The world’s existence
Abstract
The article does not ask the question whether the world exists, but rather questions the meaning of being of the world from Husserl. It explores, from the thought of Patočka and, by difference with Husserl, the possibility of a non-ideal donation of the world which makes it possible to put into question the neorealist approach to the world's existence. It shows the conflict at work in the Husserl of the Ideen 1 between the phenomenology of perception and the phenomenology of reason and asserts the possibility of a chaotic dimension of the world, which is irreducible to a pure cosmos. This conflict proceeds from the intuitionist conception of evidence in Husserl, which opens the way to an alternative: a non-intuitive donation of the world. This thesis, which is inspired by the Merleau-Pontyan conception of the infinite, allows criticizing the realist perspective and asserting the new proposal of an arch-realism of the world.
Keywords
Husserl, world, Patočka, realism
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