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Vol. 41 Núm. 73 (2022)

Teoría económica

Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental

https://doi.org/10.19053/01203053.v41.n73.2022.13496

Publicado 2022-02-22

  • Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia
    • ,
  • Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérez

Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia
Universidad Industrial de Santander

Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérez
Universidad EAFIT

Resumen

Thomas Schelling es uno de los grandes referentes en teoría de juegos y negociación, pues ha sido reconocido como un pionero al proponer los conceptos y sentar las bases de los modelos formales, basado siempre en la observación y el contraste empírico. Su enfoque sobre la comunicación, las jugadas estratégicas y el compromiso permite entender las ventajas, en términos de poder de negociación, de anunciar públicamente que la decisión ya está tomada, incluso cuando el mensaje es simple palabrería. Tomando este punto de partida, este artículo se centra en cómo la economía experimental ha permitido ampliar y afinar sus propuestas originales. Es posible clasificar esta literatura en tres vertientes: 1) comunicación no vinculante, 2) utilización de jugadas estratégicas, 3) credibilidad y compromiso. Entre los hallazgos se resalta que la comunicación es un mecanismo útil para transmitir información privada y, por lo tanto, afecta las creencias y el comportamiento de los negociadores. Por su parte, las jugadas estratégicas cumplen el rol de transferir la ventaja del primer movimiento al segundo jugador. Por último, el sentido de justicia, el temor a los castigos y la reputación de los negociadores afectan la credibilidad de sus amenazas.

Palabras clave

Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación, teoría de la confrontación, amenazas, poder de negociación, resolución de conflictos, compromiso creíble

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Biografía del autor/a

Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérez

Economista UIS. Asistente de investigación en el Grupo de Investigaciones Económicas y Financieras de la Universidad EAFIT

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