Dialegesthai and self-reflection: two perspectives of Arendt’s conception of thinking

Abstract

I propose that the Arendtian faculty of thought can be understood from
two perspectives: as dialegesthai and as self-reflection, but in this, through
the exercise of narrative conscience, enhances the preventive character
against evil. For this I divide the text into four moments. First, I expose
the three conceptual presuppositions of the thesis: the banality of evil, ‘the
two-in-one’ and moral behavior. In the second moment, I present Arendt´s
faculty of thinking as a discursive faculty, characterized from the similes
of Socrates and her interpretation of Plato’s Socratic Dialogues. In the
third moment, I present the ability to think as self-reflection, characterized
by the activity of narrative conscience. Returning to the difference in the
expression of language between dialegesthai and self-reflection, I hightligh
the importance of narration as an activity of self-conscience, and I show the
direct relationship of this narrative activity with moral behavior.