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Vol. 38 Núm. 67 (2019)

Política económica

Efectos de los anuncios de política monetaria y la credibilidad sobre las expectativas de inflación: evidencia para Colombia

https://doi.org/10.19053/01203053.v38.n67.2019.7912

Publicado 2019-02-07

  • Juan Camilo Galvis Ciro
    • ,
  • Juan Camilo Anzoategui-Zapata

Juan Camilo Galvis Ciro
Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana.

Juan Camilo Anzoategui-Zapata
Universidad Autónoma Latinoamericana

Resumen

Este documento analiza los efectos de los anuncios del banco central sobre las expectativas de inflación para la economía colombiana. En particular, son estudiados los impactos de los pronunciamientos sobre la tasa de interés y los choques macroeconómicos sobre las tasas de inflación compensadas, dado el escenario de credibilidad de la política monetaria. La evidencia empírica es abordada por medio de un análisis de regresión con un modelo EGARCH para el período 2008-2016. Los resultados muestran que las expectativas de inflación responden a los anuncios de política. Además, los pronunciamientos fueron más efectivos en anclar las expectativas durante el período 2012-2016 y la mayor credibilidad de la política permitió que las expectativas fueran más estables frente a los choques externos.

Palabras clave

expectativas de inflación, bancos centrales, política monetaria, modelos econométricos

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Biografía del autor/a

Juan Camilo Galvis Ciro

Profesor Facultad de Economía.

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