Résumé

 

Au moyen des notions de démission et renonciation trouvés dans les lettres écrites par Bolivar, nous identifions les prises de positions politiques faites par le Libertador sur l’exercice du pouvoir, en essayant de montrer comment ces idées ont influencé la vie politique de la société colombienne de l’époque, et en tentant de comprendre également ses activités relatives à la dissolution inévitable du projet de nation colombienne pendant les années 1829-1830. À partir de l’analyse de la correspondance de Bolivar pendant ces années, on cherche à comprendre ses positions politiques en rapport avec sa permanence ou sa démission du poste de président de la république.

 

Mots clés: Bolivar, dissolution du projet national, correspondance, union, légalité, démission

 

1. Introduction

 

Towards the end of his life Simon Bolivar suffered from a profound disappointment regarding what he himself had formed: "the Colombian nation." On the afternoon of May 4th, 1830, he supposedly[4] abandoned the exercise of power[5]. This resignation occurred within the framework of a very difficult situation for the Colombian national project: the problems of the state were accumulated and felt by Bolivar as his own, because he was absolutely united with the realization of the idea of ​​a nation he called "Colombia"[6] and which he had made his own, warning on many occasions that his departure would be the end of Colombia[7], better known as la Gran Colombia (Great Colombia). For Gutiérrez Escudero, one can see the Liberator's obsession with creating 'supranational units' - Gran Colombia (Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela) or the Andean Confederation (Bolivia and Peru) - that would allow all problems to be tackled together and inspire respect from both the United States and Europe[8]." On this, Castro Leiva points out that the Republic of Colombia, expressed in terms of a "union", went from an effective union to an illusory principle; all this, in little more than a decade[9].

It is possible to inquire about Bolivar´s concern by referring to the events that culminated in the disintegration of the Republic of Colombia during the years 1829-1830. Although it is not possible to enter into the intricacies of the mind of Bolivar, surely affected by the difficulties that were happening after 1826 – a date in which the first animosity against the Republic of Colombia, La Cosiata[10], broke out, - it is possible to follow his political actions through letters written by him, to try to answer this question: what was the political content of Bolivar's letters in this last stage of his life with regard to his political practices? From there other questions arise: did he cling to power? Was he just talking about giving up the presidency and continuing to participate in politics, or did he definitely want to retire?

In order to answer these questions, it is important to identify the political positions taken by Bolivar in the face of various circumstances, which will be analyzed in this study: The "Congreso Admirable"(admirable congress), a constitutional meeting after which Bolivar resigned and traveled to the region of Cartagena and Santa Marta; the new government of Joaquín Mosquera and the dictatorship of Urdaneta, a de facto government during which Bolivar died. These political positions were not inscribed within the framework of a fundamental identification of Bolivar but a situational one[11], depending on the circumstances he showed his position regarding them.

Methodologically, part of the review of the documentation related to the subject matter is investigated, in order to identify the argumentative elements that allow the determination of the political decisions assumed by Bolivar. The position taken by Bolivar in this last period allows us to approach an understanding of Bolivar in the events of 1830 that profoundly marked the fate of Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador, current republics whose immediate origins lie in the death of Bolivar’s Colombian project, which was consummated in the year of 1830 with the death of Bolivar. The work is part of what historiographically has been called the “construction of the Colombian Nation[12]", particularly in the dissolution of this national experience.

2. Political Bolivar: his last years


In mid-1829, Bolivar's position was marked by the events of the previous year: the Ocaña
[13] convention and what was interpreted as a sequel to it: the conspiracy to kill him, the "Noche Septembrina"(September night), and the issuance of the Organic Decree of the 27 of August of 1828[14] that granted extensive powers to Bolivar, because it created an autocratic regime to counteract the aggressions of public opinion at the time[15]. In public opinion, the phantom of dissolution became stronger. In a letter to his Foreign Secretary, Estanislao Vergara, dated July 13, 1829, Bolivar stated:

Not being able to continue for much longer at the head of the government, after I am gone, the country will be divided in the midst of a civil war and the most appalling disorders ... To prevent such horrible damages, which must necessarily happen before ten years’ time, it is preferable to divide the country with legality, in peace and good harmony[16].

In Bolivar's opinion, irreparable tensions (below in the same letter, typifying the existence of at least two adverse parties: Santander and Páez) shook Colombia, so it was necessary that it be divided. According to him, the events of the year ´28 had led him to his resignation[17]. He also believed that the state of the country was chaotic; he saw the monarchy as an inconvenience, for it would only deepen the divisions. In the same letter, right away, it is possible to identify how he saw himself:

 

As for me, you must suppose me tired of serving and annoyed by so much ingratitude and crimes that are committed daily against me. You saw the extreme case in which the Great Convention put me: to let the country be sacrificed or to save it at my expense. The article that you speak of to me is the most favorable that has been written in my honor, it only says that my usurpation is blissful and civic. Me a usurper! A usurpation committed by me! My friend, this is horrible; I cannot bear this idea, and the horror it causes me is such that I prefer the ruin of Colombia than to hear me called by that epithet[18].

The reception of the Organic Decree, published almost a year before, was the reason for some opinions that, according to Bolivar, were negative. For Bolivar, these were slanders that stained his image by calling him a usurper. As can be seen, Bolivar defended himself by saying that he could not do otherwise, because the political situation had demanded a determined action "at his expense", that is, incurring his own perjury. Bolivar exhibited a sensitivity to negative views of his personality, because his constructed image (which was associated with words such as "glory", "honor" or "place in history") was above all else, even above his "Colombia". The honor was too dear to Bolivar; any expression that he believed to tarnish it was very badly judged. The opinion was divided, as Martinez Garnica points out, into the "liberal faction and the servile faction,[19]" the latter being the name given at the time to the supporters of Bolivar. Tensions and criticisms made the legislature a battleground. These factions originated around the year 1827. From these confrontations came the Organic Decree[20], reaffirming the opinions that pointed to Bolivar as a tyrant and his followers as servile.

 

            This letter is neither the first nor the last in which Bolivar expressed an irresolvable determination to resign. During the second half of 1829 Bolivar seriously considered this possibility. According to him, the reason was his physical and mental fatigue. Aiming at introspection, Bolivar pointed out that his will to carry out the work of government was not enough[21]. The first allusions to a resignation can be identified, even in the letter of February 2nd, 1829 to Jose Maria del Castillo y Rada[22]. In this letter, rather obscure thoughts about the future of Colombia are presented, noting that it will be divided into two or three states, noting that what had happened on September 25 (noche septembrina) defined his destiny and that of Colombia, conceiving himself as out of power, and Colombia divided.

            The subject of his inability to continue in government begins to recur at the end of that year when he writes again:

All this and whatever happens the council must decide, which I mean in everything, everything, everything, because I am determined not to rule any more. For the same reason, I earnestly desire to be separated from all public businesses dependent on the Executive. I will even serve as an executioner if they appoint a new magistrate, and if not, not even for God. This is done, my friend, not because I fear nothing, but because everything must be expected of the good state of things and the good state of opinion, which could never be better. We have overcome Moors and Christians; my friends are the vanquishers; I offer my services and my life to the country. If it is necessary, we will save it again with my authority, with my friends and with the army. In addition, what army is greater than public opinion[23]?

Three elements can be identified in this letter: 1) Bolivar is determined to abandon his command and to offer himself for all kinds of services, but does not wish to occupy the position of president; 2) According to him, the state of opinion "could never be better" and, 3) Bolivar offers to serve the new presidential magistrate, and, if necessary, "save the country" again using his three strengths: his personal authority, his friends and the army. In this way, it can be typified that the resignation, at least at this stage, did not imply a total isolation from the affairs of the government, only the desire to be separated from the office of the maximum executive authority of the nation, and to be in the service of the new government. The idea of ​​appointing "another magistrate" seems to be based on Bolivar's ardent desire to be separated from the executive; nevertheless, by this time, the context indicates that this was a moment of great political tension with the legislative bodies closed and Bolivar installed in a dictatorship. However, this does not seem to mean that Bolivar intended to allow another political sector to hold the first magistracy. When examining the documentation, it is even found that perhaps Bolívar's first intention was to leave the command to one of his "friends[24]", because it could not be agreed to, to surrender it to the opposition.

His glory, is the element that outlines the connotation that Bolivar wanted to have in public opinion: an image without fault. But, as has been mentioned, he cannot conceive of an authority without his influence and support. He wrote to General Mariano Montilla, prefect of the department of Magdalena, in a letter dated November 30, 1829, in which he expresses that he is bereft of slander and that he withdraws from the political command, but not from the military. He adds that "another magistrate, however good, will be held by me, my friends and the army. He will be supported by the Laws and by our authorization. I will lend all my influence: influence that no one can lend me[25]." Therefore, Bolivar did not abandon old political contents in his letters such as his personalism and authority. He still considers that his assent is indispensable for a new president to govern, and that only by giving him his influence could he be sustained. He even implies that a president requires his authorization to be strong. This indicates that there is a project by Bolivar to influence the new government in case of not managing to control it. This interest is explained by the existence in Bolivar’s idea of a marked impossibility to conceive of the project of Colombia without his participation. Therefore, he proposed to continue, at least among the leaders of this project, possibly not from the exercise of political power, but he indicates the need for his sanction for a new president to govern. Thus, at the end of 1829, Bolivar ends up revealing a name that, according to him, has all the characteristics: Sucre[26]. At the same that he claims to be tired and that he will definitely leave, he offers to support Sucre "with heart and soul[27]," with the probability of being backed by all his supporters. When he insinuates this name, Bolivar thinks that he will have a passionate defender of his projects, who will surely act according to his considerations. However, this surprising candidacy, which fails to keep a close eye on political opinion, seems to be no more than a slight insinuation.

         During this period, in which Bolivar planned his departure from power, he was particularly sensitive to attacks on his person by all those he identified as his enemies and on his creation called "Colombia." The title of tyrant irritated him in particular and affirmed that, according to his enemies, it would be necessary to be a victim so as not to be a tyrant[28]. He never ceased to complain about the satire that sought to damage his personal and political reputation, for example, that published in Venezuela[29]. In the imminence of his departure from power, he continued to wage a war to preserve his reputation, his honor and his glory. Thus, he showed great concern for the situation in Venezuela, because, since the events of La Cosiata, Páez had been commanding there as he saw fit[30]. Bolivar occupied himself with Páez after citing that he is tired and wanted to resign. Bolivar told him to swear that he would submit to the authority of the new president[31]. With this he might have sought to prevent Paez from becoming insubordinate, as he feared that only he would be able to contain Paez, he sought to make him commit to abiding by the new government[32].

Another key man who deserved Bolivar's attention at this historical moment is José María del Castillo y Rada. With him, who by this time was his principal minister, he discussed the legal order that the republic should have. He recommended that the popular will be taken into account when deliberating in Congress[33], but warned of the unsustainable situation in Venezuela and came to contemplate the possibility of the division of Colombia[34]. Faced with this danger, Castillo said that even some federal concessions may be made; he mentioned, for example, the proposal that, according to the Constitution of Angostura (1819), the republic be divided into three federal states[35]. He added that perhaps this was the only way to maintain the union and manifested his departure from the presidency as a basis for the realization of all these projects[36].

        In January, when the "Admirable Congress" was inaugurated, Bolivar indicated his definitive resignation from the presidency. However, since the deliberations of the Congress had only just begun, Bolivar was obliged to continue to hold office until May 4, 1830. Meanwhile, Venezuela announced its separation and a commission was sent to negotiate the terms of said determination[37]. Bolivar then delegated the command to Domingo Caicedo and moved to the Quinta de Fucha[38], located in the suburbs of Bogota. From there "El Libertador" insisted on his pessimistic perspective and did not abandon his fight in the interest of public opinion, and asked Madrid to help to clarify the accusations that were made about him, in which he supposedly had plans to establish a monarchy[39]. The subject of the monarchy was, undoubtedly, the political controversy that most obsessed Bolivar and was, apparently, the most damaging to his public image. On the other hand, when General José María Obando asked for his intervention, he replied: "I have died politically forever[40]." In this expression, the idea of a​​ retreat is supposedly affirmed, not only to renounce but to abandon political life altogether. It seems to occupy, in part, Bolivar's thoughts. The idea of retirement was probably affirmed for Bolivar in the course of the deliberations of the Congress. The inability to contain anarchy is highlighted as one of the main causes why "the Father of the Country" definitively left his command[41]. The correspondence indicates a great disappointment, a sense of failure for the national project, a work that, as has already been said, Bolivar considered to be his. However, it remains to be seen whether there really was a definitive withdrawal from Bolivar, whose only certainty - according to him - was resignation.

        In a letter to Gabriel Camacho[42] he went on to say that he would never again serve such ungrateful persons[43]. He also expressed his concern for money, because, as he intended to embark for Europe, he said that he would need money to live with honor and decorum and to maintain his prestige and that of the nation[44]. He mentioned his despair when he declared himself to be pursued, repudiated and robbed[45]. Perhaps because of that feeling, he stressed the need to leave the country, and marched towards the coast looking for port in Cartagena, as he has suggested[46]. Thus, Bolivar began his journey, embarking from Honda, down the Magdalena River. Nevertheless, he continued to correspond with the main personalities of the country. His correspondence shows intentions to leave the country[47], but also a concern for what he called "the precariousness of the new government chaired by Joaquin Mosquera," writing to him that Colombia marched on "the road to Buenos Aires[48]," an example of anarchy of the time. While in Cartagena, he received alarming news about the state of the new government and how it seemed unable to achieve political stability[49]. As he explains in the letters, Mosquera's hesitations in approaching General Santander's sympathizers, were viewed with concern: the restlessness came from his supporters. So, this change of interests and the end of Bolivarian influence in the administration were reasons for great concern.

While Mosquera's government was just beginning to organize throughout New Granada, according to Bolivar, what remained of Colombia, and even the newly separated Venezuela, demanded Bolivar return to power[50]. It is difficult to determine whether this was Bolivar's true intention, but it is possible to affirm that his writings are those of someone convinced of his fundamental role. Nevertheless, various soldiers and civilians were also convinced of the need for Bolivar's return. Finally, in circumstances that are not clear[51], on September 5th, 1830, General-in-Chief Rafael Urdaneta staged a coup in Bolivar´s name. On this matter and the invitations of Urdaneta to occupy the presidency, Bolivar wrote in the following terms:

I am also very concerned about the nature of the authority that I will accept and delegate. Its origin is vicious, its extension is not known and even less the term that it will last; what, then, is this kind of government to be called? The acephaly of a nation's body imperiously demands a prompt public health measure to establish authority and legal order. The first act is legitimized by the restoration of public tranquility and the rule of law; if this is not done, the first movement is nothing more than usurpation, and the exercise of its authority, a well-qualified tyranny[52].

He expressed his concern about the legality of the authority that Urdaneta expected to assume. It seemed to him that Urdaneta's proposal was fraught with political uncertainty and lent itself to misunderstandings. Bolivar considered that the legitimate path was necessary. For him alone there was a legitimate way to obtain power: elections[53]. As this path was constitutionally consecrated, the impact of the lack of this legitimacy would be understood as a tyranny. Regarding this idea, it is worth repeating; Bolivar expressed no doubts. This was a constant in Bolivar: although he can be blamed for claiming excessive power based on his own person, he always attempted to seek some legitimation, for example, in a legislative congress. For Bolivar, an assault on power was too dark for him to express his direct support. He was quite harsh in his reply, for he warned Urdaneta that he was bordering on usurpation and would create a tyranny if he decided to exercise the command obtained from this usurpation. However, this act was not altogether repudiated by Bolivar, for he suggested to Urdaneta himself that he should seek a degree of electoral legitimacy, thus restoring "the laws".

Regarding the Urdaneta government, Bolivar judges that it lacked legitimacy. However, in a letter to Juan José Flórez, he addressed matters of state in ambiguous terms when he stated that "the administration of Bogotá, presided over by Urdaneta, is conducted with enough energy and not a little activity[54]." These messages of adhesion, of propagandistic character, wanted to portray Urdaneta as respectful of the law although he had just taken power, just as Bolivar himself had admitted when affirming that the government of Urdaneta did not have a legal origin. Bolivar´s constant preoccupation with the origin of the authority that Urdaneta insisted him to assume, led him to say:

I have been appointed president throughout New Granada, but not by the lair of murderers from Casanare and Popayan; and meanwhile Urdaneta is staffing the executive branch with the ministers of his choice. I have not accepted this revolutionary position because the election is not legitimate; I have become ill because I have not been able to serve nor even subject. As long as all this happens, elections are being verified according to the law, although out of time, in some parts. They assure me that I will have many votes, and I might be the one that gets the most, and then we will see the result. You can decide if a man who has made the previous conclusions about the revolution will be willing to drown again after coming out of the belly of the whale: it is clear[55].

 

 

As Bolivar feared feeding more rumors, it is not surprising that he even begged Florez to burn the letter when he read it[56]. However, if one takes into account that Bolivar moved away from the possibility of directly intervening in the government, it is worth wondering if Urdaneta's coup was not what Bolivar was waiting for, since he was looking for a military man in 1829 to take over the executive branch. As expressed above, at the end of 1829 Bolivar was playing with the idea of ​​installing someone completely "addicted" to his own person in government and who would govern "by his authorization." And who was more addicted than Urdaneta, whose first act of government was to offer Bolívar the presidency? At least outwardly, Urdaneta proved to lack an autonomous political ambition, and surrendered before the dictates of Bolivar, even in the first hours of his government. It seemed necessary, according to the Bolivarian reading of the time, the existence of a strong, almost all-pervading authority, in order to avoid anarchy, as Rosendo Bolivar[57] points out. The Liberator himself appears as the one in charge to reconcile the diverse interests and to save to the country from anarchy, at least since the sedition known as "La Cosiata[58]". In that way, the figure of "The Liberator" was called to occupy such a place in the political universe of the time.

Nevertheless, Bolivar's hesitations and the lack of a clear pronouncement[59], such as a proclamation, for example, of his role, whether as guarantor of Urdaneta or as president, allowed him to contemplate certain possibilities: he was not entirely comfortable with the grab for power on the part of Urdaneta or was he already so separated from these public businesses that he truly abandoned Colombia to her fate and, therefore, did not have the disposition (assuming also, by his letters, that he was sick) to assume either the presidency nor some kind of authority that would make him part of the new government. Such a drastic change of opinion (in December 1829 he claimed to remain "supreme commander" of the new government) can only be understood under very serious news: the events of Venezuela (final secession), the illness and the intensification of the insults against his person.

             However, his last written thoughts show enormous concerns about what the future would bring to Colombia. In the months following September 1830, Bolivar set out to seek the strengthening of Urdaneta's position, since from the very beginning of this administration he devoted himself to delivering thoughts like this, in a letter to Estanislao Vergara, who was one of his ministers: "You have the goodness of expressing this letter to General Urdaneta, and persuading him for my behalf to make me his friend and that I shall soon assist him however I can. Add to it that I am very far from seeking the command, whether military or civil, and that I sincerely desire that our compatriots place him in the highest office of the republic[60]", despite privately disapproving of his conduct and rejecting the constant demand for his return (he also writes to Vergara to "let the whole country know, and my friends and my enemies know that I do not aspire to anything and that I will gladly see any of my friends in first place. I offer to serve anything, because what I hate most is the presidency[61]"). However, Bolivar did not rule out the possibility of assuming the presidency to attract various sectors of bolivarianismo that were disregarding Urdaneta[62]. This ambiguity is evident: at the same time that he rejects the presidency he ignites in more than one heart the hope for his return to power; he disapproves of the way Urdaneta assumes power but is willing to invent tricks to help sustain it. This is expressed in a letter that was sent to Estanislao Vergara on September 25, 1830 from Cartagena[63], referring specifically to the topic of Urdaneta, the coup and pronouncements:

In three days, I go to Santa Marta, to exercise, to get out of the annoyance I'm in and to improve my temperament. I am here denying, against all my will; because I wanted to go to hell, to leave Colombia; But Mr. Juan de Francisco (Martin), at the head of another inopportune group, has tyrannized me by making me stay where I cannot and do not want to live. You will tell me that all this is in opposition to my proclamation and my office to the government. I will reply that Santa Maria made me see that you were going to divide yourself into a thousand parties and completely ruin the country if I answered correctly that I did not accept, I offered, then, to disguise, speaking vaguely of serving as a citizen and as a soldier. However, I did not fail to express to General Urdaneta that I would not go to Bogota or accept the command: I said the same thing to my friends. Therefore, I have deceived no one but our enemies so that they do not finish you suddenly[64].

 

Bolivar details his relationship with Urdaneta's seizure of power and insists on his final withdrawal and that he has been called by various sectors that were beginning to divide in his absence to consolidate the union of his political supporters. None of these supporters, especially those who were at the forefront of political and military command- the "caudillos," if they want to call themselves that- could conceive of a leader who was not Bolivar, and distrusted each other. Justo Briceño distrusted Urdaneta[65], since all the requests made by Bolivar to send troops to Urdaneta[66] had been neglected, and Pedro Briceño Méndez[67] did not decide to occupy a ministerial place in Bogota, perhaps because he was not very convinced of Urdaneta´s command. These indecisions are a conscious act of one who is torn between the idea of ​​union and legality. In order for there to be a union, he had to more or less violate legality and let Urdaneta´s "usurpation" pass, doing everything to support him. And, if he definitively opted for legality, his supporters would likely be polarized and any possibility of a union would be lost. So, the ambiguous position of Bolivar was between two dangerous extremes. It was a question of balancing between his personal reputation, which would be tainted if he were to lead a coup, and the preservation of the last possibilities of carrying out his project for Colombia and uniting his supporters under his aegis.

So, a possible variation in his political position is then typified: after being determined to control the government with his authority, he seems to consider abandoning it. This variation is evident from the positions of late 1829, in which he had hoped to influence, if not dominate, the government, to the situation of rejection of any political responsibility in September 1830. Around this last date, Bolivar continued to express that it was beyond his will to occupy the highest authority. He was indignant at the pressures of his supporters, seemingly annoyed to go to occupy a position that he no longer wanted and that he said he no longer had the strength to occupy, only to please and sustain them as the head of a government that for him, apparently was not clear. According to the following letter it seems that he lost all his interest in the government:

You urge a lot because I become an agitator and put myself at the head of some rebels; at least this is the whole meaning of a very long letter from Mr. Aranda. I have read this letter which has certainly filled me with disgust, instead of encouraging me to commit a criminal action. They are still not happy yet to have me lose favor in public opinion on the advice of Ocaña and the infamous acts and projects of monarchy; but also want to deprive me of personal honor, degrading me to the species of the enemies of the country[68].

 

Therefore, in Bolivar's opinion, it had been these pressures that had ruined the country: because of the pressures of his friends and supporters, the course was lost in Ocaña, for they forever linked him to the idea of ​​the monarchy. Eventually, the world conspired against the genius of his glory: friends and enemies jeopardized his possibilities to reach glory with their opinions and projects, to consecrate himself like the Liberator and the founder of Colombia. When he reproached others for their political decisions, Bolivar showed how full of vanity he was. In his effort to save the last of his reputation, he did not hesitate to say that his "friends" wanted to take away his glory, when he says: "I am required to sacrifice my name as an honorable citizen only for bringing four emigre people to their homes. Well, I will not do it and I swear to you that I will never again take command, so as not to be ungrateful again with my friends or cowardly with my enemies[69]." And he adds: "I leave to my friends the free field so that they can enhance their courage, their character and their talents. With this I give them the only good they need; and I relieve them from the burden of loving and serving an ingrate[70]." The accusation of ingratitude, apparently coming from the most rotten part of Bolivarianism, gives him the impetus he needs to be safe from exhortations vitiated by the lust for power. However, instead of putting an ocean between him and these evils, Bolivar continues along the coast and, passing through Soledad and Barranquilla, begins the march towards Santa Marta.

The assertion that at his departure his partisans would split irreconcilably weighed more than anything else, according to Bolivar himself, as revealed to Stanislaus Vergara in the letter from September 1830. His attitude toward this certainty is a kind of state of haunting indifference; he consoles himself by sending suggestions to Urdaneta, who apparently takes orders or advice from a superior who must understand, without deciding to intervene directly. This prevented him from speaking on Bolivar's action of retreat with precision, since he himself presented notorious ambiguities that seemed to confuse even his closest friends: he continued to carry on matters of government and insisted, also, on being the soul of his own party; he was not an innocent bystander in the political arena. There is no greater variation in Bolivar's contradictory positions, for he continued to direct affairs with his customary style of authority: he decided who occupied the ministries, who to employ in military garrisons[71], and troop commanders. He imposed himself upon his party as a political and military leader, presenting his decisions as "dictates[72]." In this way, it could be said that Bolivar still conceived of himself as the possessor of power, the person called to occupy the highest political authority.

 

This is possible to infer by making a brief contrast. If one takes the letter that Bolivar sent to Urdaneta on October 31, 1830, it says that "it is indispensable to send arms, ammunition and troops to Valle (del Cauca), with a good leader. The best would be Jimenez or Castelli[73]." Urdaneta, in a letter dated December 7[74], replies: "I will probably also send Castelli to Valle del Cauca, so that he can take over operations against Lopez and Obando[75]." On the military state in Cúcuta, Bolivar comments: "[...] Carrillo alone in Cúcuta will be mocked and we will lose everything. Even if you send Murgenza as second or whatever you want, but let Murgenza go or another shrewd officer who will not get caught up in Cucuta[76]." Urdaneta, in a letter dated December 7th, comments:

 

I am going to send Murgenza to Cucuta: since, as you say more a less candid man than Carrillo is necessary, also, it is best, that he can contain Briceno when he wants to make some madcap escapade; Murgenza has good judgment, intelligence and courage, and there is the favorable circumstance that Briceno himself wants him to be sent[77].

          An innocent observer can read the great influence of Bolivar in the government, because even his last letter did not stop dealing with these matters: he got to write to Urdaneta, since the latter took power, about 18 letters and even two per day. From September to December of 1830 there was no recipient that rivaled in number the letters with Urdaneta, only Montilla approaches him with 13 letters. The letters deal with various state matters such as the situation in Riohacha, insurgent since the middle of that year[78]; the insurrection of the south, where Jose Maria Obando and Jose Hilario López incited to ignore the government of Urdaneta[79]; and the subject of General Justo Briceño, reluctant to serve the orders of someone other than Bolivar[80]. Finally, the alleged union prevailed over legality in Bolívar. Although privately, Bolivar joined the ranks of the government of Urdaneta as its main sponsor and inspirer; their vain efforts to consolidate the Urdaneta´s position, mainly in the face of the rising of the south and Briceño´s "escapades", seem to leave no room for doubt. The search for the submission of the Isthmus to "the Government[81]", and confidence in the Urdaneta administration, ratified by requests for adhesion to it (as we have already pointed out by Justo Briceño, and another by Montilla[82]) ratify this statement.

 

3. Conclusions

 

Bolivar never retired from the exercise of political power in spite of his resignation. On the contrary, even his last letter shows that he exerted his power and influence when he tried to exhort Justo Briceño to take to the party of Urdaneta. Despite his resignation, privately and through letters to personalities of the government, he intervened in political affairs and continued to pull the strings of the sector where he declared himself addicted; or, in Urdaneta's words, "his good friends that idolize his glories[83]." Above Bolivar's apparent desire to uphold legality and to reject the takeover of the Urdaneta coup, there is the chimera of the Union: a union of his supporters, a union of the country, because only a government inspired in him could guarantee overcoming this trance. Once again, in Urdaneta's words: "We only need you to give impulse to the good patriots of the south and Venezuela[84]." So, in these regions, where the situation of the Bolivarian Party was critical, according to Urdaneta, there were still patriots who only needed Bolivar to decide to act and rebuild that illusory creation that is, to date, Colombia.

Perhaps it is worthwhile to take a little from the conclusion that Ivan Jaksic gives for this period, noting that the political ideas of the late Bolivar were too authoritarian, idiosyncratic and difficult to apply without the central figure of Bolivar[85], necessary to sustain the weight of the baroque political universe, which is described above all as, full of factions, intrigues and interests of various kinds.

From these ideas, the ambiguous political positions of Bolivar emerged: on the one hand, the desire to control power to curb what he considered to be "anarchy" by which would be an authoritarian political identification; on the other hand, his desire to respect the legalities and to abandon power and be marginalized in the most important political positions, giving place to other possible political projects, which would mean a political legal identification, or one located within legality. What is clear is that they established the displacement of Bolivar from the highest position of power to the position of simple citizen.

        The political journey through the letters of Bolivar during that long year allows us to see a politician unclear in his appreciations, divided in his ideas, oscillating between the two identified positions, but organic when it comes to defending his reputation and his Colombian project. Because of his reputation and his project, Bolivar was ready to deliver whatever was necessary, even if it was difficult for him to betray the legality and legal authority of that law.

 

Documental Sources

 

Archivo del Libertador [online].  Disponible en: <http://libertador.bolivarium.usb.ve/>.

 

Blanco, José Félix y Azpurúa, Ramón.  Documentos para la historia de la vida pública del Libertador de Colombia, Perú y Bolivia.  Caracas: Imprenta Nacional, 1875-1878.

 

Bolívar, Simón.  Obras completas.  Cartas del Libertador comprendidas en el periodo 1799 a 8 de diciembre de 1830, testamento, proclamas y discursos.  La Habana: Editorial Lex, 1947.

 

______________.  Doctrina de El Libertador.  Caracas: Fundación Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1994.

 

Bibliography

 

Bolívar, Rosendo. “Pensamiento político de Simón Bolívar”. Revista venezolana de Ciencia Política, núm. 27 (enero-junio 2005): 125-144.

 

Castro Leiva, Luis. Obras. Tomo I. Para pensar a Bolívar. Fundación Polar- Universidad Católica Andrés Bello. Caracas, 2005, pág. 58

 

Fernández de Rota. José. Nacionalismo, cultura y tradición. Barcelona: Anthropos, 2005.

 

Gutiérrez Escudero, Antonio. Simón Bolívar: aproximación al pensamiento del Libertador Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades. Año 8, Nº 14 Segundo semestre de 2005

 

Jaksic, Iván. “La Republica del orden: Simón Bolívar, Andrés Bello y las transformaciones del pensamiento político de la independencia. Historia, Vol.36 (2003): 191-218.

 

Lynch, John.  Simón Bolívar.  Barcelona: Crítica, 2006.

 

Madariaga, Salvador de.  Bolívar.  Buenos Aires: Editorial Suramericana, 1959.

 

Martínez Garnica, Armando.  La ambición desmedida.  Una nación continental llamada Colombia.  Alcalá de Henares: Universidad de Alcalá-IELAT, 2013.

 

Martinez Garnica, Armando. La agenda de Colombia, 1819-1831, Bucaramanga, Universidad Industrial de Santander, Tomo I,2008,

 

Perú De Lacroix, Louis.  Diario de Bucaramanga.  Bucaramanga: Universidad Industrial de Santander, 2008.

 

Polanco Alcántara, Tomás.  Simón Bolívar: ensayo de interpretación biográfica a través de sus documentos.  Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1994.

 

Roca, Juan Manuel.  “La poesía y violencia en Colombia: la poesía colombiana frente al letargo”. Revista Casa Silva, núm. 15 (2002): 46-57.

 

Sáez Arance, Antonio.  Simón Bolívar, el Libertador y su mito.  Madrid: Editorial Marcial Pons, 2011.

 

To cite this article:

Álvaro Acevedo Tarazona and Carlos Iván Villamizar, “The last years of Bolívar: resignation and retirement from power (1829-1830). Between authority and legality”, Historia y Memoria, No. 11 (July - December, 2015): 213-239.



* This article is the product of the research project in Spanish, called: "El último proyecto político de Bolívar: La constitución de Bolivia, la Convención de Ocaña y el Decreto Orgánico del 27 de agosto", registered in the VIE-UIS.

[1] This fragment, extracted from Urdaneta’s letters, which Bolivar did not receive due to his death, is a compelling example of the situation Colombia was in at that moment. Revisited in the “Memorias del General O´Leary”, the letter rests in the Archivo del Libertador (Archive of the liberator), Roll 3. (Bogotá, December 7 1830, folder 32. Available in the following link: http://libertador.bolivarium.usb.ve/documento.php?id=11733f84.

[2] Doctor of Universidad de Huelva. Tenured professor Universidad Industrial de Santander. Research group Policies, Social Behaviours and Historical-Educational Representations (PSORHE, by its acronym in Spanish). Email address: tarazona20@gmail.com.

[3] Student of the School of History of Universidad Industrial de Santander. Assistant researcher for the research group Policies, Social Behaviours and Historical-Educational Representations (PSORHE, by its acronym in Spanish).

[4] According to Bolivar´s letters, the reason for his trip was to retire. Nevertheless, as we will try to show in the lines of this resignation - realized on May 4th of 1830 - there is much still to investigate regarding Bolivar´s retirement from public life.

[5] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas.  Cartas del Libertador comprendidas en el periodo 1799 a 8 de diciembre de 1830, testamento, proclamas y discursos (La Habana: Lex, 1947), Carta 2.239.

[6] See: Armando Martínez Garnica, La ambición desmedida.  Una nación continental llamada Colombia (Alcalá de Henares: Universidad de Alcalá-IELAT, 2013).

[7] In the following, this thought and others will be widely discussed, which are susceptible to being read with a certain political aspect.

[8]Gutiérrez Escudero, Antonio. Simón Bolívar: aproximación al pensamiento del Libertador Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades. Año 8, Nº 14. Second semester 2005

[9] Castro Leiva, Luis. Works. Tomo I. Para pensar a Bolívar. Fundación Polar - Universidad Católica Andrés Bello. Caracas, 2005, p. 58.

[10] See in this regard: José Félix Blanco and Ramón Azpurúa. Documentos para la historia de la vida pública del Libertador de Colombia, Perú y Bolivia (Caracas: National Press, 1875-1878), Documents 2,601, 2,617, 2,636, 2,641, 2,647, 2,652, 2,677 and 2,679. This is a political movement, with a double purpose (these are pronouncements of municipal councils) that occurred in Venezuela. This was a case in which Paez was implicated, because he was accused of negligence, at the least. The documents fail to consider the ambiguous explanations of Páez, presenting himself as called by the municipalities to safeguard their rights against the centralist despotism of the head of executive power during the absence of Bolivar, Vice President Santander. Also worth mentioning is the proclamation dictated by Bolivar when arriving at Puerto Cabello, and which is basically a clear invitation to forget about the events that had been led by Paez. Bolivar does not hesitate in affirming: "I have not known what has happened" (Bolivar, Simón.: 1947 "Obras Completas. Cartas del Libertador comprendidas en el periodo 1799 a 8 de diciembre de 1830, testamento, proclamas y discursos"). (Vicente Lecuna, compiler). Havana: Editorial LEX (in two volumes). Speeches and Proclamations, number 161.

[11] José Fernández De Rota. Nacionalismo, cultura y tradición. (Barcelona, Anthropos, 2005), 48

[12] Martinez Garnica, Armando. La agenda de Colombia, 1819-1831, Bucaramanga, Universidad Industrial de Santander, 2008, Volume I. p. 30.

[13] This is an attempt to amend the Constitution in which the delegates split into irreconcilable sides, and thus sank the Bolivarian projects of a transformation of the Executive into a more central and dominant position. The "Bolivarian" delegates left it hastily, thus ending the convention. See Louis Peru De Lacroix, Diario de Bucaramanga (Bucaramanga, Universidad Industrial de Santander, 2008). See also Tomás Polanco Alcántara, Simón Bolívar: ensayo de interpretación biográfica a través de sus documentos (Caracas: National Academy of History, 1994).

[14] Simón Bolívar, Doctrina de El Libertador (Caracas: Fundación Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1994), 230. The Organic Decree superseded the Constitution in many respects, and subjected the great majority of State affairs to Bolivar's discretion.

[15] From that time the following stanza, which is said to have been recited by the poet and writer from Granada, Luis Vargas Tejada, in a political meeting: "If we take the first and last letter from Bolivar «oliva» the peace symbol, is what remains. / This means that we must cut the head and the feet from the tyrant if a durable peace is what we want.”  The text is found in Juan Manuel Roca, “La poesía y violencia en Colombia: la poesía colombiana frente al letargo”, (Revista Casa Silva No. 15, (2002): 46-57). The following words of Roca accompany the transcription of the poem with: "I refer to this place so far away, in order to point out the differences when looking at the issue of the violent struggles that have plagued us since the founding of the country. Violent was the way Luis Vargas Tejada asked to dismember Bolivar to find peace during the events of September 1828. Vargas, a poet and author of theater and political sketches participated with other poets in the conspiracy against Bolivar.

[16] Simón Bolívar, Doctrina de El Libertador, 245. Letter to Estanislao Vergara written in the Field of Buijó, opposite Guayaquil, 13 of July of 1829.

[17] Simón Bolívar, Doctrina de El Libertador, 246.  It refers to the Ocaña Convention and the Noche Septembrina.

[18] Simón Bolívar, Doctrina de El Libertador, 246.

[19]  MARTINEZ GARNICA, Armando. La agenda de Colombia, 1819-1831 (Bucaramanga: Universidad Industrial de Santander, 2008) Volume I, p. 24.

[20] MARTINEZ GARNICA, Armando. La agenda de Colombia…. 25.

[21] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas…Letter 2,175 to “Señor Doctor José Ángel Álamo”.

[22] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas…Letter 1,939 to “Señor Doctor José María del Castillo y Rada”.

[23] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas…Letter 2,179 to “Señor Estanislao Vergara”.

[24] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas…Letter 2,183 to “Señor José Fernández Madrid”.

[25] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,184 to “Señor General Mariano Montilla”.

[26] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,186 to “Señor General J. J. Flóres”.

[27] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,186.

[28] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,188 to “General Rafael Urdaneta”.

[29] Simon Bolivar, Obras completas ... Letter 2,199 to "General J. A. Paez ". He mentions the existence of such passages, but the documentation that he indicates has not been traced: Bolivar only comments on them, but he does not show signs of knowing which they are or what they contain.

[30] John Lynch, Simón Bolívar, (Barcelona: Critique, 2006), 295-302. Lynch argues that these internal difficulties, originated in a faction that sought Venezuelan independence and encouraged Paez as an instrument of its cause, following the judgment of O`Leary.

[31] Simon Bolivar, Obras completas ... Letter 2,199 to "General J. A. Paez ".

[32] This letter is left by Paez without an answer, since the last letter in which he responds to Bolivar is the one of November 29th, 1830 (which he does on January 15th of 1830). Both the letter of December 16th, 1829 and the last letter sent by Bolivar, that of December 29th, 1829, are left unanswered. This letter of December 29th, 1829 is the one that contains the proposal to make Sucre president.

[33] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,200 to “Señor doctor José María del Castillo y Rada”.

[34] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,200.

[35] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,200.

[36] On these projects and more, Bolivar writes to another strong man of the moment, Urdaneta. Bolivar in that letter laments the state of events in Venezuela and judges that the origin of all this was "the events of the year 26", that is, La Cosiata. See, Simon Bolivar, Obras completas... Letter 2,202.

[37] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas…Letter 2,219 to “Señor José Fernández Madrid”.

[38] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,219.

[39] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,219.

[40] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,220 to “Señor General José María Obando”.

[41] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,237 to “Señor José Fernández Madrid”.

[42] Gabriel Camacho was a civilian, a relative of Bolivar, married to one of his nieces. He was allowed to make such confessions also because Camacho had some participation in the mining business of Aroa, property of Bolivar that he sought to sell.

[43] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas…Letter 2,241.

[44] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,241.

[45] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,241.

[46] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,241 to “Señor Gabriel Camacho”.

[47]Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,248 to Vice-President Domingo Caycedo.

[48]Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,249.

[49] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas... Letter 2,259. In this letter addressed to José Fernández Madrid, he typified different uprisings in the south, in Boyacá and in Magdalena that made them fear for the stability of the new government. To this he added the alleged efforts of President Mosquera to approach the "demagogues", which he always identified with Santander.

[50]  Simón Bolívar, Obras completas... Letter 2,253. This letter without addressee, General Briceño Mendez argues that it was addressed to him.

[51]  Bolivar alludes to the protagonism of the Batalla Callao, threatened by a group of "gamonales (landowners) of the sabana" on the 11 of August. There are 16 days of maneuvering until the "pseudo-liberal party" was defeated. In this way, Mosquera and Caycedo left their positions, and on September 5 Urdaneta assumed the reins of the executive power. This confused account can be seen in a letter written to Pedro Alcantara Herran, October 11, 1830. See Simon Bolivar, Obras completas... Letter 2,284. Martinez Garnica, in turn, gives the following account of the Mosquera administration: "This administration was shot down by the rebellion of the Callao battalion, commanded by the Venezuelan colonel Florencio Jiménez, and supported by the Zerrezuela and Facatativá militias. The motive was the ministry of exalted liberals and staunch enemies of the Liberator who had been appointed by President Mosquera. General Rafael Urdaneta was sent by the government to negotiate with the rebels, but took advantage of the circumstances to take charge of the rebellion, extended in the province of Socorro (18 of August) by the Venezuelan General Justo Briceño, in the province of Tunja (August 25) by the Venezuelan Colonel Pedro Mares, and in Honda and Mariquita by Colonel Joaquin Posada. Also, in Cartagena and Mompós the military had been pronounced against the exalted faction that accompanied the Mosquera Administration ". Martínez Garnica, Armando. La agenda de Colombia, 1819-1831 (Bucaramanga: Universidad Industrial de Santander, 2008) Volume I. 123.

[52] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas... Letter 2,300. In this extensive letter to Urdaneta, written on November 4 in Soledad, a few days before his departure for Barranquilla, Bolivar for the first time fully exposes all his concerns and reflects on the events of the coup showing his concern for legitimacy.

 

[53] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas…Letter 2,300.

[54] Simón Bolívar, Doctrina de El Libertador, 274. Letter from Barranquilla, 9 November 1830, to Juan José Flóres.

[55] Simón Bolívar, Doctrina de El Libertador, 275.

[56] Simón Bolívar, Doctrina de El Libertador, 276.

[57] Bolívar, Rosendo. Pensamiento político de Simón Bolívar. In Revista venezolana de Ciencia Política, Number 27, Caracas, January-June 2005. P. 135

[58] BOLÍVAR, Simón: 1947 " Obras completas. Cartas del Libertador comprendidas en el period 1799 al 8 diciembre 1830, testamento, proclamas y discursos. " (Vicente Lecuna, compiler). La Habana: Editorial LEX (two volumes) Document 1433, to "Señor José Rafael Arboleda.” This letter is revealing as to the way in which Bolivar was seen within the state: it describes a union threatened by anarchy, treason and external enemies, which could only be saved by him, and does not hesitate to report: "either the republic is lost, or I am given immense authority."

[59]  The only proclamation of Bolivar on this fact is quite ambiguous. It dates from September 18th 1830 (Urdaneta took power on September 4th) and there, Bolivar only offers his services as a citizen and soldier, although later he states: "many of you call me to contribute to rid the Republic of the frightening dissolution that threatens it. I promise you, penetrated with the purest gratitude, to correspond, as far as my faculties allow, to the confidence with which you honor me. I offer you all my strength to cooperate in the meeting of the Colombian family, now immersed in the horrors of the civil war." So, Bolivar seems to join politics again, although it should be noted that he makes no effort to take on the presidency. Rather, he wants to act away from the great scenarios of power, taking care, above all, of his reputation. It was already noted how much he was frightened that he could be associated with Urdaneta´s coup. See: Simón Bolívar, Obras completas... Number 189 of the "Discursos y Proclamas" section.

[60]Simón Bolívar, Obras completas…Letter 2,268.

[61]Simón Bolívar, Obras completas…Letter 2,268.

[62] He acknowledges his ruse in a letter to Major General Pedro Alcántara Herrán. Simón Bolívar, Obras completas ... Letter 2,284.

[63] In particular also, in the correspondence of Bolivar, letters 2,282 (written in Turbaco on October 2, 1830 and addressed to Urdaneta), 2283 (to Justo Briceño, the same date, the same place as the previous one)

[64] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,280 to “Señor Estanislao Vergara”.

[65] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,317 to “Señor General Justo Briceño”.

[66]Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,283 to “Señor General Justo Briceño”.

[67] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,331 to “Señor General Pedro Briceño Méndez”.

[68] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas…Letter 2,269 to “Señor General P. Briceño Méndez”.

[69] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,269.

[70] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,269.

[71] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas…Letter 2,297 to “General Rafael Urdaneta”.

[72] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas... Letter 2,315. In this letter, addressed to Montilla, he has the job of second in command of the department of Magdalena, in which Montilla was prefect. In the context of the conflict to submit Riohacha, which seemed to try to join Venezuela, he writes: "This is my order, and they release Valdés.

[73] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas…Letter 2,305 to “General Rafael Urdaneta”.

[74] Letter to Bolívar 7 December 1830 in Archivo del Libertador.

[75] Letter to Bolívar 7 December 1830 in Archivo del Libertador.

[76] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas…Letter 2,305 to “General Rafael Urdaneta”.

[77] Letter to Bolívar 7 December 1830 in Archivo del Libertador.

[78] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas…Letter 2,287 to “General Rafael Urdaneta”.

[79] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,285 to “Señor prefecto de Antioquia”.

[80] Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,334 to “General Rafael Urdaneta”.

[81]Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,313 to “General Rafael Urdaneta”

[82]Simón Bolívar, Obras completas… Letter 2,291.

[83] Letter to Bolívar, 7 December 1830, in Archivo del Libertador.

[84]Letter to Bolívar, 7 de December 1830, in Archivo del Libertador.

[85] Jaksic, Iván. “La Republica del orden: Simón Bolívar, Andrés Bello y las transformaciones del pensamiento político de la independencia.” In Historia, Vol.36, Santiago de Chile, (2003): 209